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STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF ROAD AND RAILWAY HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY  
Amirfarrokh Iranitalab, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2018 
Advisor: Aemal Khattak 
Transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) in the United States (U.S.) 
constituted 22.8% of the total tonnage transported in 2012 with an estimated value of 
more than 2.3 billion dollars. As such, hazmat transportation is a significant economic 
activity in the U.S. However, hazmat transportation exposes people and environment to 
the infrequent but potentially severe consequences of incidents resulting in hazmat 
release. Trucks and trains carried 63.7% of the hazmat in the U.S. in 2012 and are the 
major foci of this dissertation. The main research objectives were 1) identification and 
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of 
hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for 
improving safety and; 2) quantifying components of risk of hazmat transportation for 
costs prediction, planning purposes, or short-term decision-making.  
A comprehensive review of literature, study framework, and available data led to 
identification of six foci for this dissertation: 1) estimation of hazmat release statistical 
models for railroad incidents; 2) estimation of rollover and hazmat release statistical 
models for Cargo Tank Truck (CTT) crashes; 3) analyzing hazmat-involved crashes at 
highway-rail grade crossings (HRGCs); 4) model-based and non-model-based methods 
for classifying hazmat release from trains and CTTs; 5) estimation of macroscopic-level 
  
statistical models for frequency and severity of rail-based crude oil release incidents; and 
6) estimation of statistical models for types and consequences of rail-based crude oil 
release incidents.  
Some of the findings of this research include: train derailments increased hazmat 
release probability more than other incident types; non-collision CTT crashes were more 
likely to result in rollovers, while rolling over increased the likelihood of hazmat release; 
at HRGCs, flashing signal lights were associated with lower hazmat release probability 
from trucks; increase in volume and distance of crude oil shipped from one state to 
another led to greater frequency and severity of incidents between the two states; and in 
rail-based crude oil release incidents, non-accident releases were associated with higher 
probability of gas dispersion, and lower probability of fire and explosion. Based on the 
results, recommendations regarding policies and countermeasures for improving safety 
are provided. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) exposes people and environment 
(e.g., air and water) to the infrequent but potentially severe consequences of incidents 
resulting in hazmat release. Such incidents, depending on the type of hazmat, quantity of 
release, environment and spatial/temporal characteristics of the incidents may impose 
monetary and non-monetary (e.g., pain and suffering of incident victims) costs upon the 
society. For example, in a 2015 train incident in Maryville, Tennessee release of 29,710 
gallons of Acrylonitrile led to fire, explosion, gas dispersion, water pollution, 
environmental damage, 195 injuries, evacuation of 5,000 people, and $7.7 million worth 
of damages (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Office of 
Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). Improving safety of hazmat transportation by 
decreasing the frequency of such incidents and alleviating their consequences from safety 
planning or shipper/carrier points of view benefits society. 
Substances are categorized as hazmat if they can cause injury, death and serious 
illness, or put a significant threat to the human population or the environment due to their 
chemical, physical or other characteristics (Lee 2014). The U.S. Department of 
Transportation defines hazmat as belonging to one of the nine hazard classes, presented 
in Table 1.1, along with the U.S. shipment amounts and ratios in 2012 according to the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 Commodity Flow Survey (the latest publicly available 
Commodity Flow Survey at this time) (U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2015). 
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Table 1.1 2012 Hazardous Material Shipment Characteristics by Hazard Class for the 
U.S. 
C
la
ss
 
Description 
Value Ton Ton-miles 
2012 
(million 
dollars) 
Percent 
of total 
2012 
(1000s) 
Percent 
of total 
2012 
(million
s) 
Percent 
of total 
1 Explosives 18397 0.79% 4045 0.16% 1012 0.33% 
2 Gases 125054 5.36% 164794 6.39% 33157 10.78% 
3 Flammable and 
combustible liquids 
2016681 86.39% 2203490 85.42% 204573 66.52% 
4 Flammable solids 5415 0.23% 11321 0.44% 5804 1.89% 
5 Oxidizers and 
Organic Peroxides 
7562 0.32% 12025 0.47% 5479 1.78% 
6 Toxic (Poisonous) 
Materials and 
Infectious Substances 
15196 0.65% 7612 0.30% 3607 1.17% 
7 Radioactive Materials 12288 0.53% NA NA 39 0.01% 
8 Corrosive Materials 75850 3.25% 125287 4.86% 37784 12.29% 
9 Miscellaneous 
Dangerous Goods 
57981 2.48% 51006 1.98% 16068 5.22% 
  Total 2334424 100.00% 2580153 100.00% 307523 100.00% 
(Source: 2012 Commodity Flow Survey (U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department 
of Commerce 2015)), NA: Not Available  
Hazmat transportation constitutes a considerable portion of freight transportation 
and is a significant and non-negligible economic activity in the U.S. According to the 
2012 Commodity Flow Survey, 2,580,153 thousand tons (307,524 million ton-miles) of 
hazmat was transported in 2012, with the approximate monetary value of $2,334,425,000. 
This constitutes 22.8% of the total tonnage and 10.4% of the total ton-miles of freight 
transportation. Demand for hazmat transportation in the U.S. has grown over the past 
decade, specifically due to transportation of crude oil. A 15.6% increase in the tonnage 
and 49.4% increase in the value of the transported hazmat since 2007 is reported in the 
2012 Commodity Flow Survey. These statistics justify the need to study the safety 
aspects of hazmat transportation in the U.S.  
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Hazmat is transported by different modes. Highway, rail, water, air and pipelines 
(and also multimodal, e.g. combination of truck and rail) are the most common modes of 
hazmat transportation. In 2012, highway accounted for 59.4% of the total tonnage (31.4 
% of the total ton-miles) and rail constituted 4.3% of the total tonnage (27.6% of the total 
ton-miles) of hazmat transportation in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Transportation and 
U.S. Department of Commerce 2015) (Figure 1.1). Also, according to Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) 2008-2017 ten-year incident 
summary reports (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
2018), hazmat-released highway incidents made up 87.6% of the total reported release 
incidents, 93.1% of fatalities, 72.2% of injuries, and 72.2% of the total damages 
(excluding pipelines). These values were 4.0%, 2.0%, 21.1% and 26.5% for rail incidents 
Figure 1.2). This information shows the importance of improving safe transportation of 
hazmat by trucks and trains. 
 
Figure 1.1 Distribution of Hazmat Transportation by Different Modes in the U.S. for 
Tons (left) and Ton-miles (right) of transportation (Source: 2012 Commodity Flow 
Survey) 
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of Different Transportation Modes in Number of Hazmat Release 
Incidents (top left), Fatalities (Top Right), Injuries (Bottom Left) and Total Damages 
(Bottom Right) due to Hazmat Release Incidents (Source: 2008-2017 PHMSA ten-year 
incident summary reports) 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This research is focused on safe transportation of hazmat by trucks and trains at 
microscopic and macroscopic study levels, and from safety planning and shipper/carrier 
points of views. Transportation of hazmat exposes society to the costly consequences of 
release of hazmat when incidents happen. Therefore, stakeholders, such as safety 
planning agencies and hazmat shipper/carriers, are interested in decreasing these costs by 
reducing the likelihood and possible consequences of hazmat release during 
transportation. At both levels of study, the main objectives are: 1) identification and 
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of 
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hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for 
improving safety and; 2) quantifying components of risk of hazmat transportation in a 
study unit (e.g. a link/route in a transportation network, an intersection, or a census tract) 
for costs prediction, planning purposes (e.g. hazmat network design), or short-term 
decision-making (e.g. routing). 
1.3 Study Framework 
In this study the major approaches of studying hazmat transportation and their 
objectives are categorized into microscopic and macroscopic levels. In the microscopic 
approaches, the unit of analysis is individual hazmat carrier incidents (e.g. trains, hazmat 
cars, or cargo tank trucks (CTTs)), and the potentially important variables are at 
microscopic-level (e.g. train length, tank car characteristics, or truck’s weight). In the 
macroscopic approaches the unit of analysis is geographic areas, segments of 
transportation infrastructure, or pairs of origin-designation (OD). In these studies, the 
explanatory variables are at the macroscopic level (e.g. population, traffic volume, or 
volume of hazmat movement among ODs). Figure 1.3 presents the objectives and tools of 
this framework for hazmat transportation safety analysis. 
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Figure 1.3 Outline of the objectives and tools for hazmat transportation safety analysis. 
Microscopic and macroscopic analyses provide useful information for 
stakeholders and they can be used in risk-based decision frameworks. In this study, risk 
of hazmat transportation is defined as equation 1.1.  
𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖𝑐𝑖 (1.1) 
In this equation, 𝑅𝑖 is the risk of hazmat transportation on transportation entity i (a 
road segment, an intersection, a route, etc.), 𝜋𝑖 is the probability of release of hazmat 
from train/truck on entity i, and 𝑐𝑖 is the cost of release of hazmat from train/truck on 
entity i. Depending on the type of study, an appropriate entity may be chosen. For 
example, network design problems are usually formulated as link-based, while routing 
problems may rely mostly on the hazmat transportation risk of routes. 
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Probability of release of hazmat and release costs are quantified using equations 
1.2 and 1.3. 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) × 𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.2) 
𝑐𝑖 = ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖(𝑘)
𝑘∈𝑆
 (1.3) 
In these equations 𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is the probability of occurrence of an incident on 
entity i (examples of incidents are train derailments or truck traffic crashes), 
𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is the conditional probability of release given an incident on entity 
i, 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖(𝑘) is the costs of type k as a result of hazmat release on entity i, and S is the set of 
all types of costs, S = {carrier damage, property damage, response, clean-up, injuries, 
fatalities, evacuation, transportation infrastructure closure}.  
In the above formulation of the hazmat transportation risk, 𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) has a 
macroscopic nature (defined as the frequency/rate of incident occurrence), while 
𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) and 𝑐𝑖 can be studied in a microscopic scale. Microscopic and 
macroscopic levels are introduced next, as individual types of study and also components 
of risk. 
1.3.1 Microscopic-Level Approach 
The main objectives of this approach are: 1) Policy-making and determination of 
countermeasures regarding safe transportation of hazmat: this approach is able to identify 
and quantify the impacts of microscopic-level variables on different components of risk 
of hazmat transportation. Such information enables governmental agencies to make 
policies to restrict and guide shippers/carriers towards fewer and less severe hazmat 
release incidents, and also enables shippers/carriers directly to determine 
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countermeasures that can make their operations safer and less costly. 2) Risk assessment: 
it involves calculation of probabilistic costs of hazmat transportation on segments of 
transportation network. Risk can be used in decision-making from both safety planning 
and shipper/carrier’s points of view. Network design and pricing for hazmat 
transportation, and emergency response planning are examples of government’s decision 
frameworks, while hazmat routing, mode choice, destination choice and facility location 
(in cases of existence of more than one alternative) are shipper/carrier’s concerns. 
1.3.1.1 Conditional Probability of Release 
In this research, different approaches for estimating 𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) for 
trucks and trains are proposed. The concept behind these approaches is estimating the 
probability of release of hazmat in an incident involving a hazmat-carrying truck/train, 
based on explanatory variables such as characteristics of truck/train, roadway/railroad, 
incident, and environment. The differences in the proposed approaches are based on the 
level of analysis, modeling techniques and how the variables are used. Different 
approaches for trucks and trains are as follows. 
The conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains can be analyzed at 
train-level and hazmat car-level. In the former, the unit of analysis is trains and the 
probability of a train release is of concern, while in the latter hazmat cars are the units of 
analysis and a hazmat car release’s probability is estimated. Equations 1.4 and 1.5 present 
these approaches, respectively. 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 = Φ(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.4) 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑐𝑎𝑟 = Φ(𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟 , 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.5) 
9 
 
In these equations, X shows the characteristics of its subscript. Some of the 
characteristics of incidents may depend on other explanatory variables (e.g. number of 
derailed/damaged cars may depend on train’s speed) and can be estimated accordingly, 
while some of them are not predictable at the microscopic level (e.g. type of incident) and 
may be taken in to account in the estimation of 𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
Conditional probability of release for hazmat-carrying vehicles, similar to trains, 
can be assumed to be a function of the explanatory variables (e.g. characteristics of 
trucks, road, environment, and crash). Equation 1.6 presents this approach. 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) = Φ(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘, 𝑋𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ) (1.6) 
Examples for 𝑋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ include number of vehicles involved in the crash and rolling 
over. According to literature (Douglas Behrens Pape 2012), in crashes of CTTs, one of 
the main highway hazmat carriers, rollovers are frequent, leading to hazmat release. 
While the number of vehicles involved in the crash is independent of the crash 
characteristics and may be predicted at the macroscopic level (similar to type of train 
incidents), rolling over can be modeled based on explanatory variables (similar to the 
number of railcars derailed/damaged). 
1.3.1.2 Costs 
Equation 1.3 showed that calculating costs of a hazmat release incident needs 
quantification of the eight members of set S. Each of these components are dependent on 
different factors, such as type of release (spillage and/or gas dispersion), consequences of 
release (fire, explosion, environmental damages, entering waterway), quantity of release, 
type of hazmat, mode of transportation, population living within a specified distance from 
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the location of incident, public/private properties located within a specified distance from 
the location of incident, type of environment (e.g. type of soil), and distance to waterway. 
These factors are also interdependent, for example probability of fire depends on the 
quantity released, type of hazmat and type of release.  
Quantification of some of these components can be based on statistical modeling. 
Equations 1.7 and 1.8 are examples of such approaches. It should be noted that, 
parameter estimation of these equations, along with the cost models, can provide useful 
information regarding policy- and decision-making.  
𝑃(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟,𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.7) 
𝑃(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟,𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.8) 
Examples for 𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 include type of hazmat, for 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 include quantity 
released and type of release (spillage and/or gas dispersion), for 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 include mode of 
transportation and their characteristics, and for 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 include weather. It should be 
noted that type of release is dependent on explanatory variables, itself and can be 
expressed as equation 1.9. 
𝑃(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡, 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟,𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) (1.9) 
1.3.2 Macroscopic-Level Approach 
In the macroscopic-level approaches, the unit of study can be a geographic area 
(e.g. state, county, urban area), or pairs of ODs (e.g. among counties of a state). The main 
objectives of the macroscopic-level study of hazmat-related incidents are: 1) policy-
making for decreasing hazmat transportation costs due to releases, by identifying and 
quantifying the macroscopic factors that affect these costs, such as hazmat production, 
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consumption, infrastructure, policies and restrictions. 2) prediction of frequency and costs 
of hazmat transportation incidents in the future for planning, decision-making, and 
budget allocation. 
1.3.2.1 Probability of Incident Occurrence 
𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is commonly estimated as an annual incident frequency or rate (e.g. 
incidents per mile, incidents per ton-mile, or incidents per car-mile) multiplied by 
distance or the exposure measure of the transportation entity. Examples of such 
approaches can be found in (Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1990, 1993; Qiao, Keren, and 
Mannan 2009). Besides measures for traffic, incident rates are usually estimated based on 
characteristics of highway/rail, land-use characteristics and driving behavior. Incident 
frequency/rate can solely be the subject of a macroscopic study with the purpose of 
policy/countermeasure identification towards decreasing hazmat incident frequency/rates. 
An example is provided here to avoid confusion about the definitions of probability, 
frequency and rate in this context: if 5 derailments occur on a segment of a railroad per 
year and 3500 trains pass that segment every year, then: the frequency is 5 incidents per 
year; the rate of incidents is 5/3500 = 0.0014 crashes per train passage; if the traffic 
increases to 7000 trains in a year, we expect 7500*0.0014 = 10 crashes in that year; and 
the probability of a derailment in one passage of a train in that segment is 0.14%. 
Area-based approaches may be used in macroscopic hazmat transportation safety 
analysis. However, in this research an OD-based macroscopic approach is considered. In 
this approach, frequency and costs of hazmat-related incidents among pairs of ODs in the 
area under study is modeled based on a set of macroscopic variables. The advantage of 
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OD-based approaches, as opposed to area-based approaches, is that variables such as 
hazmat traffic between the OD pairs, distance of transportation, and availability of modes 
of transportation can be taken into account. This approach can be formulated as equations 
1.10 and 1.11. 
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗 = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗, 𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗, 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗) 
(1.10) 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗, 𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗, 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗) 
(1.11) 
In these equations, 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 are frequency and costs of hazmat-related 
incidents between OD pair i and j, respectively and X represents different characteristics 
between OD pair (i, j). The total costs of the area under study will be ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗
𝑛
𝑖 , in which 
n is the number of sub-areas. 
1.4 Research Foci 
Based on the study framework of section 1.3, previous studies (in chapter 2) and 
available data, six areas were identified as the foci for this dissertation.  
The conditional probability of hazmat release from a hazmat-carrying train in a 
train incident or from a hazmat-carrying truck in a traffic crash is the subject of four of 
these foci. In the first focus, conditional hazmat release statistical models were estimated 
at train and car level for railroad incidents. The second focus estimated rollover and 
hazmat release statistical models for CTT crashes. In the third focus, crashes at highway-
rail grade crossings (HRGCs) were analyzed and separate hazmat release statistical 
models were estimated for truck-train crashes where at least one of the two were carrying 
hazmat. The first three foci used statistical model-based approaches for modeling hazmat 
release with an emphasis on model interpretation for countermeasure and policy 
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determination (while there was a minor emphasis on estimation of the release 
probability). The fourth focus used model-based and non-model-based classification and 
regression methods for classifying hazmat release and estimating hazmat release 
probability (along with a few other incident/crash outcomes) from trains and CTTs.  
Transportation of crude oil by rail has increased significantly in the U.S. in the 
past decade. The other two foci of this dissertation (fifth and sixth) are on rail 
transportation of crude oil in the U.S. The fifth focus developed OD-based macroscopic-
level statistical models to identify and quantify the effects of volumes and distances of 
crude oil movement and other macroscopic variables on the frequency and aggregate 
measures for severity of crude oil release incidents. The sixth focus identified and 
quantified the effects of crude oil, tank car and incident characteristics on types and 
consequences of crude oil release, using statistical models. 
1.5 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation consists of ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study 
background, states the research problem, outlines the study framework, lists the six foci 
of the dissertation and ends with introducing the structure of the manuscript. Chapter 2 
presents a comprehensive literature review on the general topic of hazmat transportation 
safety. Chapter 3 introduces the statistical models and approaches that were used in this 
research. Chapter 4 to 9 each presents one of the six foci of the dissertation, including 
problem statement, methods, additional literature review, data description, modeling 
results and conclusions for each focus. Chapter 10 presents summary, general 
conclusions and recommendations for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Safe transportation of hazmat has been a topic of research for decades. While the 
studies include a large variety of topics and approaches, in this literature review they are 
categorized into three major sets: studies that used operations research (optimization) as 
their main tool towards hazmat transportation safety operations; studies that are focused 
on assessment and quantification of risk of hazmat transportation; and studies that 
collected hazmat incident data from different sources and provided insightful descriptive 
statistics. This chapter presents general literature review, while chapters 4 to 9 present 
additional literature review wherever needed.   
2.2 Operations Research 
Operations research-based approaches have been used in the hazmat 
transportation literature, frequently. These approaches are proposed from both the safety 
planning and shipper/carrier points of view. Some of the methods from the safety 
planning point of view include: hazmat transportation network design (Verter and Kara 
2008; Bianco, Caramia, and Giordani 2009; Erkut and Alp 2007; Kara and Verter 2004) 
which involves finding an optimum subset of the transportation network links to close 
down to the hazmat-carrying vehicles; transportation network pricing (Marcotte et al. 
2009; Wang et al. 2012) that is the assignment of specific tolls to the transportation 
network links for the vehicles that carry hazmat; and emergency response planning 
(Hamouda 2004; Zografos and Androutsopoulos 2008) that includes decisions regarding 
location, routing and operations of emergency response units. Studies from the 
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shipper/carrier’s point of view focus on: hazmat transportation routing (List et al. 1991; 
Abkowitz and Cheng 1988; Zografos and Androutsopoulos 2008; Romero, Nozick, and 
Xu 2016) which is the consideration of risk in routing caused by the hazmat on-board, 
besides the usual economic concerns in freight routing; mode choice (Bagheri, Verma, 
and Verter 2014) that involves the choice of the safest mode of transportation for hazmat; 
and facility location (Romero, Nozick, and Xu 2016), which is the identification of 
proper locations for hazmat storage, loading, unloading, etc. 
Glickman et al. proposed a routing strategy for hazmat-carrying trains that 
accounts for incident risk from a macroscopic perspective. They quantified rail 
transportation risk by estimating the expected population that resides within a given 
radius of the location of a probable train incident and then used a weighted combination 
of cost and risk to generate alternate routes. The results showed in some cases the 
alternate routes achieved significantly lower risk measures than the practical routes at a 
small incremental cost (Glickman, Erkut, and Zschocke 2007).  
Some studies focused on manifest trains (trains carrying both regular and hazmat 
freight). Verma presented a bi-objective optimization model for planning and managing 
railroad transportation of hazmat by determining the best routing plan for railcars, with 
hazmat and regular freight, and the number of trains of each type required to meet the 
given set of demand. The two minimization objectives were risk and costs (Verma 2009). 
Verma et al. also, proposed a bi-objective optimization problem for tactical planning of 
railroad hazmat transportation (short-term planning for a railroad company with 
predetermined amount of hazmat and regular freight to move). This formulation 
16 
 
determines the routes to be utilized for each shipment, the yard activities, and the number 
of trains needed, while minimizing transportation cost and risk. Risk was defined based 
on population exposure (Verma, Verter, and Gendreau 2011). 
Consistency between trucks and trains in intermodal hazmat transportation has 
been the subject of some studies. Verma and Verter defined rail–truck intermodal 
transportation of hazmat as inbound drayage (the transportation activity between the 
shipper and the origin rail terminal by truck), rail haul, and outbound drayage (between 
the destination rail terminal and the receiver by truck). They formulated a bi-objective 
optimization model to plan and manage intermodal shipments by minimizing 
transportation costs and population exposure to hazmat (Verma and Verter 2010). 
Assadipour et al. proposed a bi-objective optimization framework for planning rail–truck 
intermodal hazmat shipments, considering terminal equipment capacity and congestion. 
Risk and transportation costs were minimized, while satisfying the demand on-time. The 
results showed that congestion at the terminals is a potential source of public risk and 
could be a significant source if intermodal terminals are close to population centers. They 
proposed several approaches for reducing this congestion (Assadipour, Ke, and Verma 
2015). 
Some researchers used multi-objective optimization formulation of hazmat 
transportation to consider more than one aspect for optimality. Liu et al. formulated 
hazmat risk management as a multi-attribute decision analysis problem and estimated a 
negative binomial regression model to estimate car derailment probability, following the 
use of a pareto-optimality technique to determine the lowest risk that can be achieved at a 
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specific level of investment. They analyzed two types of risk reduction strategies (broken 
rail prevention and tank car safety design enhancement) and their optimal combination 
under a budget constraint (Liu, Saat, and Barkan 2013). Zografos and Androutsopoulos 
presented a decision support system for hazmat routing considering travel time, risk and 
evacuation implications, while coordinating the emergency response deployment 
decisions with the hazmat routes. The proposed system worked towards alternative 
hazmat routing, in terms of cost and risk minimization, specification of locations for first-
response emergency service units to achieve on-time response to accidents, and 
determination of evacuation paths from the impacted area to shelters (Zografos and 
Androutsopoulos 2008). 
2.3 Risk Assessment 
While quantifying risk of hazmat transportation for segments of the transportation 
systems is necessary in risk-based approaches to hazmat safety (such as in the operations 
research approaches mentioned earlier), it also may provide useful operational 
information. Risk of hazmat transportation is defined generally as the multiplication of 
probability of occurrence of an incident leading to hazmat release and a measure of 
consequences of such a release. Most of these definitions have some components in 
common and many studies focused on quantifying these components. Examples of these 
components include: hazmat-related incident rates in the transportation infrastructure 
(Anderson and Barkan 2004; Liu, Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017); probability of release 
given an incident (Liu, Saat, and Barkan 2014; Treichel et al. 2006); and the release 
consequences (Saat et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2013). 
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A general study by Nayak et al. presented a set of methods for quantifying risk 
components in hazmat rail transportation. This included development of measures for 
accident rates based on track class, severity of an accident based on accident speed and 
the probability and mean amount of release based on accident speed. Finally, a method to 
estimate the impacts of hazmat release on people and property was proposed in this study 
(Nayak et al. 1983). 
Incident rates per unit of transportation infrastructure (e.g. roadway segment, rail 
segment, route, etc.) as a component of hazmat transportation risk is studied. Harwood et 
al. calculated truck accident rates and hazmat-released truck accident probability based 
on a combination of federal and state truck accident databases. They found area type 
(urban/rural), roadway type (two-lane, multilane undivided/divided, and freeway), and 
truck ADT effective on accident rates, and type of incident (collision/non-collision, 
single/multiple vehicle, run-off/overturn, etc.) effective on hazmat release probability 
(Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1993). Qiao et al. developed hazmat transportation incident 
frequency models for trucks using negative binomial and fuzzy logic. The former was 
used to account for route-dependent variables (population, number of lanes, and weather) 
and the latter took into account route-independent variables (truck configuration, 
container capacity, and driver experience). They recommended the use of multiple data 
sources, such as The Department of Public Safety (DPS) accident databases and the 
Commodity Flow Survey (Qiao, Keren, and Mannan 2009). 
Probability of hazmat release given a hazmat-carrying truck/train incident is 
another important component of hazmat transportation risk. Treichel et al. estimated 
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probabilities of lading loss (given derailment) for a variety of tank car specifications, 
using logistic regression models. Head shield type, head thickness, tank insulation, shell 
thickness, tank car pressure and yard/mainline affected probability of release from head, 
shell, top fittings, and bottom fittings of tank cars. They also investigated effects of train 
speed on lading loss probability and the distribution of quantities of lading lost given a 
release (Treichel et al. 2006). 
Another component of the hazmat transportation risk may be different measures 
for severity of incidents, which may be useful in predicting the consequences of release. 
One of these severity measures for trains is the number of released tank cars. Liu and 
Barkan estimated a generalized probabilistic model for the number of tank cars releasing 
hazardous materials in a train derailment. They considered train length, derailment speed, 
incident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a 
train and tank car safety design as the potentially effective factors (Liu, Saat, and Barkan 
2014). Liu and Hong estimated the number of tank cars released based on the number of 
tank cars derailed. They used a binomial model and a generalized binomial model. The 
former considers the probability of release from a tank car independent of the number of 
the other released tank cars, while the latter takes into account interdependence of 
released tank cars in a train incident. The results showed a better estimation by the 
generalized binomial model, indicating the presence of the interdependence (Liu and 
Hong 2015).  
The number of released tank cars in an incident is a function of the number of 
derailed cars, as was shown in (Liu and Hong 2015). Therefore, some studies worked on 
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modeling the number of derailed cars. Liu et al. used negative binomial models for the 
number of derailed tank cars based on track class, method of operation and annual traffic 
density. The latter variable was obtained from class 1 railroad companies, while the 
others were from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data. Higher track classes, 
signaled operations and larger annual traffic density were associated with lower sizes of 
derailment (Liu, Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017). Liu et al. analyzed derailments, as the 
most common type of freight-train accidents in the United States. Zero-truncated negative 
binomial regression model was developed to estimate the conditional mean of train 
derailment size. Recognizing that the mean is not the only statistic describing data 
distribution, a quantile regression model was also developed to estimate derailment size 
at different quantiles. Combining the two models resulted in a better understanding of 
train derailment severity distribution (Liu et al. 2013). 
The consequences of release of hazmat and the subsequent costs is another major 
component of risk of hazmat transportation. These costs are comprised of carrier/property 
damage, response/clean-up costs, injuries/fatalities, environmental damages and 
evacuation. Some studies worked on quantifying these costs. Saat et al. proposed a 
quantitative environmental risk analysis of rail transportation for a group of chemicals. 
They developed probabilistic estimates of exposure to different spill scenarios. The 
authors considered the clean-up cost based on route-specific probability distributions of 
soil type and depth to groundwater, traffic volume, car accident rate, and car safety 
features (Saat et al. 2014). Dennis quantified the monetary costs of unit exposure of 
hazmat transportation by trains, considering type of hazmat based on environmental and 
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safety hazard. The costs that were accounted for included equipment damage, lading loss, 
way and structures damage, signal damage, wrecking expenses, environmental costs, and 
others. The data was collected through a survey of railroads in the U.S. (Dennis 1996). 
Clark and Besterfield-Sacre proposed a data-driven quantitative risk assessment approach 
during unloading. They used latent class analysis, loglinear modeling and Bayesian 
networking as their data analysis tools. Consequences of hazmat release were considered 
as dollar loss and release quantity and the most influential variables on these two 
measures were related to the failure of the container (Clark and Besterfield-Sacre 2009). 
Verma developed a risk assessment methodology for hazmat rail transportation 
based on the characteristics of trains and accidents, using Bayes Theorem and Logical 
Diagrams. The results of implementing the method on a case study found transportation 
risk a function of train length, train-decile position of the hazmat railcar, and the number 
of intermediate handling. The front of the train was found riskier, and that 7–9th train-
deciles were the most appropriate for moving hazmat railcars for freight-trains of any 
length. Furthermore, it was concluded that rail-track risk can be reduced by strategically 
distributing hazmat railcars in the train-consist (Verma 2011). 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics could provide preliminary useful insight towards hazmat 
release incidents. Oggero et al. investigated 1932 incidents reported from the beginning 
of the 20th century to July 2004 around the world that involved the transportation of 
hazmat by road and rail. More than half of the incidents happened on roads (63%). The 
most frequent type of accidents were releases (78%), followed by fires (28%), explosions 
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(14%) and gas clouds (6%). More than half of the accidents did not cause any fatalities. 
Among fatal incidents the number of deaths was between 1 and 10, frequently. Given the 
occurrence of an incident, the consequences were more severe on average in train 
incidents, rather than trucks. Evacuations were rare, however the number of people 
evacuated was mostly between 101 and 1000 (29%), followed by the class of between 1 
and 10 (24%) (Oggero et al. 2006). Ambituuni prepared descriptive statistics of 2318 
accidents involving truck tankers carrying crude oil from 2007 to 2012 in Nigeria. The 
results showed 79% of the accidents were caused by human factors. More than 70% of 
the accidents resulted in loss of containment leading to spills, fires and explosions. 81% 
of the accidents resulted in either injuries, fatalities or both. About $7 million was 
estimated as the average cost per accident (Ambituuni, Amezaga, and Werner 2015). 
2.5 Summary 
Based on the literature review, areas that require more research attention are 
identified. Only one major study was found that focused on conditional probability of 
hazmat release given an incident (Treichel et al. 2006), which was a car-level modeling 
for trains. This probability needs to be studied at other levels considering more 
comprehensive variables for trains, and also for trucks. Hazmat-carrying CTTs’ crash 
data is not analyzed sufficiently, based on this review, while they are responsible for a 
significant portion of hazmat release incidents in the U.S. Although a large number of 
studies focused on quantifying components of hazmat transportation risk, they rarely 
have evaluated the accuracy of these quantifications. While model-based statistical 
approaches are useful in measuring the impacts of factors on risk components, they may 
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not be necessarily good predictors for these quantifications. So, non-model-based 
methods may provide better estimates, and this needs to be evaluated. Moreover, trucks 
and trains may involve in collisions in highway and railroad grade crossings (HRGC), 
leading to hazmat release, given either of them carrying hazmat. Such incidents are not 
investigated in the literature. 
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents an introduction to the statistical models and other methods 
used in different sections of this research. While this chapter presents general information 
about each method, the way they are utilized, and necessary additional explanations are 
provided in chapters 4 through 9, as needed.  
3.1 Logistic Regression and Multinomial Regression 
Logistic regression models, a common method for modeling binary responses, are 
a type of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) with the Bernoulli distribution assumption 
for the response variables and cumulative density function of a logistic probability 
function as the link function (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011). 
Assuming outcomes of the binary response as success and failure, in logistic regression 
the probability of success (𝜋𝑖) is modeled based a set of explanatory variables. In this 
study, 𝜋𝑖 is the conditional probability of hazmat release in the i
th train incident or vehicle 
crash (hazmat release is replaced by other binary response variables in some sections of 
this dissertation). If 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 are p explanatory variables measured on the i
th 
observation, in the logistic regression model 𝜋𝑖 is defined as in equation 2.1. 
𝜋𝑖 =
exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝)
1 + exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝)
 (2.1) 
In this equation, 𝛽0, … , 𝛽𝑝 are the logistic regression parameters or coefficients of 
the explanatory variables that are estimated based on the data. Equation 2.2 is another 
way to state logistic regression. The left side of equation 2.2 is the natural logarithm for 
the odds of success (hazmat release) and the right side is a linear combination of the 
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coefficients with the explanatory variables, often referred to as linear predictors. This 
transformation of 𝜋𝑖 is referred to as the logit transformation (Bilder and Loughin 2014).  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜋𝑖
1 − 𝜋𝑖
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 (2.2) 
In this study, Maximum Likelihood (ML), a common estimation approach for 
logistic regression, was replaced by the bias-reduction method developed by Firth (Firth 
1993) (except where noted), as bias was detected in the outcome of ML estimation 
(abnormally large estimated standard errors for some of the coefficients (Bilder and 
Loughin 2014)). The bias could be due to complete or quasi separation (an explanatory 
variable separates the data between 0 and 1 for the response variable), as a result of rarity 
of cases of either outcome in the response variables. 
In case of multi-category response variables (types and consequences of crude oil 
release in this dissertation), a popular model is multinomial regression (also known as 
multinomial logit model or baseline-category logit model), which is developed by 
selecting one response category as the base level and forming the odds of the remaining 
J-1 categories against the base level (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Assuming category 1 as 
the base level, multinomial regression relates a set of explanatory variables to each log-
odds by equation 2.3 for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜋𝑗
𝜋1
) = 𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 (2.3) 
The probabilities will then be defined as equations 2.4 and 2.5 for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽.  
𝜋1 =
1
1 + ∑ exp (𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝)
𝐽
𝑗=2
 (2.4) 
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𝜋𝑗 =
exp (𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝)
1 + ∑ exp (𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝)
𝐽
𝑗=2
 (2.5) 
Similar reasons, as in logistic regression, cause bias in ML estimates for 
multinomial regression. The bias-reduction method developed by Firth (Firth 1993) and 
adapted to the multinomial case by Kosmidis and Firth (Kosmidis and Firth 2011) is one 
solution for this issue and was utilized in this study due to detection of signs of bias in the 
ML-estimated models.  
3.2 Mixed Logistic Regression 
A logistic regression assumes uncorrelated observations in the dataset. However, 
single-level or multi-level grouping might exist in a dataset causing correlation among 
the observations. In the hazmat release models for trains, a single-level grouping existed 
in the train-level models, while a two-level grouping was present in the car-level models. 
Neglecting these correlations could result in smaller estimated variances, leading to 
model misinterpretation (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Generalized Linear Mixed Models 
(GLMMs) relax the uncorrelated observations assumption by inclusion of random effects 
in models. In case of this study, with binary response and Bernoulli distribution 
assumption, mixed logistic regression as a class of GLMM, were estimated. In a mixed 
logistic regression, equation 2.2 turns into equation 2.6. In this equation, 𝑏𝑗𝑖s are the 
random parameters (for 𝑗 = 0 to p) and are assumed to follow a normal distribution with 
mean of 0 and unknown variance (which will be estimated). 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜋𝑖
1 − 𝜋𝑖
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏0𝑖 + 𝑏1i𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑝 
(2.6) 
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There are different methods for estimation of mixed logistic regression through 
ML, including penalized quasi-likelihood, Laplace approximation and Gaussian 
quadrature (Bilder and Loughin 2014). The latter one was used in this study. 
3.3 Poisson Regression and Mixed-effects Negative Binomial Regression 
Count-response models were estimated in several cases in this dissertation, 
including the number of railcars damaged/derailed on a train, the OD-based frequency of 
crude oil release incidents and the number of crude oil released tank cars. Poisson 
regression was an appropriate approach for the former case, while Mixed-effects 
Negative Binomial Regression was used in the other two. 
For a count response variable 𝑌𝑖 and p explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 for the i
th 
observation, assuming a Poisson distribution with mean 𝜇𝑖 for 𝑌𝑖, where 𝜇𝑖 = exp (𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝), results in the Poisson regression model. It is a GLM with Poisson 
random component, a linear systematic component 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 and 
logarithmic link function (Bilder and Loughin 2014). These models do not account for 
overdispersion, meaning there is more variability to the counts than what the models 
assume there is (Cox 1983). Negative Binomial Regression (NBR) (also known as 
negative binomial loglinear models) is often used as an alternative to the Poisson 
regression to account for overdispersion. NBRs assume a loglinear relation between the 
count response variable and the explanatory variables.  
Let 𝑉1, 𝑉2, …, 𝑉𝑛 denote an independent and identically distributed sample of unit 
mean gamma random variables with shape parameter 𝛼; that is 𝑓(𝑣1) ∝
𝑣1
𝛼−1𝑒−𝛼𝑣1𝐼(𝑣1 > 0). Suppose the i
th count 𝑌𝑖 has a Poisson distribution with mean 𝑣𝑖𝜇𝑖 
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conditional on 𝑣𝑖, therefore 𝑌𝑖|𝑣𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑣𝑖𝜇𝑖). The counts are then marginally 
independent negative binomial variables with mass functions given by equation 2.7, 
where 𝑦 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … } (Booth et al. 2003). 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦; 𝛼, 𝜇𝑖) =
Γ(y + 𝛼)
Γ(𝛼)𝑦!
(
𝛼
𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼
)
𝛼
(
𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼
)
𝑦
 (2.7) 
If 𝜇𝑖 is related to a set of explanatory variables, denoted by vector 𝒙𝑖, while 𝛽0 
and 𝜷 are the model constant and the vector of model coefficients, respectively, the NBR 
loglinear equation will be as equation 2.8. 
log(𝜇𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖′𝜷 or 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑒
𝛽0+𝒙𝑖′𝜷 (2.8) 
Similar to the mixed logistic regression, a potential three-level correlation among 
the observations as a result of presence of grouping among them was possible. One way 
to account for this possible multilevel grouping was addition of random effects to the 
above NBR (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Booth et al. 2003), resulting in Mixed-effects 
Negative Binomial Regression (MNBR), as in equation 2.9. 
log(𝜇𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖′𝜷 + 𝑏0 + 𝒙𝒊′𝒃 or 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑒
𝛽0+𝒙𝑖′𝜷+𝑏0+𝒙𝒊′𝒃 (2.9) 
In this equation, 𝑏0 is the random parameter for the model constant and it is 
assumed to have a Normal distribution with mean 0 and unknown variance. 𝒃 is the 
vector of random parameters for some or all of the explanatory variables’ coefficients, 
and they are also assumed to follow Normal distributions with mean 0 and unknown 
variances. These variances are estimated along with the fixed effects. Similar to mixed 
logistic regression, at least three methods are available for estimating MNBR through 
ML, and Gaussian quadrature was used in this study. 
3.4 Mixed-effects Ordered Logit Models 
29 
 
As measures of aggregate severity of crude oil release incidents, quantity released 
and total costs of release of crude oil were categorized as ordinal categorical response 
variables. Ordered Logit Models (OLM), also known as cumulative logit models or 
proportional odds models, is a tool for modeling ordinal categorical response variables on 
a set of explanatory variables, through modeling cumulative probabilities based on the 
category ordering. If the probability of category i of the J categories of the response 
variable is 𝜋𝑖, then cumulative probability for category j of Y is 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗) = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 +
⋯ + 𝜋𝑗  and 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝐽) = 1. The log-odds of cumulative probabilities is, then, as equation 
2.10 (Bilder and Loughin 2014). 
log (
𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = log (
𝜋1 + ⋯ + 𝜋𝑗
𝜋𝑗+1 + ⋯ + 𝜋𝐽
) (2.10) 
OLM assumes this log-odds of cumulative probabilities is a linear function of 
explanatory variables and also the slope of this relationship is the same regardless of the 
category j (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011). The OLM model is stated 
as equation 2.11. 
log (
𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = 𝛽𝑗0 − 𝒙𝑖′𝜷 (2.11) 
In this equation, vector 𝒙𝑖 is a set of explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑗0 is the model 
constant for the response category j and 𝜷 is the vector of model coefficients.  
Similar to the MNBR model, to address grouping by inclusion of random effects in the 
OLM models, mixed-effects ordered logit models (MOLM) are used. Equation 2.12 
shows MOLM. In this equation 𝑏0 and 𝒃 are defined as in equation 2.9 (Christensen 
2011). 
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log (
𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = 𝛽𝑗0 − 𝒙𝑖
′𝜷 + 𝑏0 − 𝒙𝒊′𝒃 (2.12) 
Among the three methods for ML estimation of MOLM (similar methods as in 
logistic regression and MNBR), Laplace approximation was used in this study. 
3.5 Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
The idea behind BMA is to find an average for all the models, using different 
subsets of the set of explanatory variables which have close values of the variable 
selection criteria (instead of choosing one model as the best model) to account for the 
uncertainty in finding the best model (since a slight change in the data can result in 
selection of a different “best” model) (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Bayesian model 
averaging uses Bayesian theory to compute the probability that each possible model is the 
correct model (Hoeting et al. 1999). 
Suppose M models are estimated, where M is the total number of possible models 
(𝑀 = 2𝑝). If Bayesian Information Criteria (a model selection criteria where lower 
values indicate better models) for model m is 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, the smallest value for 
BIC among all models is 𝐵𝐼𝐶0, and ∆𝑚= 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚 − 𝐵𝐼𝐶0 ≥ 0, then assuming all models 
equally likely before estimation, the estimated probability that model m is correct, 𝜏𝑚, is 
as equation 2.13. 
?̂?𝑚 =
exp (−
1
2 ∆𝑚)
∑ exp (−
1
2 ∆𝑚)
𝑀
𝑎=1
 (2.13) 
If 𝜃 is the parameter being estimated, such as the logistic regression parameters, 
its estimate in model m is denoted by 𝜃𝑚, and the corresponding variance is 𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝜃𝑚), 
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then the model-averaged estimate of the parameter is as equation 2.14 and its variance is 
as in equation 2.15 (Bilder and Loughin 2014).  
𝜃𝑀𝐴 = ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝜃𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
 (2.14) 
𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝜃𝑀𝐴) = ∑ ?̂?𝑚[(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑀𝐴)
2 +
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝜃𝑚)] (2.15) 
Confidence intervals (CI) can be constructed for the model-averaged parameters 
based on 𝜃𝑀𝐴 and 𝑉𝑎?̂?(?̂?𝑀𝐴). BMA results in non-zero estimates of all the parameters, 
but the explanatory variables that are truly unimportant are less likely to appear in models 
with high probability, so 𝜃𝑀𝐴 will be closer to 0 (Bilder and Loughin 2014). In this study, 
BMA was used in the CTT crash analysis. Also, Corrected Akaike Information Criteria 
(AICc) was used in the BMA procedure, instead of BIC, as AICc, relative to BIC, is 
inclined towards models with larger number of explanatory variables, which was 
desirable in this study. 
3.6 Interpretation Tools for Statistical Models 
Quantifying the effects of explanatory variables on response variables can be 
done in different ways, depending on the model and purpose. In this dissertation, Odds 
Ratios (OR) were used for binary, multi-category and ordinal response models, while 
Percentage Change (PC) was utilized for the count-response models. 
Odds for binary response models is defined as the division of probability of 
hazmat release by probability of no release, in the conditional release models (similarly 
can be defined for other binary response variables, such as CTT rollover). For a c-unit 
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increase in a continuous explanatory variable, x, equation 2.16 gives the odds ratio. The 
interpretation is that “the odds of hazmat release change by OR times for every c-unit 
increase in x, holding other variables constant”. If x is a categorical explanatory variable, 
the value of c is 1, and the interpretation changes to “the odds of hazmat release change 
by OR times as x changes from 0 to 1, holding other variables constant” (Bilder and 
Loughin 2014). 
𝑂𝑅 =
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑥+𝑐
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑥
= 𝑒𝑐𝛽𝑖 (2.16) 
PC is defined as the percentage change in the mean response that results from a c-
unit change in an explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖 (holding other explanatory variables constant) 
(Bilder and Loughin 2014). In MNBR, PC for 𝑥𝑖 equals 100(𝑒
𝑐𝛽𝑖 − 1), if only the main 
effects of 𝑥𝑖 is used in the model, and equals 100(𝑒
𝑐𝛽𝑖+𝑐𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖 − 1), if the quadratic form 
of 𝑥𝑖 is also in the model (𝛽𝑖′ is the coefficient of the quadratic term). OR for MOLMs is 
defined as the change in the odds of 𝑌 > 𝑗 versus 𝑌 ≤ 𝑗, corresponding to a c-unit change 
in an explanatory variable, 𝑥𝑖 (also, holding other explanatory variables constant). 
Similarly, in case of inclusion of only the main effects of 𝑥𝑖, OR equals 𝑒
𝑐𝛽𝑖, and equals 
𝑒𝑐𝛽𝑖+𝑐𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖, if the quadratic form is included.  
3.7 Random Forests (RF) 
RF is an ensemble machine learning method (methods that generate many 
classifiers/regressors and aggregate their results), proposed by Breiman (Breiman 2001). 
RF is based on bagging (bootstrap aggregating) with decision trees, meaning successive 
classification/regression trees are generated from data which do not depend on earlier 
trees (using a bootstrap sample of the training set), and the results of each 
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classification/regression are aggregated as the final result (Breiman 2001; Friedman, 
Hastie, and Robert 2007). In RF, each node is split using the best among a subset of 
explanatory variables randomly chosen at that node. Performance of RF depends on 
tuning of the hyperparameters (parameters whose values should be set before training).  
In this study, the hyperparameters included number of explanatory variables 
sampled randomly as candidates at each split (v), number of trees to generate (t), and 
terminal nodes’ minimum size (n) (terminal nodes on decision trees are the nodes the 
algorithm do not split, and node size is the number of data observations associated with 
each node). RF was used as a classifier for hazmat release in train incidents and CTT 
crashes, and rollover for CTT crashes, and as a regressor for number of damaged/derailed 
railcars in a train incident. Due to data imbalance for classification in this study (the cases 
of hazmat release/rollover were significantly infrequent), RF was used with under-
sampling. This means that the sample of the data for each tree is drawn with equal 
frequency of classes. Also, the hyperparameter tuning was based on out-of-bag samples 
(Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007).  
3.8 Naïve Bayes 
Naïve Bayes is a classification technique which is based on the Bayes’ theorem 
and is appropriate when the number of explanatory variables is large. This method 
assumes that given a class for the response variable, the explanatory variables are 
independent (Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007). In other words: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑗|𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝) = ∏ 𝜋𝑖(𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑘)
𝑝
𝑘=1
 (2.17) 
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In this equation, 𝜋𝑖(𝑗|𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝) is the probability of outcome j given the set of 
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝, for observation i. The naïve Bayes classifier determines 
the classes based on the calculated 𝜋𝑖(𝑗|𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝) using equation 2.18 for each 
observation and depending on the cutoff probability. Naïve Bayes was utilized as a 
classifier, for similar objectives as RF. 
𝜋𝑖(𝑗|𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝) =
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝|𝑗)𝜋𝑖(𝑗)
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝)
 (2.18) 
3.9 Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
SVM is a machine learning approach, used for classification and regression, 
originally developed by Vapnik et al. (Boser, Guyon, and Vapnik 1992; Wu and Vapnik 
1999). It is a system for efficiently training linear learning machines in the kernel-
induced feature spaces, while respecting the insights provided by the generalization 
theory, and exploiting the optimization theory (Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor 2000). In 
this study, C-classification and 𝜀-regression were used as the SVM setting for 
classification and count regression, respectively. A kernel function should be chosen to 
use in the structure of the algorithm, for which the Gaussian radial basis kernel was used 
in this study. This kernel function has a hyperparameter, 𝛾, that should be tuned along 
with c, the cost of violation of the constraints of the optimization problem solved during 
training of SVM. Hyperparameter tuning for SVM in this study was based on 5-fold 
stratified cross validation. More in-depth information about SVM and stratified cross 
validation is available in (Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007). In this dissertation, SVM 
was used for the same objectives as RF. 
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3.10 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curves and Cutoff Probabilities 
ROC curves plot “sensitivity” (also known as “recall” in the classification 
evaluation) versus rate of “false positive (FP)” for various cutoff probabilities used with a 
classification method to choose a cutoff probability that corresponds to an appropriate 
level of sensitivity and FP rate. While these terms are explained in more details in the 
next section, in the context of ROC curves in this study, sensitivity was the proportion of 
actual cases of hazmat release (or other binary outcomes) correctly classified, while FP 
rate was actual non-release cases, incorrectly classified as release. The area under these 
curves (AUC) is a general criterion for performance evaluation in classification (Fawcett 
2006). 
3.11 Classification and Count Prediction Performance Evaluation Measures 
The classification performance evaluation criteria in this study included confusion 
matrix, precision, recall (sensitivity), F1 score and AUC (these measures were calculated 
for each method based on the test dataset). Confusion matrix summarizes the results of a 
classification method. For a binary classification with classes “negative” and “positive”, 
the confusion matrix will be:  
  Classified 
 Classes - + 
Original 
- TN FP 
+ FN TP 
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In this matrix, TN, FP, FN and TP denote true negative, false positive, false 
negative and true positive, respectively. In the hazmat release classification, instead of 
negative and positive, the classes were “no release” and “release”, respectively. For 
example, TN is the number of no release crashes in the test dataset correctly classified as 
no release and FN is the number of release crashes incorrectly classified as no release. 
Precision, recall and F1 score are defined as below: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 (2.19) 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 (2.20) 
F1  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 2
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 (2.21) 
In this study, recall is the proportion of real hazmat release cases that are correctly 
classified as hazmat release. Precision denotes the proportion of cases classified as 
hazmat release that are correctly hazmat release. Since cases with release of hazmat are 
significantly costlier than others, recall may be a better evaluation criterion in this study. 
However, precision may also provide useful information depending on how the estimated 
probabilities are to be used, as it captures the costs of misclassifying a non-release case as 
release. F1 score is the harmonic average of precision and recall. These three criteria 
evaluate the performance of the classification after determination of the cutoff point, 
while AUC assesses the general classification regardless of the cutoff point.  
This study used two measures for evaluating the prediction of number of 
damaged/derailed cars in a train, given an incident: Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), 
and Total Count Error (TCE). These measures are defined as below: 
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𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
∑ (𝜇𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 (2.22) 
𝑇𝐶𝐸 = |
∑ 𝜇𝑖 − ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
| (2.23) 
In the above equations, 𝜇𝑖 is the actual number of derailed or damaged cars in 
incident i, 𝑦𝑖 is the predicted number of derailed or damaged cars in incident i, and n is 
the size of the test dataset. In case of this study, RMSE is more insightful relative to TCE, 
as the major use of the number of derailed/damaged cars prediction is using in the hazmat 
release models. In an independent usage where the number of derailed/damaged cars 
itself is of interest, TCE may be a more useful measure. 
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CHAPTER 4 TRAIN-LEVEL AND CAR-LEVEL MODELING OF HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS RELEASE IN RAILROAD INCIDENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Identification of operational, environmental, and technical factors affecting the 
probability of hazmat release from trains in railroad incidents is important for making 
decisions toward decreasing the probability of hazmat release in train incidents; it can 
also be useful in risk-based methods designed to improve the safety of rail transportation 
of hazmat. 
This chapter presents analysis of hazmat-carrying train incidents to fulfil two 
objectives: 1) quantifying the impacts of incident, railroad, environment and train/car 
characteristics on conditional probability of hazmat release (given a train incident) and 2) 
developing a prediction tool for this conditional probability. This chapter considered two 
sets of models; trains were the unit of analysis for the first set of models while hazmat 
cars were the unit of analysis for the second set. For both sets, logistic regression and 
mixed logistic regression were estimated using the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) 2012-2016 rail equipment incident dataset. Single-level and two-level groupings 
in the train-level and hazmat car-level models (due to possible hazmat release 
interdependence among cars belonging to a train and trains belonging to an incident) 
were considered, and significant factors associated with hazmat release identified. 
Moreover, ROC curves were developed to improve the prediction performance of the 
models, by defining an appropriate cut-off point. 
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The next section explains the methods of this chapter. The ensuing section 
introduces the dataset and variables, followed by the estimation results of the models and 
interpretation. The last section presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
4.2 Methods 
As was mentioned in section 3.2, there is a possibility of interdependence in 
hazmat release from trains involved in an incident and hazmat cars that belong to a train, 
which may lead to a single-level correlation in the train-level models and a two-level 
correlation in the car-level models. Logistic regression does not consider multi-level 
correlation among observations, but mixed logistic regression has the capability of 
addressing it. Therefore, this study took both into account. As is shown in Figure 4.1, a 
single-level grouping existed in the train-level models while a two-level grouping was 
present in the car-level models. Neglecting these correlations might result in smaller 
estimated variances, leading to model misinterpretation (Bilder and Loughin 2014). 
The response variable in the train-level logistic regression and mixed logistic 
regression models was a variable that indicated the occurrence of hazmat release from a 
train, given an incident. The response variable in the car-level logistic regression and 
mixed logistic regression models was the occurrence of hazmat release from a hazmat car 
(including tank cars, covered hoppers, gondolas, etc.), given an incident. The explanatory 
variables for the two sets of models included train/car, railroad, operation, environment 
and incident characteristics.  
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Note: Icons in this figure were obtained from http://iconfinder.com, http://clipartfest.com and 
http://thenounproject.com 
Figure 4.1 Multi-level structure of the mixed logistic regression models. 
The logistic regression and mixed logistic regression models can serve as 
prediction tools. As in section 3.10, ROC curves in this study aided visualizing, 
organizing and selecting prediction models based on their performance. In the context of 
this chapter, the definition of sensitivity was the proportion of actual incidents with 
hazmat release correctly predicted while the FP rate was actual incidents without hazmat 
release incorrectly predicted as hazmat release. Cut-off probabilities is the threshold for 
the estimated probabilities the model uses to predict “release” or “no release” for each 
incident. ROC curves plot sensitivity versus false positive rate for various cut-off 
probabilities used with a prediction model.  
4.3 Data and Variables 
Railroad reported incidents involving a hazmat-carrying train were extracted from 
the 2012-2016 US rail equipment incident database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration 
Office of Safety Analysis 2017). According to FRA: “Rail equipment incidents are 
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collisions, derailments, fires, explosions, acts of God, and other events involving the 
operation of on-track equipment (standing or moving) that result in damages higher than 
the current reporting threshold (i.e., $9,500 for calendar year 2012, $9,900 for calendar 
year 2013, $10,500 for calendar year 2014, $10,500 for calendar year 2015, $10,500 for 
calendar year 2016, and $10,700 for calendar years 2017 and beyond, until revised) to 
railroad on-track equipment, signals, tracks, track structures, or roadbed, including 
labor costs and the costs for acquiring new equipment and material.” The extracted 
dataset consisted of 2581 incidents, 2787 trains, and 39162 hazmat cars. Car-level data 
was generated based on the original train-level dataset using information on number of 
hazmat-carrying cars, and number of cars that released hazmat. Tonnage of train cars was 
approximated by dividing the gross tonnage of trains (excluding the power units) by the 
number of cars in each train.  
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the variables of train-level and car-level datasets, 
respectively. Car-level models did not utilize train-level variables (e.g., hazdamrate, 
derrate, typrr, tonnage, and hazcarrate), since their possible impacts on hazmat release 
were at the train level; train-level models did not utilize the car-level variable cartonnage. 
All the categorical explanatory variables were used in the models as sets of dummy 
(indicator) variables, with the base level set to the first level (alphabetical order), with the 
exception of typinc, in which the third level (crossing incidents) was chosen as the base 
level. Track classes 1 and X were aggregated in one level for the variable trkcls, as they 
represented the same maximum speed for freight trains (10 mph). Also, track classes 5 to 
9 were aggregated into one level (they were infrequent in the dataset). 
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Table 4.1 Statistics for Train-Level Variables 
Variable 
Variable 
Name 
Values and Statistics 
Response Variable   
Hazmat Release hazrel 0 = No (96.73%), 1 = Yes (3.26%) 
Explanatory Variables   
Incident Characteristics   
Type of incident typinc 
1 = Derailment (62.68%), 2 = Collision 
(12.77%), 3 = Crossing (8.50%), Others 
(16.04%) 
Proportion of damaged/derailed hazmat 
cars to all hazmat cars 
hazdamrate Mean = 0.2504, Variance = 0.1540 
Locomotive(s) derailed locder 0 = No (91.96%), 1 = Yes (8.04%) 
Proportion of damaged/derailed cars to 
all cars 
derrate Mean = 0.0989, Variance = 0.0331 
Cause of incident cause 
E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures 
(12.16%), H = Human Factors (39.25%), M 
= Miscellaneous (20.99%), S= Signal and 
Communication (3.01%), T= Track, Roadbed 
and Structures (24.58%) 
Railroad Characteristics   
Type of railroad (Interstate Commerce 
Commission) 
typrr 
1 = Class I (83.05%), 2 = Class II (0.90%), 3 
= Class III (16.05%) 
Method of operation mopera 
1 = Signal indication (24.26%), 2 = Direct 
train control (6.71%), 3 = Yard/restricted 
limits (2.08%), 4 = Block register territory 
(0.47%), 5 = Other than main track rules 
(66.49%) 
Track class trkcls 
1 = Classes 1 and X (67.60%), 2 = Class 2 
(7.61%), 3 = Class 3 (6.71%), 4 = Class 4 
(14.46%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (3.62%) 
Type of track typtrk 
1 = Main (32.44%), 2 = Yard (59.78%), 3 = 
Siding (2.37%), 4 = Industry (5.42%) 
Environmental Characteristics   
Temperature temp Mean = 58.62, Variance = 496.55 
Visibility visibility 
1 = Dawn (7.86%), 2 = Day (42.59%), 3 = 
Dusk (7.39%), 4 = Dark (42.16%) 
Weather weather 
1 = Clear (66.49%), 2 = Cloudy (22.53%), 3 
= Rain (7.14%), 4 = Fog (1.15%), 5 = Sleet 
(0.25%), 6 = Snow (2.44%) 
Train Characteristics   
Train speed (mph) trnspd Mean = 12.37, Variance = 211.40 
Train gross tonnage (ton) tonnage Mean = 4404, Variance = 21787396 
Proportion of hazmat tank-cars to all 
tank-cars 
hazcarrate Mean = 0.2947, Variance = 0.0958 
Remote control locomotive rclmod 0 = No (80.19%), 1 = Yes (19.81%) 
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety 
Analysis 2017)) 
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Table 4.2 Statistics for Hazmat Car-Level Variables 
Variable 
Variable 
Name 
Values and Statistics 
Response Variable   
Hazmat Release hazrel 0 = No (99.38%), 1 = Yes (0.62%) 
Explanatory Variables   
Incident Characteristics   
Type of Incident typinc 
1 = Derailment (67.46%), 2 = Collision 
(11.89%), 3 = Crossing (10.14%), Others 
(10.51%) 
Locomotive(s) derailed locder 0 = No (89.93%), 1 = Yes (10.07%) 
Cause of incident cause 
E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures 
(14.38%), H = Human Factors (35.03%), M 
= Miscellaneous (20.01%), S= Signal and 
Communication (1.65%), T= Track, Roadbed 
and Structures (28.93%) 
Railroad Characteristics   
Method of operation mopera 
1 = Signal indication (32.67%), 2 = Direct 
train control (8.25%), 3 = Yard/restricted 
limits (2.75%), 4 = Block register territory 
(0.60%), 5 = Other than main track rules 
(55.72%) 
Track class trkcls 
1 = Classes 1 and X (57.83%), 2 = Class 2 
(9.75%), 3 = Class 3 (10.03%), 4 = Class 4 
(20.18%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (2.21%) 
Type of track typtrk 
1 = Main (43.11%), 2 = Yard (48.92%), 3 = 
Siding (2.80%), 4 = Industry (5.17%) 
Environmental Characteristics   
Temperature temp Mean = 57.30, Variance = 509.56 
Visibility visibility 
1 = Dawn (8.15%), 2 = Day (43.68%), 3 = 
Dusk (6.81%), 4 = Dark (41.37%) 
Weather weather 
1 = Clear (65.81%), 2 = Cloudy (22.60%), 3 
= Rain (6.84%), 4 = Fog (2.06%), 5 = Sleet 
(0.25%), 6 = Snow (2.45%) 
Train/Car Characteristics   
Train speed (mph) trnspd Mean = 13.89, Variance = 213.38 
Tank car tonnage (ton) cartonnage Mean = 77.30, Variance = 5356.59 
Remote control locomotive rclmod 0 = No (88.37%), 1 = Yes (11.63%) 
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety 
Analysis 2017)) 
4.4 Modeling Results 
This section presents the estimation results, model interpretations and prediction 
considerations. 
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4.4.1 Train-Level Models 
This set of models provides the probability of hazmat release from one or more 
cars of each train, given an incident. The five binary response models (Table 4.3) include 
two logistic regression models estimated by ML (A1 and A2), one logistic regression 
model estimated by Firth’s bias reduction estimator (FE) (A3), and two mixed logistic 
regression models (A4 and A5). The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test provided information on 
the impacts of each variable on probability of hazmat release, and variable selection 
(along with Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)). A comparison of models A2 and A3 
shows a slight difference in the estimations, indicating possible biased estimation of A2; 
hence, A3 is preferable. The AIC values and the p-values of the LR test of the random 
parameters show that a mixed effects model is not necessary in train-level models. So, A3 
was chosen as the best model for further interpretation (in terms of re-substitution 
validation, the performance of models was similar).  
  
  
Table 4.3 Estimated Train-Level Models 
Variables 
A1) Logistic 
regression (ML) 
A2) Logistic 
regression (ML) 
A3) Logistic 
regression (FE) 
A4) Mixed logistic 
regression 
A5) Mixed logistic 
regression 
LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value 
typinc 0.01219 * 0.00778 ** 0.00893 ** 0.01219 * 0.00778 ** 
hazdamrate 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
temp 0.79757  —  —  0.79757  —  
visibility 0.62895  —  —  0.62895  —  
weather 0.81558  —  —  0.81558  —  
trnspd 0.00003 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00003 *** 0.00001 *** 
tonnage 0.00470 ** 0.00547 ** 0.00564 ** 0.00470 ** 0.00547 ** 
trkcls 0.01460 * 0.01326 * 0.01483 * 0.01460 * 0.01326 * 
typtrk 0.56286  —  —  0.56286  —  
locder 0.88518  —  —  0.88518  —  
derrate 0.27772  —  —  0.27772  —  
hazcarrate 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
cause 0.00040 *** 0.00022 *** 0.00026 *** 0.00040 *** 0.00022 *** 
typrr 0.95962  —  —  0.95962  —  
rclmod 0.12957  —  —  0.12957  —  
mopera 0.99563   0.03931 * 0.04360 * 0.99563   0.03931 * 
Random Effects 
Variables NA NA NA Intercept Intercept 
Variance NA NA NA 0.00000 0.00000 
Variance LR test  
comparison with 
NA NA NA Model A1 Model A2 
Variance LR test p-
value 
NA NA NA 0.49962 0.50000 
Re-substitution 
Validation 
Release 20.88% 20.88% 20.88% 20.88% 20.88% 
Overall 97.24% 97.00% 97.20% 97.24% 97.20% 
AIC 613.47 584.64 585.52   615.5 586.6 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
NA: Not Applicable, — : Variable not used       
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Table 4.4 presents estimated coefficients and standard errors, the values of 𝑐 for 
odds ratios, estimated odds ratios and 95% profile LR confidence intervals for odds ratios 
for model A3. The model interpretation is as follows (all the statements in the next two 
paragraphs are subject to “95% confidence” and “conditional on keeping all the other 
variables constant”): 
Table 4.4 Estimated Coefficients and Odds Ratios for Model A3 
Variables 
Coefficients Odds Ratios 
Estimate Std. Error c 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound of 
C.I. 
Upper 
Bound of 
C.I. 
(Intercept) -8.6420 0.9631 NA NA NA NA 
typinc1 1.8090 0.5819 1 6.1055 1.9992 24.3916 
typinc2 1.4260 0.7245 1 4.1634 0.9403 20.0359 
typinc4 1.0590 0.6620 1 2.8822 0.7167 12.1323 
hazdamrate 1.9220 0.3043 0.1 1.2119 1.1401 1.2955 
trnspd 0.0515 0.0124 5 1.2934 1.1467 1.4924 
tonnage 0.0001 0.0000 1000 1.0632 1.0207 1.1049 
trkcls2 1.1100 0.4647 1 3.0346 1.1827 7.8901 
trkcls3 1.0140 0.5390 1 2.7559 0.9264 8.3848 
trkcls4 0.0606 0.6027 1 1.0625 0.2987 3.5781 
trkcls5 0.2340 0.7896 1 1.2637 0.2241 5.9801 
hazcarrate 2.5200 0.3450 0.1 1.2867 1.2016 1.3918 
causeh 1.2340 0.5194 1 3.4358 1.2622 11.6063 
causem 1.1060 0.5278 1 3.0208 1.0801 10.0642 
causes 2.0230 0.7551 1 7.5599 1.3317 34.6251 
casuet 1.7910 0.4570 1 5.9956 2.5679 18.7879 
mopera2 -0.0712 0.3487 1 0.9313 0.4435 1.8342 
mopera3 0.1922 0.6187 1 1.2119 0.279 3.8557 
mopera4 0.4817 0.8202 1 1.6189 0.2403 7.2008 
mopera5 -1.4510 0.5132 1 0.2343 0.0819 0.6649 
NA: Not Applicable 
Derailment incidents increased the odds of hazmat release by 2.0 to 24.4 times 
compared to a crossing incident, while sufficient evidence was not available to show that 
collisions and other types of incidents changed the odds of hazmat release, compared to 
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crossing incidents. A 10% increase in the ratio of damaged or derailed cars resulted in 
14% to 30% increase in the odds of hazmat release, and a 10% increase in the ratio of 
hazardous materials-carrying cars on a train increased these odds by 20% to 39%. A 5-
mph increase in train speed was associated with 15% to 49% increase in the odds of 
hazmat release, and a 1000-ton increase in the gross tonnage of the train resulted in 2% to 
11% increase in these odds. 
FRA track class 2 increased the odds of hazmat release (given an incident) by 
1.18 to 7.89 times, compared to FRA track class 1 and X. Other FRA track classes did 
not show statistically significant evidence of affecting the probability of hazmat release. 
Incidents due to track, roadbed and structures, signal and communication, human factors 
and miscellaneous causes compared to mechanical and electrical issues increased the 
odds of release by 2.57 to 18.79 times, 1.33 to 34.63 times, 1.26 to 11.61 times, and 1.08 
to 10.06 times, respectively.  
4.4.2 Hazmat Car-Level Models 
This set of five binary response models provides the probability of hazmat release from 
each hazmat car, given an incident. A number of cars carried hazmat on each train with 
some releasing hazmat, leading to a potential two-level grouping in the dataset: hazmat 
cars belonging to the same train; and hazmat cars that belonged to the same incident from 
the same or different trains. 
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Table 4.5 presents the five estimated models including two logistic regression 
models with ML (B1 and B2), two single-level mixed logistic regression models (B3 and 
B5) with different explanatory variables and a 2-level mixed logistic regression (B4) to 
account for the two possible levels of grouping (there is no FE model as it was similar to 
the ML models). 
AIC values and the LR test for variances of the random parameters in the mixed 
logistic regression models showed that grouping in the car level was statistically 
significant but the incident level grouping could be ignored. All mixed logistic regression 
showed the same cross validation performance and were superior to the logistic 
regression models; Model B5 was selected for interpretation.  
  
  
Table 4.5 Estimated Hazmat Car-Level Models 
Models 
B1) Logistic 
regression (ML) 
B2) Logistic 
regression (ML) 
B3) Mixed logistic 
regression 
B4) 2-level Mixed 
logistic regression 
B5) Mixed logistic 
regression 
Variables LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value LR test p-value 
typinc 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00033 *** 0.00033 *** 0.00055 *** 
temp 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.20616  0.20524  0.14155  
visibility 0.00002 *** 0.00001 *** 0.44398  0.44358  —  
weather 0.00804 ** 0.00433 ** 0.89123  0.89141  —  
trnspd 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
cartonnage 0.12937  0.06547 . 0.89327  0.89327  —  
trkclas 0.00006 *** 0.00000 *** 0.06485 . 0.06488 . 0.00001 *** 
typtrk 0.87620  —  0.90482  0.90495  —  
locder 0.01132 * 0.00718 ** 0.87437  0.87437  —  
cause 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
rclmod 0.04997 * —  0.04045 * 0.04040 * 0.10905  
mopera 0.38831  —  0.80503  0.80434  —  
Random Effects 
Levels NA NA 1 Level (trains) 
2 Levels (trains, 
incidents) 
1 Level (trains) 
Variables NA NA Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Variance NA NA 4.0200 (4.0140, 0.0000) 4.2820 
Variance LR test 
comparison with 
NA NA Model B1 Model B3 
A logistic regression 
with similar 
variables 
LRT p-value  NA NA 0.00000 *** 0.50000  0.00000 *** 
Re-substitution 
Validation 
Release 0.00% 0.00% 4.98% 4.98% 4.98% 
Overall 99.38% 99.38% 99.41% 99.41% 99.41% 
AIC 2356.5 2354.8 2101.3 2103.3 2080.3 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
NA: Not Applicable 
— : Variable not used 
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Table 4.6 presents odds ratios and their 95% profile LR confidence intervals for 
Model B5 along with estimated coefficients, standard errors and the values for the 
parameter c. All interpretations are subject to “95% confidence” and “conditional on 
keeping all the other variables constant”. The model interpretation is as follows. 
Table 4.6 Estimated Coefficients and Odds Ratios for Model B5 
Variables 
Coefficients Odds Ratios 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
c 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound of 
C.I. 
Upper 
Bound of 
C.I. 
(Intercept) -11.1806 0.9912 NA NA NA NA 
typinc1 2.3070 0.7003 1 10.0447 2.5459 39.6298 
typinc2 2.0391 0.8566 1 7.6837 1.4335 41.1857 
typinc4 2.0841 0.7568 1 8.0376 1.8235 35.4276 
temp -0.0071 0.0059 10 0.9317 0.8305 1.0452 
trnspd 0.0593 0.0145 5 1.3451 1.1671 1.5502 
trkcls2 1.6586 0.4454 1 5.2517 2.1937 12.573 
trkcls3 1.4134 0.5152 1 4.1098 1.4973 11.281 
trkcls4 0.5925 0.5848 1 1.8085 0.5748 5.6904 
trkcls5 0.4597 0.9016 1 1.5836 0.2705 9.2701 
causeh 1.5382 0.5839 1 4.656 1.4825 14.6227 
causem 1.5662 0.6045 1 4.7885 1.4644 15.6576 
causes 3.3066 0.8892 1 27.2922 4.7768 155.934 
casuet 2.0961 0.5125 1 8.1344 2.9793 22.2088 
rclmod 0.7857 0.4812 1 2.1939 0.8543 5.634 
NA: Not Applicable 
Derailment incidents, collisions and other types of incident increased the odds of 
hazmat release from a car by 2.55 to 39.63 times, 1.43 to 41.19 times and 1.82 to 35.43 
times, respectively, compared to a crossing incident. The odds of release given an 
incident also increased by 17% to 55% for each 5-mph increase in train speed. FRA track 
classes 2 and 3 increased the odds of hazmat release by 2.19 to 12.57 times and 1.50 to 
11.28 times compared to FRA tack class 1 and X, respectively. Incidents caused by track, 
roadbed and structures, signal and communication, human factors and miscellaneous 
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compared to mechanical and electrical issues, increased the odds of release by amounts 
between 2.97 to 22.21 times, 4.78 to 155.93 times, 1.48 to 14.62 times, and 1.46 to 15.66 
times, respectively. 
4.4.3 Prediction 
For both train-level and hazmat car-level models, the datasets were randomly 
divided to model estimation (80%) and model validation (20%) subsets. Models A3 and 
B5 were re-estimated using the estimation data subsets. Figure 4.2 presents the ROC 
curves for both models. The larger area under ROC curves showed that the car-level 
model provided better overall predictions. 
  
Figure 4.2 ROC curves for train-level and hazmat car-level models. 
To achieve higher sensitivity without a large increase in false positive rates, using 
the ROC curves, new cutoff points were selected as 0.05 and 0.01 for the train-level and 
car-level models, respectively. The value of 0.05 relative to the default value of 0.5 
corresponds to increase in sensitivity and false positive rate from 31.82% to 77.27% and 
from 0.19% to 14.77%, respectively, in the train-level model. These values for choosing 
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0.01 over 0.5 for the hazmat car-level model were from 3.85% to 78.85% and 0.01% to 
7.38%, respectively. Table 4.7 shows the prediction results of both models for the 
validation subsets for the cutoff point of 0.5 and the new cutoff points of 0.05 and 0.01. 
Table 4.7 Prediction Results of Train-Level and Hazmat Car-Level Models 
 Train-Level Model Hazmat Car-Level Model 
Cutoff 
Probability 
0.5 0.05 0.5 0.01 
 
No 
Release Release 
No 
Release Release 
No 
Release Release 
No 
Release Release 
No Release 534 1 456 79 7779 1 7206 574 
Release 15 7 5 17 50 2 11 41 
No Release 99.81% 0.19% 85.23% 14.77% 99.99% 0.01% 92.62% 7.38% 
Release 68.18% 31.82% 22.73% 77.27% 96.15% 3.85% 21.15% 78.85% 
Overall 97.13% 84.92% 99.35% 92.53% 
The results showed that both models with the new cutoff probabilities correctly 
predicted approximately 80% of hazmat release occurrences. However, the proportion of 
“no release” incidents predicted as “release” was twice as large for the train-level models. 
Overall, the new cutoff probabilities improved the prediction performance of the models, 
and the car-level models were preferred over train-level models. 
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
The research presented in this chapter showed that derailment type incidents 
increased the likelihood of hazmat release more than the other incident types. This 
finding strengthens the existing emphasis of researchers and policy-makers on preventing 
rail derailment incidents involving hazmat. Higher proportion of damaged/derailed 
hazmat cars in a train increased hazmat release probability, emphasizing the need and use 
of countermeasures aimed at decreasing the number of damaged/derailed cars in 
incidents. While all causes of incidents increased hazmat release probability, relative to 
the base level (mechanical and electrical failures), prioritization of the corresponding 
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countermeasures and policies are suggested on this descending order: signal and 
communication; track, roadbed and structures; human factors; and miscellaneous. 
Track class 2 in both models and track class 3 in the car-level models were 
associated with higher probability of hazmat release. This may be a consideration in 
routing of hazmat-carrying trains. In the train-level model, other than main track rules as 
a method of operation was associated with a decrease in hazmat release probability, 
relative to signal indication. Statistically significant evidence was not available with 
respect to the effects of environmental characteristics on hazmat release probability. 
These characteristics might have indirect effects captured in the model through other 
variables and may be assessed in a future study. Higher train speed, train gross tonnage 
and proportion of hazmat tank-cars on trains increased the hazmat release probability. 
These variables are useful in developing policies aimed at requiring railroad companies to 
decrease train speed, gross tonnage, and proportion of hazmat cars in hazmat-carrying 
trains. 
The results of mixed models showed hazmat release from hazmat cars belonging 
to a train were interdependent and hazmat release from trains belonging to an incident 
were independent. Analyzing the incidents in train-level and car-level gave relatively 
consistent results. The train-level model accounted for variables such as hazdamrate, 
derrate, and hazcarrate leading to useful insights. The car-level model captured the effect 
of the number of cars released by having cars as units of analysis. Characteristics of 
hazmat cars were not available in the FRA dataset and therefore not considered in this 
study (which is a limitation of this study). In addition, the car-level model had better 
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performance in prediction, suggesting the implementation of risk-based analyses at the 
car level. 
As reported in the literature review, Liu et al. (Liu, Barkan, and Saat 2011) found 
track-related derailments more likely on lower class tracks. They also reported higher 
speed increased the average number of cars derailed in an incident, while Barkan et al. 
(Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003) reported that train speed increased the probability of 
hazmat release. These results are consistent with the findings of this study (reported 
herein). Barkan et al. (Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003) also identified the incident 
cause “broken rails or welds”, as the most significant incident cause on the number of 
derailed cars. Although, the current study accounted for grouped incident causes (due to 
limitations of the number of variables usable in the models), the group that contained this 
incident cause (Track, Roadbed and Structures) increased hazmat release probability, 
significantly. Other causes that were in the same group had different effects on release 
probability in (Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003), which could not be addressed in the 
current study. 
The results and conclusions of this chapter may be biased to some degree because 
of exclusion of the explanatory variables that were not available in the data and probably 
were correlated to the explanatory variables that were included in modeling (this is also 
known as unobserved heterogeneity). This unavailability was due to either data collection 
restrictions or the fact that some potentially significant factors are not readily observable 
or practically impossible to collect. While inclusion of random parameters in the models 
of this chapter may have addressed this issue to some degree, in practice, the 
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recommendations of this study based on its conclusions need to be taken into account 
cautiously (for policy- and decision-making), considering the fact that some of the 
observed effects of the explanatory variables may be fully or partially the actual effects of 
other unobserved factors.  
Future research on this topic may investigate the effects of other variables, such as 
hazmat car specification and safety design, and type of hazmat on the hazmat release 
probability. The effects of incident causes on hazmat release at a more detailed level in 
train incidents can be the emphasis of a future study.  
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CHAPTER 5 ROLLOVER AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE MODELS 
FOR CARGO TANK TRUCK CRASHES 
5.1 Introduction 
CTTs are one of the major surface transportation carriers of hazmat. CTTs’ 
rollover crashes are the leading cause of injuries and death from hazmat transportation 
incidents, accounting for approximately 75% of gasoline-related fatalities (Calabrese et 
al. 2017). CTTs are susceptible to rollover crashes due to their size, weight distribution, 
having a high center of gravity, and the surging and sloshing of the liquid cargo during 
transportation. Major strategies to address these rollovers are electronic stability control 
systems and driver training (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
2003; Calabrese et al. 2017; Douglas B Pape et al. 2007). Identification of factors that 
affect or associate with probability of rollover and hazmat release in CTT crashes is a 
step toward objectively reducing these probabilities. 
The objectives of this chapter were identification and quantification of the effects 
of various factors on the probability of rollover and release of hazmat in CTT crashes and 
developing prediction tools for these two probabilities. Statistical modeling was 
performed using logistic regression and BMA with rollover and hazmat release as the 
binary response variables, and crash, trucks, roadway, environment, and driver 
characteristics as the explanatory variables. States of Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2016 
police reported crash datasets were combined and filtered for CTT-involved crashes and 
used in the statistical modeling. ROC curves were developed for model validation and 
prediction performance evaluation and improvement. Statistical modeling provided 
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useful information about the presence and magnitude of effects of explanatory variables 
on rollover and hazmat release. Based on the results, this chapter presents 
recommendations for countermeasures and policies toward improving safety of CTTs.  
The remainder of this chapter includes: an additional literature review on safety 
aspects of CTTs; the chapter’s methods; introduction to the dataset and variables; results 
of the statistical modeling; a discussion of the results; and finally, the chapter’s 
conclusions.  
5.2 Additional Literature Review 
In addition to the general literature review of chapter 2 on hazmat transportation, 
this section reviews studies on safety aspects of CTTs.  
Some studies focused on analysis of CTT-involved crash data. McKnight and 
Bahouth investigated 239 large truck rollover crashes in the US and found almost half of 
the crashes resulted from failing to adjust speed to curves, characteristics of the load, 
condition of the brakes, road surface, and intersection conditions. Other major crash 
contributors involved driver’s attention, steering, and load size (McKnight and Bahouth 
2009). Shen et al. studied 708 crashes of hazmat-carrying CTTs reported during 2004-
2011 in China. They found the predominant crash types were rollover (29.10%), run-off-
the-road (16.67%), and rear-end collisions (13.28%), with a high likelihood of hazmat 
release (up to 75.00 % for freeway crashes). Human-related errors (73.8%) and vehicle-
related defects (19.6%) were the primary reasons of occurrence of such crashes (Shen et 
al. 2014).  
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Calabrese et al. analyzed 93 cargo tank rollovers (2011-2014) based on various 
elements focusing on potential human factors contributors. Driver related factors were 
most frequently identified contributing factors. Driver performance errors comprised 
about half of the rollovers, followed by driver decision errors. Analysis of ten-year 
historic crash statistics showed that the largest proportion of rollovers occurred on 
undivided roadways, straight roads without curves and away from intersections. The most 
effective countermeasures identified were stability control systems, lane departure 
warning, and driver monitoring technologies (Calabrese et al. 2017). Pape et al. evaluated 
different approaches to reducing CTT rollover and reported: motion-base simulators and 
driver performance monitoring systems could improve drivers’ performance in avoiding 
rollovers; electronic stability aids could prevent rollovers by direct intervention in 
slowing the vehicle as it enters a curve at high speed; wider track width effective in 
avoiding rollovers; and sag and horizontal curve combination and pavement conditions as 
associated with tank trucks’ rollovers (Douglas B Pape et al. 2008). 
Some studies analyzed mechanical design of CTTs and their rollover potential. 
Kolaei et al. developed an analytical model of a partly-filled tank of arbitrary cross-
section for predicting transient lateral slosh force and rollover moment. They suggested 
that a tank cross-section with lower overall center of mass and lower critical slosh length 
yielded an enhanced roll stability limit under medium- and high-fill conditions (Kolaei, 
Rakheja, and Richard 2014). Kang et al. formulated an optimization problem for finding 
optimal tank geometry to enhance roll stability limits of partial and fully loaded CTTs. 
They identified wider bottom tanks desirable for high fill volumes, while tanks with 
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approximately conical geometry were desirable when fill volume varied considerably (X. 
Kang, Rakheja, and Stiharu 1999). Zheng et al. studied factors that influence driving 
stability of CTTs. They developed a vehicle dynamics model considering liquid sloshing 
during braking and turning for elliptical, circular and improved rectangular cross-section 
tank shapes and found that the latter tank shape had better driving stability, while the fill 
level of the liquid and the sloshing frequency of the tank influenced driving stability 
(Zheng et al. 2017). 
As a summary, a number of studies worked on quantifying trucks’ tank design 
features on rollovers by experimentation and simulation. A few studies quantified hazmat 
release probability from trains in train incidents. Although some studies used descriptive 
statistics (and not rigorous modeling techniques) in analyzing CTT crashes, the review of 
published literature did not uncover any studies specifically focused on identifying and 
quantifying the effects of the type of factors considered in this study on CTTs’ rollover 
and hazmat release probabilities.  
5.3 Methods 
This chapter involves the estimation of statistical models for two outcomes of 
traffic crashes involving CTTs: rollover and hazmat release. These two binary variables 
(rollover/no rollover and hazmat release/no release) were the response variables modeled 
based a set of explanatory variables including characteristics of crashes, trucks, roadway, 
environment, and driver traits. The binary response models used were BMA-based 
logistic regression which combines logistic regression with BMA as an explanatory 
variable selection tool (introduced in section 3.5). This chapter utilized BMA-based 
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logistic regression because: 1) availability of a relatively large set of explanatory 
variables made the task of variable selection for inclusion in the model specification more 
complicated thus requiring the use of a robust variable selection method and 2) this was 
an exploratory study and consideration of a model selection approach, such as BMA that 
does not eliminate variables from the models was desirable. 
The BMA-based logistic regression models can serve as prediction (classification) 
tools for CTTs’ rollover and hazmat release in crashes. In the context of this chapter, 
sensitivity was the proportion of actual crashes with rollover/hazmat release correctly 
classified, while FP rate was actual non-rollover/non-release crashes, incorrectly 
classified as rollover/release. Cutoff probability is the threshold for the estimated 
probabilities the model uses to classify outcomes: “rollover/release” or “no rollover/no 
release” for each crash.  
5.4 Data and Variables 
The 2010-2016 police-reported crash data from Nebraska and Kansas were 
combined and used in the statistical analysis. Other states in the Midwest were contacted 
but their data were unavailable in the timeframe for this study. The Nebraska and Kansas 
datasets were obtained from Nebraska Department of Transportation and Kansas 
Department of Transportation, respectively. Crashes with the involvement of CTTs were 
extracted from the combined dataset. This resulted in 2015 crashes with a CTT involved 
(all CTTs subset) and 546 crashes with a hazmat-carrying CTT involved (hazmat-
carrying subset). The model for truck rollover used all the CTT-involved crashes 
(carrying hazmat or not), while the model for hazmat release used a subset of the data 
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with hazmat-carrying trucks only. Besides rollover and hazmat release as response 
variables, this study utilized different characteristics of crash, CTTs, roadway, 
environment, and drivers as explanatory variables. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present these 
variables and their statistics in the CTT and hazmat-carrying CTT subsets, respectively. 
Criteria for inclusion of the explanatory variables in the study were: 1) variables 
that were identified effective on different safety measures, e.g. injury severity, in the 
literature; 2) variables available in both Nebraska and Kansas crash data without 
significant ratio of missing values (while some information was collected differently in 
the two states, they were converted to a compatible format); and 3) variables that were 
identified potentially effective on probability of rollover and hazmat release in CTT 
crashes. Relative rarity of reported crashes with involvement of CTTs was the reason for 
using a larger crash interval (7 years), compared to usual crash data analyses.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for the CTT Crash Data 
Variable Values and Statistics 
Response Variable  
Rollover 1 = No (84.57%), 2 = Yes (15.43%) 
Explanatory Variables  
Crash Characteristics  
Vehicle Point of 
Impact 
1 = None (3.08%), 2 = Center front (17.07%), 3 = Center rear (6.75%), 4 = 
Left front (10.87%), 5 = Left rear (5.66%), 6 = Left side (11.76%), 7 = Right 
front (14.29%), 8 = Right rear (5.26%), 9 = Right side (13.00%), 10 = All 
areas (0.99%), 11 = Other (11.27%) 
Type of Crash 1 = Collision (86.60%), 2 = Non-collision (13.40%) 
Object Involved 1 = No (81.24%), 2 = Yes (18.76%) 
Vehicle Movement 
1 = Straight (61.04%), 2 = Turning left (8.24%), 3 = Turning right (7.44%), 4 
= Changing lanes (2.73%), 5 = Slowing/stopped in traffic (7.49%), 6 = 
Backing (2.68%), 7 = Other (10.37%) 
CTT Characteristics  
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Vehicle Body Style 
1 = Single-unit (20.89%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (71.71%), 3 = Tractor 
with doubles/triples (0.84%), 4 = Truck tractor (0.30%), 5 = Truck with trailer 
(6.25%) 
Vehicle Make 
1 = Freightliner (22.63%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (10.87%), 3 = Kenworth 
(19.90%), 4 = Mack (5.16%), 5 = Peterbilt (14.39%), 6 = Other (27.05%) 
Vehicle Age Mean = 7.55, SD = 6.62 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.63%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (9.33%), 3 = More 
than 26,000 lbs. (88.04%) 
Roadway 
Characteristics 
 
Speed Limit Mean = 53.73, SD = 15.05 
Number of Lanes 
1 = One (4.27%), 2 = Two (61.89%), 3 = Three (3.57%), 4 = Four or more 
(30.27%) 
Road Surface Type 
1 = Asphalt (55.78%), 2 = Concrete (35.38%), 3 = Dirt (1.84%), 4 = Gravel 
(6.50%), 5 = Other (0.50%) 
Road Surface 
Condition 
1 = Dry (82.03%), 2 = Ice (3.03%), 3 = Sand/mud (0.99%), 4 = Slush (0.15%), 
5 = Snow (3.42%), 6 = Wet (9.23%), 7 = Other (1.14%) 
Road Level 1 = Level (77.52%), 2 = Hilltop (1.89%), 3 = Slope (20.60%) 
Road Curvature 1 = Straight (89.53%), 2 = Curved (10.47%) 
Intersection Involved 1 = No (59.85%), 2 = Yes (40.15%) 
Railroad Involved 1 = No (98.96%), 2 = Yes (1.04%) 
In Workzone 1 = No (95.43%), 2 = Yes (4.57%) 
Driver Characteristics  
Driver's Sex 1 = Male (98.06%), 2 = Female (1.94%) 
Driver's Age Mean = 47.55, SD = 12.94 
Alcohol Related 1 = No (98.51%), 2 = Yes (1.49%) 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Weather Conditions 
1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.15%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow (1.34%), 3 = 
Fog, smog, smoke (1.49%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… (0.10%), 5 = Severe crosswinds 
(6.80%), 6 = Snow (1.09%), 7 = Other (3.03%) 
Light Conditions 1 = Daylight (73.50%), 2 = Dark (21.49%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk (5.01%) 
(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation) 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Hazmat-Carrying CTT Crash Data 
Variable Values and Statistics 
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Response Variable  
Hazmat Release 1 = No (87.00%), 2 = Yes (13.00%) 
Explanatory Variables  
Crash Characteristics  
Vehicle Point of 
Impact 
1 = None (3.48%), 2 = Center front (17.58%), 3 = Center rear (6.78%), 4 = 
Left front (10.07%), 5 = Left rear (5.68%), 6 = Left side (12.27%), 7 = Right 
front (13.37%), 8 = Right rear (4.03%), 9 = Right side (14.10%), 10 = All 
areas (0.37%), 11 = Other (12.27%) 
Type of Crash 1 = Collision (86.08%), 2 = Non-collision (13.92%) 
Object Involved 1 = No (85.35%), 2 = Yes (14.65%) 
Vehicle Movement 
1 = Straight (62.09%), 2 = Turning left (7.14%), 3 = Turning right (7.14%), 4 
= Changing lanes (1.83%), 5 = Slowing/stopped in traffic (8.06%), 6 = 
Backing (1.47%), 7 = Other (12.27%) 
Rollover 1 = No (84.57%), 2 = Yes (15.43%) 
CTT Characteristics  
Vehicle Body Style 
1 = Single-unit (21.25%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (69.41%), 3 = Tractor 
with doubles/triples (1.47%), 4 = Truck tractor (0.37%), 5 = Truck with trailer 
(7.51%) 
Vehicle Make 
1 = Freightliner (22.63%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (11.36%), 3 = Kenworth 
(24.73%), 4 = Mack (4.21%), 5 = Peterbilt (28.21%), 6 = Other (11.17%) 
Vehicle Age Mean = 6.30, SD = 5.30 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.01%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (5.13%), 3 = More 
than 26,000 lbs. (92.86%) 
Roadway 
Characteristics 
 
Speed Limit Mean = 54.86, SD = 14.46 
Number of Lanes 
1 = One (3.85%), 2 = Two (60.26%), 3 = Three (3.85%), 4 = Four or more 
(32.05%) 
Road Surface Type 
1 = Asphalt (56.04%), 2 = Concrete (34.98%), 3 = Dirt (1.83%), 4 = Gravel 
(6.41%), 5 = Other (0.73%) 
Road Surface 
Condition 
1 = Dry (81.32%), 2 = Ice (4.40%), 3 = Sand/mud (1.28%), 4 = Slush (0.18%), 
5 = Snow (4.40%), 6 = Wet (7.88%), 7 = Other (0.55%) 
Road Level 1 = Level (76.37%), 2 = Hilltop (1.47%), 3 = Slope (22.16%) 
Road Curvature 1 = Straight (89.19%), 2 = Curved (10.81%) 
Intersection Involved 1 = No (63.19%), 2 = Yes (36.81%) 
Railroad Involved 1 = No (98.53%), 2 = Yes (1.47%) 
In Workzone 1 = No (95.97%), 2 = Yes (4.03%) 
Driver Characteristics  
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Driver's Sex 1 = Male (98.90%), 2 = Female (1.10%) 
Driver's Age Mean = 48.76, SD = 11.92 
Alcohol Related 1 = No (98.35%), 2 = Yes (1.65%) 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Weather Conditions 
1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.81%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow (1.10%), 3 = 
Fog, smog, smoke (0.73%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… (6.59%), 5 = Severe crosswinds 
(0.92%), 6 = Snow (3.85%), 7 = Other (0.00%) 
Light Conditions 1 = Daylight (72.89%), 2 = Dark (22.89%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk (4.21%) 
(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation) 
5.5 Results 
This section presents the results of the BMA-based models for CTTs’ rollover and 
hazmat release including the results and their interpretations of the statistical models 
regarding the effects of different factors on probability of rollover and hazmat release in 
CTT crashes. It also provides the ROC curves, cut-off probability determination and 
prediction performance evaluation of the estimated models. 
5.5.1 Estimated Models 
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 present the BMA-based logistic regression models for 
rollover and hazmat release, respectively, in terms of estimated odds ratios and their 95% 
CIs. In these two tables, the variables are sorted based on their significance, according to 
the frequency of appearance in the estimated models with the highest AICc.  Inclusion of 
“1.0” in a CI for an explanatory variable indicates a lack of sufficient statistical evidence 
for the effects of that explanatory variable on the response variable. The variables with 
sufficient statistical evidence towards their effects on the response variables are in bold 
fonts in these tables. Interpretation of the estimated odds ratios and CIs follows next. All 
the statements regarding the effects of each explanatory variable on the response 
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variables are subject to 95% confidence while holding other explanatory variables in the 
model constant. 
Table 5.3 Odds Ratios and 95% CIs for the Rollover Model 
Variables 
OR Point 
Estimate 
95% Confidence Interval 
(CI) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Vehicle Point of Impact 
Center front 1.99 0.46 8.71 
Center rear 0.47 0.07 3.33 
Left front 1.86 0.41 8.37 
Left rear 0.70 0.11 4.39 
Left side 3.69 0.84 16.13 
Right front 2.41 0.56 10.31 
Right rear 1.01 0.17 6.09 
Right side 6.53 1.55 27.50 
All areas 45.06 4.86 417.62 
Other 0.30 0.07 1.38 
Type of Crash Non-collision 188.96 101.28 352.54 
Object Involved Yes 15.35 9.05 26.02 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
10,001 to 26,000 lbs. 12.53 1.42 110.47 
More than 26,000 lbs. 12.53 1.58 99.16 
Speed Limit (c = 5 mph) 1.17 1.07 1.29 
Number of Lanes 
Two 0.48 0.23 1.02 
Three 0.01 0.00 0.21 
Four or more 0.22 0.09 0.55 
Vehicle Body Style 
Tractor & semi-trailer 0.59 0.36 0.98 
Tractor with doubles/triples 1.01 0.11 9.12 
Truck tractor 11.39 0.39 329.44 
Truck with trailer 0.84 0.36 1.99 
Vehicle Movement 
Turning left 1.23 0.51 2.93 
Turning right 1.38 0.60 3.18 
Changing lanes 0.63 0.05 7.30 
Slowing/stopped in traffic 0.44 0.10 1.96 
Backing 0.00 0.00 0.09 
Other 2.47 1.37 4.47 
Weather Condition 
Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow 0.09 0.00 1.56 
Fog, smog, smoke 0.39 0.08 1.86 
Rain/Sleet/... 0.83 0.28 2.45 
Severe crosswinds 5.03 1.19 21.33 
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Snow 0.59 0.14 2.46 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Light Condition 
Dark 1.09 0.69 1.74 
Dawn/Dusk 0.32 0.11 0.95 
Driver Sex Male 0.84 0.24 2.98 
Vehicle Make 
Internat. Harvester 1.58 0.78 3.20 
Kenworth 0.55 0.28 1.06 
Mack 0.83 0.32 2.18 
Peterbilt 1.24 0.72 2.14 
Other 0.63 0.31 1.28 
Road Surface Type 
Concrete 0.73 0.43 1.25 
Dirt 4.38 1.06 18.05 
Gravel 1.91 0.91 3.98 
Other 1.57 0.24 10.19 
Road Surface Condition 
Ice 0.39 0.10 1.47 
Sand/Mud 18.30 1.44 233.11 
Slush 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Snow 1.08 0.34 3.45 
Wet 1.05 0.43 2.57 
Other 0.22 0.04 1.35 
Driver Age 1.00 0.98 1.01 
Road Level 
Hilltop 1.21 0.42 3.46 
Slope 1.52 0.87 2.64 
Alcohol Related Yes 1.03 0.74 1.43 
Intersection Involved Yes 1.04 0.88 1.23 
Railroad Involved Yes 0.88 0.50 1.55 
Truck Age 1.00 1.00 1.01 
In Work Zone Yes 1.00 0.93 1.07 
Road Curvature Curved 1.01 0.96 1.06 
The odds of CTTs’ rollover in a crash increased by an amount between 1.55 to 
27.50 times when the point of impact was the right side of the truck, relative to when 
there is no impact. Also, in case of all areas of the truck being impacted, these odds 
increased by 4.86 to 417.62 times, relative to no impacts. The odds of rollover increased 
by an amount between 101.28 to 352.54 times in non-collision crashes, relative to 
collision crashes. Involvement of an object in crashes increased the rollover odds by 9.05 
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to 26.02 times. Gross truck weight groups of 10,001 to 260,000 lbs., and more than 
26,000 lbs. increased the odds of rollover by amounts between 1.42 to 110.47, and 1.58 
to 99.16, respectively, compared to trucks lighter than 10,001 lbs.  
Each 5 mph increase in the posted speed, increased the odds of rollover of the 
CTTs in crashes by 7% to 29%. Relative to one lane, highways with three lanes, and 
highways with four or more than four lanes decreased the odds of rollover by 0.00 to 0.21 
times, and 0.09 to 0.55 times, respectively. In terms of truck body style, tractor and semi-
trailer decreased the odds of rollover, relative to single-unit trucks, by an amount between 
0.36 to 0.98 times. Compared to moving straight ahead during a crash, backing decreased 
the odds of rollover by 0.00 to 0.09 times, while the movement group “Other” increased 
these odds by 1.37 to 4.47 times. Severe crosswinds, relative to clear weather increased 
the odds of rollover by 1.19 to 21.33 while light conditions during dawn/dusk, relative to 
daylight, decreased the odds of rollover by 0.11 to 0.95.  
Dirt as the road surface type, compared to asphalt, increased the odds of truck 
rollover by 1.06 to 18.05 times, while sand/mud, as road surface condition, relative to dry 
surface, increased these odds by 1.44 to 233.11 times. Each year increase in the age of 
CTTs increased the odds of rollover by an amount up to 1%. The modeling effort did not 
uncover sufficient evidence toward the effects of other explanatory variables on the 
probability of CTT’s rollover in crashes. Only two explanatory variables statistically 
significantly affected hazmat release from these trucks given a crash in a direct manner. 
Relative to non-rollover crashes, rollovers increased the odds of hazmat release by an 
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amount between 8.22 to 29.27 times. When intersections were involved in a crash, the 
odds of hazmat release increased by 1.02 to 3.47 times. 
Table 5.4 Odds Ratios and 95% CIs for the Hazmat Release Model 
Variables 
OR Point 
Estimate 
95% Confidence 
Interval (CI) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Rollover Yes 15.51 8.22 29.27 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
10,001 to 26,000 lbs. 1.70 0.17 16.56 
More than 26,000 lbs. 0.75 0.09 6.16 
Intersection Involved Yes 1.89 1.02 3.47 
Truck Age 0.95 0.89 1.01 
Object Involved Yes 1.64 0.77 3.46 
Speed Limit (c = 5 mph) 1.03 0.93 1.15 
In Work Zone Yes 0.84 0.36 1.96 
Road Curvature Curved 1.07 0.80 1.43 
Alcohol Related Yes 1.13 0.69 1.87 
Vehicle Body Style 
Tractor & semi-trailer 1.02 0.91 1.15 
Tractor with doubles/triples 1.13 0.69 1.84 
Truck tractor 0.00 0.00 Inf. 
Truck with trailer 1.00 0.90 1.11 
Type of Crash Non-collision 0.99 0.93 1.06 
Light Condition 
Dark 0.99 0.96 1.03 
Dawn/Dusk 1.02 0.92 1.13 
Number of Lanes 
Two 1.00 0.96 1.04 
Three 1.01 0.93 1.10 
Four or more 1.00 0.96 1.04 
Road Level 
Hilltop 1.00 0.95 1.04 
Slope 1.00 0.98 1.02 
Vehicle Make 
Internat. Harvester 1.01 0.96 1.06 
Kenworth 1.00 0.97 1.04 
Mack 1.01 0.95 1.08 
Peterbilt 1.00 0.98 1.02 
Other 1.02 0.94 1.12 
Driver Sex Male 0.99 0.94 1.05 
Driver Age 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Road Surface Condition 
Ice 1.00 0.99 1.01 
Sand/Mud 1.00 0.98 1.01 
Slush 0.00 0.00 Inf. 
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Snow 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wet 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other 1.00 0.99 1.01 
Railroad Involved Yes 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Vehicle Movement 
Turning left 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Turning right 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Changing lanes 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Slowing/stopped in traffic 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Backing 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weather Condition 
Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fog, smog, smoke 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Rain/Sleet/... 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Severe crosswinds 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Snow 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Road Surface Type 
Concrete 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Dirt 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Gravel 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Vehicle Point of Impact 
Center front 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Center rear 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left front 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left rear 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left side 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Right front 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Right rear 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Right side 1.00 1.00 1.00 
All areas Inf. 0.00 Inf. 
Other 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5.5.2 Prediction 
For both BMA-based logistic regression models (rollover and hazmat release), the 
datasets were split into two model estimation (80%) and model validation (20%) subsets. 
The splitting was stratified and random, meaning observations were randomly selected to 
be put in each subset, while the ratio of the classes (rollover/no rollover or release/no 
release) in each subset was held equal to the original data. This was to avoid conclusions 
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that could vary due to randomness of the splitting, as the response variables’ classes were 
highly imbalanced (positive outcomes were rare). Both models were re-estimated using 
the estimation subsets, validated using the validation subsets, and ROC curves were 
generated as in Figure 5.1. The area under the curves indicates that the rollover model did 
a better job in terms of prediction. Despite having a low rate of variables that statistically 
significantly affect the response variable, the hazmat release model also had a relatively 
sufficient prediction performance. 
  
Figure 5.1 ROC curves for the rollover and hazmat release models. 
Changing the cutoff probabilities based on the ROC curves can result in higher 
model sensitivity without a large increase in FP rates. For the rollover and hazmat release 
models, the new cutoff probabilities of 20% and 40% (instead of 50%), respectively, 
were determined. Table 5.5 shows the models’ prediction performance for both sets of 
cutoff probabilities. Correct prediction of rollovers and hazmat release cases increased 
from 71% to 89%, and 45% to 64%, respectively, after using the alternative cutoff 
probabilities. These improvements are at the price of increase in FP rates from 4% and 
5% in the rollover and hazmat release models, to 14% and 12%, respectively. 
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Table 5.5 Prediction Performance of the Models 
 Rollover Model Hazmat Release Model 
Cutoff Probability  0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 
 
No 
Rollover 
Rollover 
No 
Rollover 
Rollover 
No 
Release 
Release 
No 
Release 
Release 
No Rollover/Release 328 12 293 47 92 5 85 12 
Rollover/Release 18 44 7 55 6 5 4 7 
No Rollover/Release 96.47% 3.53% 86.18% 13.82% 94.85% 5.15% 87.63% 12.37% 
Rollover/Release 29.03% 70.97% 11.29% 88.71% 54.55% 45.45% 36.36% 63.64% 
Overall 92.54% 86.57% 89.91% 85.19% 
5.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
A relatively large number of explanatory variables were found to affect or 
associate with the probability of CTTs’ rollover in crashes. This justifies the use of BMA 
in this study. Only two explanatory variables, including rollover itself, influenced the 
probability of hazmat release. This indicates actions taken to avoid rollovers may affect 
hazmat release indirectly and in the same direction (if a change in the value of a variable 
decreases the probability of rollover, it decreases the probability of hazmat release as 
well). 
Non-collision crashes were more probable to result in a rollover (representing 
only-rollover crashes). This finding emphasizes the possibility of the role of the other 
driver characteristics that were not included in this study (due to unavailability in the 
analyzed data). These characteristics, according to the literature, include inattention, and 
specific skills for driving CTTs in terms of speed adjustment, effective braking, and 
steering. In terms of point of impact, side impacts in addition to impacts to all areas of the 
vehicle, increases the likelihood of rollover, indicating it may be more effective if drivers 
of CTTs get trained towards avoiding such crashes. 
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Relative to moving straight ahead, the probability of rollover in a crash does not 
change for other types of movements (except backing), while one may expect turning 
movements may lead to rollovers more often. This finding is consistent with Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) CTT safety recommendations, where it is 
emphasized only 7% of CTTs’ rollovers occur on exit ramps (Douglas B Pape et al. 
2007). Backing crashes are less likely to lead into a rollover, probably due to lower speed 
and less severe collisions. Based on this finding, the roadway-related countermeasures for 
truck rollover and hazmat release are recommended to not be restricted to ramps. 
Severe crosswinds was the only weather condition that increased the probability 
of rollover, relative to clear/cloudy weather. Such weather is suggested to be avoided by 
CTTs. This can be taken into consideration by policy-makers, private shippers, or truck 
drivers. If possible, driving during dawn and dusk and road surface conditions of sand 
and mud should be avoided. Probability of overturn increases when the CTTs are heavier 
(consistent with (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 2003)) and 
older. Probability of hazmat release increases when there is a rollover. Consequently, 
shippers are encouraged to consider newer trucks and also lighter trucks, in terms of truck 
type, body style and amount of loaded hazmat, specifically in cases of more dangerous 
classes of hazmat. The body style of tractor and semi-trailer decreases the probability of 
rollover, compared to all other body styles and is recommended to consideration, if 
practical.  
Collision with objects increased the probability of CTT rollover. Guardrails and 
other roadside safety structures include a significant portion of these objects. Therefore, 
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considering CTTs in the design of such structures, especially in the regions with higher 
traffic of CTTs, may be a reasonable approach for decreasing these rollovers. Only a 5-
mph increase in the posted speed resulted in up to 27% increase in the odds of rollover of 
CTTs in crashes. Therefore, consideration of lower speed limits is recommended in areas 
with frequent passage of CTTs. In routing for CTTs, shippers may prioritize their options 
based on number of lanes (3 or more) and fewer intersections in addition to usual 
economic concerns, as higher number of lanes is associated with lower probability of 
overturn and intersections increase the odds of hazmat release.  
Based on area under the ROC curves, both models had reliable prediction 
performances. Choosing alternative cutoff probabilities led to about 89% and 64% correct 
prediction of rollover and hazmat release cases. While this ensures the appropriateness of 
the models for inference on this crash data, these models can be utilized for prediction in 
risk-based hazmat transportation decision frameworks, such as routing, facility location, 
and network design. Besides hazmat release probability given a crash, these frameworks 
require quantification of other components of risk, e.g. CTT crash frequency, and 
consequences of hazmat release. 
A limitation of this chapter was the geographic coverage of the analyzed data. A 
source for a national comprehensive police-reported crash data is not available, and each 
state keeps its own crash database, with different variables and not readily available to 
public. Although, Nebraska and Kansas, as two Midwestern states with relatively similar 
traits in terms of weather, roadways and driver behavior may provide results for the 
Midwest, the results may not be generalizable across the U.S. Another limitation was 
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unavailability of some variables in the dataset that could potentially affect probabilities of 
rollover and hazmat release, such as more detailed driver and CTT characteristics, crash 
speed, type and amount of loaded hazmat, etc. (described as unobserved heterogeneity in 
chapter 4). This needs to be taken into account when implementing the policy- and 
decision-making recommendations of this chapter (the fact that some of the observed 
effects of the explanatory variables may be fully or partially the actual effects of other 
unobserved factors). 
Future studies may address these limitations by using more comprehensive 
datasets and possible inclusion of missing information in this study’s data. Utilizing other 
modeling methods and algorithms for inference and prediction may uncover additional 
useful information in future studies.  
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CHAPTER 6 MODELING THE PROBABILITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
RELEASE AT HIGHWAY-RAIL GRADE CROSSINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
Trucks and trains carry substantial amount of hazmat in the U.S., leading to the 
potential of costly hazmat release incidents. While these incidents may occur anywhere 
on the transportation system, crashes at highway-rail grade crossings (HRGCs) may lead 
to hazmat release from either trucks or trains, or both. Identifying the contributing factors 
to hazmat release in HRGC crashes involving a hazmat-carrying truck or train is 
important for setting policies and for making more informed public safety-related 
decisions.  
With a focus on crashes at HRGCs involving hazmat-carrying trucks and/or 
trains, the research objective of this chapter was to identify the effects of highway users’ 
characteristics, truck/train attributes, environment, land-use and HRGC traits on the 
probability of hazmat release from trucks or trains in these crashes. The FRA’s HRGC 
crash dataset (2007-2016) yielded two crash data subsets: 1) crashes involving hazmat-
carrying trucks and 2) crashes involving hazmat-carrying trains. Logistic regression 
models were estimated using each data subset with hazmat release/no release as the 
response variable. Both models provided useful information about the presence and 
magnitude of effects of explanatory variables on hazmat release from these two 
transportation modes. Based on the results, this chapter presents recommendations for 
countermeasures and for policies toward decreasing hazmat release in HRGC crashes. 
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Organization of the remaining of this chapter is as follows. The next section 
presents an additional review of literature on safety of HRGCs. Methods, data and 
variables, and modeling results are the ensuing sections of this chapter. Discussion, 
conclusions and a list of references complete this chapter. 
6.2 Additional Literature Review 
In addition to the general literature review of chapter 2 on hazmat transportation, 
this section reviews studies on safety aspects of HRGCs.  
The majority of studies on safety of HRGCs focused on analysis of crash 
frequency and severity at these transportation junctions. Raub examined the performance 
of four specific warning device classes (crossbucks only, STOP signs, flashing lights and 
gates) at HRGCs and compared their effects on crash frequency (Raub 2006). Hu et al. 
studied and identified factors associated with crash injury severity at HRGCs, which 
included number of daily trains, number of daily trucks, highway separation, an obstacle 
detection device, and approaching crossing marks (Hu, Li, and Lee 2010). Other factors 
that were associated with crash frequency and severity at HRGCs include highway motor 
vehicle driver’s age and behavior, traffic volume, and weather conditions (Hao and 
Daniel 2013; Russo and others 2013). Zhao and Khattak found that greater number of 
highway lanes at HRGCs, the presence of standard flashing-light signals and clear 
weather decreased the likelihood of severe injuries (Shanshan Zhao and Khattak 2015). 
Zhao et al. showed that higher train speed, female pedestrians and commercial land use 
were associated with more severe injuries in pedestrian-train crashes at HRGCs (S. Zhao, 
Iranitalab, and Khattak 2018). Fan et al. identified pick-up trucks, concrete, and rubber 
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surfaces associated with more severe crashes at HRGCs, while truck-trailers, snow and 
fog, and higher daily traffic volumes were more likely to be observed in less severe 
crashes (Fan, Kane, and Haile 2015). 
The contributing factors to crash frequency and severity at HRGCs were 
relatively consistent in the reviewed studies. However, these results do not necessarily 
hold in describing probability of hazmat release, which warrants the investigation of 
hazmat-related crashes at HRGCs. The review of published literature did not uncover 
studies specifically focused on the safety of hazmat transportation at HRGCs by trucks 
and trains. 
6.3 Methods 
This chapter involved estimation of two logistic regression models for capturing 
possible impacts and associations of explanatory variables on the probability of hazmat 
release from hazmat-carrying trucks (Truck Model) and trains (Train Model) in crashes 
reported at HRGCs. Occurrences of hazmat release/no release from trucks and trains 
respectively were binary response variables in the two logistic regression models. 
Explanatory variables included HRGC-related traits, train and highway user 
characteristics, type of crash, and environmental and land-use characteristics.  
6.4 Data and Variables 
Ten-year U.S. HRGC accident/incident data (2007-2016) and HRGC history 
inventory data were obtained from FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration 
Office of Safety Analysis 2017). According to FRA: “Each HRGC accident/incident must 
be reported to the FRA, regardless of the extent of damages or whether a casualty 
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occurred.” Crashes were matched with the inventory dataset based on unique HRGC 
identification number and approximate date of crash. Two subsets of crashes were 
extracted from this dataset: 1) crashes with hazmat-carrying highway users (trucks) 
containing 75 crashes and 2) crashes with hazmat-carrying trains, including 3726 crashes. 
Truck Model and Train Model were estimated using these two subsets, respectively. 
Table 6.1 presents the variables and their statistics for the truck subset, while Table 6.2 
shows similar information for the train subset.  
Table 6.1 Variables and Statistics of the Hazmat-Carrying Truck Data Subset 
Variable Variable Name Values and Statistics 
Response Variable     
Hazmat Release HAZREL 1 = No (45.33%), 2 = Yes (54.67%) 
Explanatory Variables   
Highway User Characteristics   
Type of Vehicle TYPVEH 
1 = Truck (20.00%), 2 = Truck-trailer 
(72.00%), 3 = Pick-up Truck (08.00%) 
Vehicle Speed VEHSPD Mean = 8.3467, Variance = 164.5268 
Driver Age DRIVAGE Mean = 47.3467, Variance = 169.0944 
Driver gender DRIVGEN 1 = Male (98.67%), 2 = Female (1.33%) 
Train Characteristics   
Railroad Class TYPRR 
1 = Class I (81.33%), 2 = Class II (01.33%), 3 
= Class III (17.33%) 
Freight Train FREIGHT 1 = No (21.33%), 2 = Yes (78.67%) 
Train Speed TRNSPD Mean = 32.4110, Variance = 326.5510 
Number of Cars NBRCARS Mean = 51.5135, Variance = 1615.2670 
Crash Characteristics   
Type of Crash TYPACC 
1 = Train Struck Highway User (92.00%), 2 = 
Train Struck by Highway User (08.00%) 
Environment and Land-use Characteristics  
Temperature TEMP Mean = 63.1600, Variance = 473.4335 
Weather WEATHER 
1 = Clear (64.00%), 2 = Cloudy (30.67%), 3 = 
Rain (05.33%), 4 = Fog, Sleet, Snow 
(00.00%)  
Visibility VISIBLTY 
1 = Dawn (06.67%), 2 = Day (70.67%), 3 = 
Dusk (08.00%), 4 = Dark (14.67%)  
Type of Land Use DEVELTYPE 
1 = Open Space (41.33%), 2 = Residential 
(09.33%), 3 = Commercial (10.67%), 4 = 
Industrial (30.67%), 5 = Other (08.00%) 
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HRGC Characteristics   
Cantilever Flashing-Light 
Signals 
CANTALIVERFLS 1 = No (94.67%), 2 = Yes (05.33%) 
Standard Flashing-Light 
Signals 
STANDARDFLS 1 = No (69.33%), 2 = Yes (30.67%) 
Bells BELLS 1 = No (58.67%), 2 = Yes (41.33%) 
Crossbucks CROSSBUCKS 1 = No (32.00%), 2 = Yes (68.00%) 
Gates GATES 1 = No (70.67%), 2 = Yes (29.33%) 
Highway Traffic Signal HWYTRFICSIG 1 = No (98.67%), 2 = Yes (01.33%) 
Audible AUDIBLE 1 = No (80.00%), 2 = Yes (20.00%) 
Stop Sign STOPSIGNS 1 = No (64.00%), 2 = Yes (36.00%) 
Other Control Devices OTHER 1 = No (82.67%), 2 = Yes (17.33%) 
Public/Private HRGC PUBLIC 1 = No (29.33%), 2 = Yes (70.67%) 
 
Table 6.2 Variables and Statistics of the Hazmat-Carrying Train Data Subset 
Variable Variable Names Values and Statistics 
Response Variable     
Hazmat Release HAZREL 1 = No (99.86%), 2 = Yes (0.13%) 
Explanatory Variables   
Highway User Characteristics   
Type of Vehicle TYPVEH 
1 = Auto (42.53%), 2 = Truck/Truck-
trailer/Pick-up Truck (40.55%), 3 = 
Van/Bus/School Bus (03.43%), 4 = 
Pedestrian (04.85%), 5 = 
Motorcycle/Other (08.64%) 
Vehicle Speed VEHSPD Mean = 7.2321, Variance = 128.9675 
Driver Age DRIVAGE Mean = 42.3601, Variance = 299.6472 
Driver gender DRIVGEN 1 = Male (75.46%), 2 = Female (24.54%) 
Train Characteristics   
Railroad Class TYPRR 
1 = Class I (86.23%), 2 = Class II 
(02.60%), 3 = Class III (11.16%) 
Train Speed TRNSPD Mean = 32.7384, Variance = 243.8642 
Number of Cars NBRCARS Mean = 69.1539, Variance = 1322.8460 
Crash Characteristics   
Type of Crash TYPACC 
1 = Train Struck Highway User (82.54%), 
2 = Train Struck by Highway User 
(17.46%) 
Environment and Land-use Characteristics  
Temperature TEMP Mean = 60.8345, Variance = 491.5737 
Weather WEATHER 
1 = Clear (69.78%), 2 = Cloudy (20.33%), 
3 = Rain (05.60%), 4 = Fog, Sleet, Snow 
(04.29%)  
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Visibility VISIBLTY 
1 = Dawn (05.17%), 2 = Day (57.11%), 3 
= Dusk (05.52%), 4 = Dark (23.18%)  
Type of Land Use DEVELTYPE 
1 = Open Space (28.35%), 2 = Residential 
(21.08%), 3 = Commercial (26.79%), 4 = 
Industrial (16.30%), 5 = Other (07.48%) 
HRGC Characteristics   
Cantilever Flashing-Light Signals CANTALIVERFLS 1 = No (80.69%), 2 = Yes (19.31%) 
Standard Flashing-Light Signals STANDARDFLS 1 = No (54.30%), 2 = Yes (45.70%) 
Bells BELLS 1 = No (41.88%), 2 = Yes (58.12%) 
Crossbucks CROSSBUCKS 1 = No (32.00%), 2 = Yes (68.00%) 
Gates GATES 1 = No (70.67%), 2 = Yes (29.33%) 
Highway Traffic Signal HWYTRFICSIG 1 = No (97.61%), 2 = Yes (02.39%) 
Audible AUDIBLE 1 = No (63.88%), 2 = Yes (36.12%) 
Stop Sign STOPSIGNS 1 = No (78.98%), 2 = Yes (21.02%) 
Other Control Devices OTHER 1 = No (83.75%), 2 = Yes (16.25%) 
Public/Private HRGC PUBLIC 1 = No (12.82%), 2 = Yes (87.18%) 
6.5 Modeling Results 
Two logistic regression models were estimated for hazmat release from trucks 
(Truck Model) and trains (Train Model) in crashes at HRGCs. Variable selection was 
based on AICc. Some variables in both models were not statistically significant (at α = 
0.10 level), but were retained in model specifications, since they contributed to the 
models according to AICc (via describing small proportions of variations in the response 
variable and affecting other parameters of the models) (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Table 
6.3 shows the modeling results including estimated coefficients, standard errors, odds 
ratios and 90% profile likelihood ratio confidence intervals for odds ratios. The 
significance of estimated coefficients with 90% confidence can be judged by looking at 
the odds ratios’ confidence intervals (if each interval does not contain 1, hypothesis of 
equality of the coefficient with zero is rejected).  
In hazmat-carrying truck crashes at HRGCs, with 90% confidence and holding all 
the other variables constant except the variable being interpreted, presence of standard 
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flashing-light signals decreased the odds of hazmat release from trucks by an amount 
between 0.0475 to 0.4716 times, relative to its absence. Railroad crossbucks decreased 
the odds of release from trucks by 0.0461 to 0.4065 times and public crossings increased 
these odds by 1.6148 to 15.8892 times, compared to private crossings. Railroad classes II 
and III decreased the odds of release from trucks by amounts between 0.0013 and 0.9781 
and between 0.0496 and 0.4631, respectively, relative to railroad class I. Freight trains 
increased truck release odds by 1.9958 to 17.4551 times, compared to non-freight trains. 
Crossing control devices introduced as “Other Control Devices” (in Table 6.1) decreased 
the odds of release from trucks by 0.0907 to 0.8836 times, compared to absence of these 
control devices. Sufficient statistical evidence was not available to support the existence 
of effects of any other variables that were considered in this study on the release of 
hazmat from trucks in HRGC crashes. 
In hazmat-carrying train crashes at HRGCs, again, with 90% confidence and 
holding all the other variables constant except the variable being interpreted, railroad 
class II increased the odds of hazmat release from trains by 1.3266 to 62.4336 times, 
relative to railroad class I. Railroad class III did not have any significant difference from 
railroad class I regarding the probability of hazmat release from trains. Type of highway 
user changed the probability of hazmat release from trains: trucks, truck-trailers and pick-
up trucks increased the odds of release by an amount between 1.6463 to 57.1876 times, 
compared to automobiles; crashes with motorcycles, other motor vehicles and other 
objects increased these odds by 2.1248 to 112.5912 times, relative to automobiles; 
hazmat release probability did not change in crashes with vans, buses and school buses, 
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and pedestrians relative to automobiles. An increase in temperature by 5o F decreased the 
odds of hazmat release from trains by an amount between 0.7990 to 0.9863 times. Fog, 
sleet and snow increased the odds of release by 1.3229 to 24.0584 times, relative to clear 
weather. There was not enough statistical evidence toward the existence of any impacts 
or association of any other variables on the release of hazmat from trains in HRGC 
crashes. 
  
  
  
Table 6.3 Results of Truck and Train Logistic Regression Models 
Variable c 
Truck Model Train Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Odds 
Ratios 
Odds Ratios 90% 
Confidence Interval Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Odds 
Ratios 
Odds Ratios 90% 
Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Level 
Upper 
Level 
Lower 
Level 
Upper 
Level 
(Intercept) NA 0.1276 0.6314 NA NA NA -7.52731 1.44417 NA NA NA 
TYPACC2 1 -1.5033 1.0194 0.2224 0.0409 1.0216 0.94787 0.66771 2.5802 0.8604 7.738 
STANDARDFLS 1 -1.8406 0.7061 0.1587 0.0475 0.4716 — — — — — 
CROSSBUCKS 1 -1.9297 0.6706 0.1452 0.0461 0.4065 — — — — — 
PUBLIC 1 1.5747 0.7058 4.8294 1.6148 15.8892 — — — — — 
TYPRR2 1 -2.6878 2.4092 0.0680 0.0013 0.9781 2.20836 1.17077 9.1008 1.3266 62.4336 
TYPRR3 1 -1.8332 0.6919 0.1599 0.0496 0.4634 -0.84804 1.12983 0.4283 0.0668 2.7466 
FREIGHT 1 1.7275 0.6682 5.6267 1.9958 17.4551 NA NA NA NA NA 
OTHER 1 -1.2336 0.7053 0.2912 0.0907 0.8836 — — — — — 
TYPVEH2 1 — — — — — 2.27244 1.07845 9.7031 1.6463 57.1876 
TYPVEH3 1 — — — — — 2.32472 1.51188 10.2238 0.8503 122.9214 
TYPVEH4 1 NA NA NA NA NA 2.31776 1.50243 10.1529 0.8577 120.1858 
TYPVEH5 1 NA NA NA NA NA 2.73871 1.20683 15.467 2.1248 112.5912 
TEMP 5 — — — — — -0.02382 0.01281 0.8877 0.799 0.9863 
WEATHER2 1 — — — — — 1.00773 0.68463 2.7394 0.8883 8.4473 
WEATHER3 1 — — — — — 0.80258 1.16608 2.2313 0.3278 15.1896 
WEATHER4 1 — — — — — 1.73017 0.88173 5.6416 1.3229 24.0584 
DEVELTYPE2 1 — — — — — -0.42363 1.22511 0.6547 0.0873 4.9111 
DEVELTYPE3 1 — — — — — 0.42381 0.89897 1.5278 0.3482 6.7025 
DEVELTYPE4 1 — — — — — 1.18478 0.84209 3.27 0.8185 13.0645 
DEVELTYPE5 1 — — — — — 1.53165 0.97012 4.6258 0.9379 22.8138 
—: Not Used in the final model, NA: Not Applicable 
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6.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Standard flashing-light signals, railroad crossbucks and “other crossing control 
devices” (as is in Table 6.1) were effective in reducing the probability of hazmat release 
from trucks in truck-train HRGC crashes. The use of such control devices is 
recommended at HRGCs with high hazmat-carrying truck traffic. Prioritization of safety 
countermeasures implementation may be given to public HRGCs since hazmat release is 
more probable at these locations relative to private crossings. Freight trains were 
associated with higher probability of hazmat release from trucks. This finding is 
reasonable as freight trains are usually longer and heavier relative to other (e.g., 
passenger) trains. HRGCs with more frequent passage of trains that belong to railroad 
classes II and III, and less frequent passage of freight trains were safer for hazmat-
carrying trucks. Routes that minimize the interaction between these trucks with class I 
railroads and freight trains may be preferred and considered in the route selection of 
hazmat-carrying trucks.  
Hazmat-carrying class II railroads were more vulnerable in HRGC crashes 
relative to class I railroads in terms of hazmat release. Extra train hazmat safety 
consideration is recommended for hazmat carrying trains on routes with HRGCs that 
carry high volumes of trucks, truck-trailers and pick-up trucks, and also motorcycle and 
other vehicles (relative to automobiles). With the exception of motorcycles, different 
types of trucks and other vehicles (e.g. recreational vehicles) are heavier than 
automobiles on average, leading to potentially more severe collisions and higher 
probability of hazmat release from trains. Since higher temperature and presence of fog, 
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sleet and snow were associated with smaller and larger probability of hazmat release, 
respectively, weather considerations are recommended in shipping of hazmat by rail and 
may be used in relevant policy-making. 
Both models may be used as a part of a risk assessment framework as explained 
in section 1.3. The framework may include at least two steps: models that predict the 
occurrence of crashes at HRGCs, based on variables such as highway and rail traffic, land 
use, control devices, etc. (e.g. (Oh, Washington, and Nam 2006; Yan, Richards, and Su 
2010)); and models, such as those estimated in this study, that predict the probability of 
hazmat release from trucks, trains, or both, given the occurrence of a crash. The product 
of these two probabilities can provide a hazmat risk measure for each HRGC, useful to 
serve as a prioritization tool for countermeasure implementation or resource allocation. 
As was mentioned in the literature review, a significant number of papers studied 
injury severity of HRGC crashes and used this criterion to evaluate control devices and 
other related factors at HRGCs. It was also mentioned that there was a lack of research on 
hazmat release crashes reported at HRGCs. The question that may arise is whether the 
factors that increase/decrease crash severity at HRGCs are consistent with the factors that 
increase/decrease the probability of hazmat release (positive correlation between crash 
severity and hazmat release). This consistency may question the importance of this study. 
To investigate this possibility, Table 6.4 summarized the results of six studies regarding 
crash severity at HRGC, and the results of this study for comparison. It should be noted 
that, although some variables were defined differently in some studies, the final results 
were consistently reported in this table.  
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Table 6.4 Comparison of the Results of Six HRGC Crash Severity Studies with Hazmat 
Release  
Variables 
Crash Severity Hazmat Release 
(Hao 
and 
Daniel 
2013) 
((Haleem 
and Gan 
2015) 
(Eluru 
et al. 
2012) 
(Shanshan 
Zhao, 
Iranitalab, 
and 
Khattak 
2016) 
(Y. 
Kang 
and 
Khattak 
2017) 
(Shanshan 
Zhao and 
Khattak 
2015) 
Highway 
User 
Train 
TYPACC2 — I I I I I NS NS 
STANDARDFLS — — NS NS I — D NS 
CROSSBUCKS — — D NS I — D NS 
PUBLIC — — — — — — I NS 
TYPRR2 — — — — — — D I 
TYPRR3 — — — — — — D NS 
FREIGHT — — — I — I I NA 
OTHER — — NS — — — D NS 
TYPVEH2 I D NS NA D D NS I 
TYPVEH3 I D D NA NS — NS NS 
TYPVEH4 NA  NS — NA — — NA NS  
TYPVEH5 I NS — NA I — NA I 
TEMP — — D NS — — NS D 
WEATHER2 I NS NS NS I — NS NS 
WEATHER3 I NS D I NS — NS NS 
WEATHER4 I D D I D — NS I 
DEVELTYPE2 D NS — NS NS — NS NS 
DEVELTYPE3 D NS — I NS — NS NS 
DEVELTYPE4 D D — NS D — NS NS 
DEVELTYPE5 D NS — NS NS — NS NS 
OFFPEAK D — — — — — — — 
VEHSPD I — — NA I I NS NS 
VISIBLTY1 I — — — NS NS NS NS 
VISIBLTY3 I — — — I D NS NS 
VISIBLTY4 I — — — I NS NS NS 
TRNSPD I I I I I I NS NS 
DRIVAGE I I I I I I NS NS 
NONPAVED I — — — — — — — 
AADT I D — NS D — — — 
DRIVGEN  — I I I I I NS NS 
BELLS — D — I — — NS NS 
GATES — — I NS NS — NS NS 
HWYTRFICSIG — — NS — NS — NS NS 
AUDIBLE — — NS — NS — NS NS 
STOPSIGNS — — I — D — NS NS 
NBRCARS — — — — I — NS NS 
—: Not Considered in Study, NS: Not Significant, NA: Not Applicable, D: Decrease, I: Increase 
 
 
This comparison shows that there were variables that affected crash severity in 
different studies, almost consistently, but were not associated with hazmat release 
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probability, such as type of crash, train speed, driver age and gender, vehicle speed and 
some types of land-use. The effects of types of highway user, temperature and weather on 
crash severity were inconsistent throughout the severity papers. While these variables 
were not significant in hazmat release from trucks, some of them affected hazmat release 
from trains, but not necessarily in the same way (direction) as in the crash severity. The 
positive effects of standard flashing-light signals, railroad crossbucks and other control 
devices on hazmat release from trucks were not observed in the majority of the crash 
severity literature. Public/private HRGCs and type of railroad were not considered in the 
reviewed crash severity studies, while they were associated with hazmat release. Freight 
trains increased crash severity and the probability of hazmat release from trucks in 
crashes at HRGCs. In general, with an exception of some cases, crash severity modeling 
results were not consistent with hazmat release modeling outcomes, indicating that 
policies and countermeasures based on crash severity studies may not be relevant to 
decreasing hazmat release in crashes at HRGCs. Thus, this underscores the necessity of 
investigating hazmat release in crashes at HRGCs. 
Large proportion of missing values in potentially important variables in the 
dataset and consequently, not using those variables in the model specifications was a 
limitation in this research. These variables included details about HRGC control devices, 
actions of highway users during crashes, sight obstructions, type of hazmat, roadway 
conditions, etc. Similar to chapters 4 and 5, this unobserved heterogeneity and its likely 
effects on the parameter estimates, conclusions and recommendations of this chapter 
should be considered in using the models in practice. Examples of these possible effects 
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include the counterintuitive results regarding the impacts of public/private HRGCs, or 
HRGCs with crossbucks on hazmat release in this chapter. 
For future studies, researchers may address the data issue by using datasets with 
fewer missing values/variables. Other modeling methods can be utilized for analyzing 
hazmat-related crashes at HRGCs that might lead to further insights. Short-term and 
long-term costs and damages of hazmat release at HRGCs may be studied to prioritize 
countermeasures and policies regarding public safety improvements at HRGCs. 
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CHAPTER 7 PREDICTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE IN TRAIN 
INCIDENTS AND CARGO TANK TRUCK CRASHES 
7.1 Introduction 
Quantifying conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains in rail 
incidents and CTTs in highway crashes assists safety agencies and shippers in decision-
making, as this probability is an important component of hazmat transportation risk 
(other components include probability of occurrence of an incident, and consequences of 
hazmat release).  
The objective of this chapter was providing computational tools with reliable 
performance for quantifying probability of hazmat release in train incidents and CTT 
crashes. Hazmat release was considered as a binary response variable (release or no 
release), and statistical and machine learning classification methods were utilized to 
probabilistically classify this binary outcome using explanatory variables. The 
explanatory variables included incident/crash, railroad/roadway, environment, and 
train/CTT characteristics. Some of the incident/crash characteristics were also outcomes 
of the incident/crash, and separate tools were developed for their estimation to use in the 
hazmat release models. The datasets were Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 2012-
March 2018 rail equipment incident data, and combined Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2017 
police reported traffic crash data. Classification methods comprised of logistic regression, 
naïve Bayes, random forests (RF), and support vector machines (SVM). The performance 
assessment of the various methods utilized different criteria, leading to usage 
recommendations for different purposes. 
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7.2 Additional Literature Review 
The additional literature review covers the use of methods of this chapter in the 
transportation safety literature.  
Injury severity of crashes is a multiclass categorical variable and statistical 
models and machine learning techniques are intensively used for classification and 
inference in this field. Examples of statistical models for analyzing injury severity are 
logistic regression or multinomial regression (Abdel-Aty and Keller 2005; Abdel-Aty and 
Abdelwahab 2004; Shaheed and Gkritza 2014; Shanshan Zhao and Khattak 2015; S. 
Zhao, Iranitalab, and Khattak 2018), while examples of machine learning include SVM, 
RF, and neural networks (Iranitalab and Khattak 2017; Li et al. 2012; Abdelwahab and 
Abdel-Aty 2001). This review did not uncover the use of the majority of the methods 
employed in this study for classification and probability estimation of hazmat release 
from trains and CTTs.  
7.3 Methods 
In risk analysis of hazmat transportation, the ability to accurately estimate the 
probability of hazmat release in rail incidents or CTT crashes is important. As was 
discussed in section 1.3, in the context of hazmat transportation, risk has different 
definitions. The majority of them include a form of a multiplication of the probability of 
release from a hazmat carrier by a measure of consequences of release. Probability of 
release is comprised of probability of occurrence of an incident/crash for a hazmat carrier 
and the conditional probability of release given the incident/crash. Some studies have 
investigated probability of occurrence of incidents/crashes for hazmat-carrying trains and 
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trucks, e.g. (Anderson and Barkan 2004; Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1990). This 
chapter focused on estimating probability of hazmat release given an incident/crash using 
classification methods for trains and CTTs. The binary variable hazmat release given an 
incident/crash (yes/no) was the response variable and the explanatory variables included 
incident, railroad, environment, and train characteristics in train incidents and crash, 
trucks, roadway, environment, and driver characteristics for the CTT crashes.  
Similar to chapter 4, this chapter classified hazmat release for trains at two levels: 
train and car. In the train-level classification each row of data was a hazmat-carrying train 
involved in an incident, while in the car-level classification each row was a hazmat-
carrying car on a train involved in an incident. The predicted quantity in the train-level 
and car-level approaches were probability of release from trains and cars, respectively. 
The explanatory variables at each level changed accordingly as in chapter 4. The number 
of cars derailed/damaged in each incident was used in calculation of some of the train-
level explanatory variables. Since this variable was also an outcome of the train incidents, 
predicting its values was necessary to use in the hazmat release classification. Therefore, 
tools for this prediction were also developed in this study and number of 
derailed/damaged cars was the count response variable. 
Classification of hazmat release for CTTs was a similar procedure. Each row of 
data was a hazmat-carrying CTT involved in a crash. One of the explanatory variables 
that was also an outcome of the crash was rollover; a binary variable that indicated if the 
CTT rolled over in the crash. A similar set of explanatory variables were used for 
classifying CTT crashes to rollover/no rollover for use in the hazmat release 
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classification. In the rollover classification, data comprised of the CTT crashes regardless 
of what the CTT has been carrying, hazmat or non-hazmat (since the probability of 
rollover was under study). 
In summary, this study involved four classifications and estimation of a count 
regression model. The classifications include train-level and car-level classification of 
hazmat release, rollover and hazmat release classification of CTTs, and the count 
regression pertained to the number of derailed/damaged cars per train incident. The 
classifiers and the regressors were developed based on a training dataset and compared 
using a test dataset. The classification and regression methods and the performance 
evaluation tools were introduced in chapter 3. 
7.4 Datasets 
Rail incidents and CTT crashes were the two datasets used in this study. This 
section introduces the datasets, along with their variables and statistics. 
7.4.1 Rail Dataset 
Railroad reported incidents including derailments, collisions, crossing incidents 
and other incidents involving a hazmat-carrying train were extracted from the January 
2012-March 2018 U.S. rail equipment incident database (Federal Railroad 
Adminsitration Office of Safety Analysis 2017), with 2012-2016 subset as the training 
dataset and January 2017-March 2018 as the test dataset. The training dataset consisted of 
2581 incidents, 2787 trains, and 39162 hazmat cars and the test dataset had 579 incidents, 
615 trains and 8318 hazmat cars. Car-level data was generated based on the original 
train-level data using information on number of hazmat-carrying cars, and number of cars 
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that released hazmat. Weight of hazmat cars were approximated by dividing the gross 
weight of trains (excluding the power units) by the number of cars in each train. Table 7.1 
and Table 7.2 present the variables and their statistics of the train-level and car-level data, 
respectively. Similar to chapter 4, track classes 1 and X were aggregated in one level for 
the track class variable, as they represented the same maximum speed for freight trains 
(10 mph). Track classes 5 to 9 were aggregated into one level as they were infrequent in 
the data.  
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Train-Level Incident Data 
Variable Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %) 
Response Variables  
Hazmat Release 0 = No (96.73%, 97.07%), 1 = Yes (3.26%, 2.93%) 
Number of 
Derailed/Damaged 
Cars 
Training: Mean = 1.27, SD = 1.66, Test: 1.21, SD = 1.61 
Explanatory Variables  
Incident 
Characteristics 
 
Type of incident 
1 = Derailment (62.68%, 62.76%), 2 = Collision (12.77%, 9.11%), 3 = 
Crossing (8.50%, 9.43%), 4 = Others (16.04%, 18.70%) 
Proportion of 
damaged/derailed 
hazmat cars to all 
hazmat cars 
Training: Mean = 0.2504, SD = 0.3924, Test: Mean = 0.2550, SD = 0.3928 
Locomotive(s) 
derailed 
0 = No (91.96%, 93.66%), 1 = Yes (8.04%, 6.34%) 
Proportion of 
damaged/derailed cars 
to all cars 
Training: Mean = 0.0989, SD = 0.1820, Test: Mean = 0.1079, SD = 0.1987 
Cause of incident 
E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures (12.16%, 13.50%), H = Human Factors 
(39.25%, 38.37%), M = Miscellaneous (20.99%, 20.33%), S= Signal and 
Communication (3.01%, 3.90%), T= Track, Roadbed and Structures (24.58%, 
23.90%) 
Railroad 
Characteristics 
 
Type of railroad 
(Interstate Commerce 
Commission) 
1 = Class I (83.05%, 85.04%), 2 = Class II (0.90%, 0.33%), 3 = Class III 
(16.05%, 14.63%) 
Method of operation 
1 = Signal indication (24.26%, 28.94%), 2 = Direct train control (6.71%, 
6.99%), 3 = Yard/restricted limits (2.08%, 2.44%), 4 = Block register territory 
(0.47%, 0.00%), 5 = Other than main track rules (66.49%, 61.63%) 
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Track class 
1 = Classes 1 and X (67.60%, 61.95%), 2 = Class 2 (7.61%, 8.29%), 3 = Class 
3 (6.71%, 7.80%), 4 = Class 4 (14.46%, 17.40%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (3.62%, 
4.55%) 
Type of track 
1 = Main (32.44%, 37.40%), 2 = Yard (59.78%, 53.01%), 3 = Siding (2.37%, 
2.60%), 4 = Industry (5.42%, 6.99%) 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Temperature Training: Mean = 58.62, SD = 22.28, Test: Mean = 56.58, SD = 23.10 
Visibility 
1 = Dawn (7.86%, 7.48%), 2 = Day (42.59%, 41.95%), 3 = Dusk (7.39%, 
8.13%), 4 = Dark (42.16%, 42.44%) 
Weather 
1 = Clear (66.49%, 65.37%), 2 = Cloudy (22.53%, 25.53%), 3 = Rain (7.14%, 
6.83%), 4 = Fog (1.15%, 0.98%), 5 = Sleet (0.25%, 0.33%), 6 = Snow (2.44%, 
0.98%) 
Train Characteristics  
Train speed (mph) Training: Mean = 12.37, SD = 14.54, Test: Mean = 12.88, SD = 15.26 
Train gross tonnage 
(ton) 
Training: Mean = 4404, SD = 4667.70, Test: Mean = 5111.04, SD = 4742.96 
Proportion of hazmat 
tank-cars to all tank-
cars 
Training: Mean = 0.2947, SD = 0.3095, Test: Mean = 0.2761, SD = 0.3038 
Remote control 
locomotive 
0 = No (80.19%, 85.04%), 1 = Yes (19.81%, 14.96%) 
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety 
Analysis 2017)) 
 
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Train Car-Level Incident Data 
Variable Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %) 
Response Variable  
Hazmat Release 0 = No (99.38%, 99.46%), 1 = Yes (0.62%, 0.54%) 
Explanatory Variables  
Incident 
Characteristics 
 
Type of Incident 
1 = Derailment (67.46%, 65.66%), 2 = Collision (11.89%, 9.59%), 3 = 
Crossing (10.14%, 9.37%), 4 = Others (10.51%, 15.38%) 
Locomotive(s) 
derailed 
0 = No (89.93%, 90.53%), 1 = Yes (10.07%, 9.47%) 
Cause of incident 
E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures (14.38%, 17.25%), H = Human Factors 
(35.03%, 34.70%), M = Miscellaneous (20.01%, 21.78%), S= Signal and 
Communication (1.65%, 1.60%), T= Track, Roadbed and Structures (28.93%, 
24.67%) 
Railroad 
Characteristics 
 
Method of operation 
1 = Signal indication (32.67%, 40.19%), 2 = Direct train control (8.25%, 
9.99%), 3 = Yard/restricted limits (2.75%, 2.55%), 4 = Block register territory 
(0.60%, 0.00%), 5 = Other than main track rules (55.72%, 47.27%) 
Track class 
1 = Classes 1 and X (57.83%, 48.86%), 2 = Class 2 (9.75%, 9.44%), 3 = Class 
3 (10.03%, 13.18%), 4 = Class 4 (20.18%, 23.61%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (2.21%, 
4.92%) 
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Type of track 
1 = Main (43.11%, 51.02%), 2 = Yard (48.92%, 39.87%), 3 = Siding (2.80%, 
3.77%), 4 = Industry (5.17%, 5.34%) 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Temperature Training: Mean = 57.30, SD = 22.57, Test: Mean = 54.01, SD = 24.49 
Visibility 
1 = Dawn (8.15%, 65.69%), 2 = Day (43.68%, 22.93%), 3 = Dusk (6.81%, 
9.91%), 4 = Dark (41.37%, 42.25%) 
Weather 
1 = Clear (65.81%, 63.69%), 2 = Cloudy (22.60%, 22.93%), 3 = Rain (6.84%, 
9.91%), 4 = Fog (2.06%, 0.72%), 5 = Sleet (0.25%, 0.04%), 6 = Snow (2.45%, 
2.72%) 
Train/Car 
Characteristics 
 
Train speed (mph) Training: Mean = 13.89, SD = 14.61, Test: Mean = 14.47, SD = 15.06 
Tank car tonnage (ton) Training: Mean = 77.30, SD = 73.19, Test: Mean = 80.75, SD = 43.29 
Remote control 
locomotive 
0 = No (88.37%, 91.67%), 1 = Yes (11.63%, 8.33%) 
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety 
Analysis 2017)) 
7.4.2 CTT Dataset 
For the CTT classification, 2010-2017 police-reported crash data from the states 
of Nebraska and Kansas were combined (obtained from Nebraska and Kansas 
Departments of Transportation), with 2010-2016 as the training dataset and 2017 as the 
test dataset. Crashes with the involvement of CTTs were extracted from the combined 
dataset. This resulted in 2015 crashes with a CTT involved and 546 crashes with a 
hazmat-carrying CTT involved in the training data. These numbers were 183 and 32 in 
the test data. Trainings for truck rollover used all the CTT-involved crashes (carrying 
hazmat or not), while training for hazmat release used a subset of the data with hazmat-
carrying trucks only. The variables and their statistics are presented in Table 7.3 for all 
CTT crashes and Table 7.4 for hazmat-carrying CTT crashes. 
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics for the CTT Crash Data 
Variable Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %) 
Response Variable  
Rollover 1 = No (84.57%, 93.44%), 2 = Yes (15.43%, 6.56%) 
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Explanatory Variables  
Crash Characteristics  
Vehicle Point of 
Impact 
1 = None (3.08%, 4.37%), 2 = Center front (17.07%, 17.49%), 3 = Center rear 
(6.75%, 7.10%), 4 = Left front (10.87%, 12.57%), 5 = Left rear (5.66%, 
9.84%), 6 = Left side (11.76%, 8.74%), 7 = Right front (14.29%, 8.20%), 8 = 
Right rear (5.26%, 10.93%), 9 = Right side (13.00%, 12.57%), 10 = All areas 
(0.99%, 1.64%), 11 = Other (11.27%, 6.56%) 
Type of Crash 1 = Collision (86.60%, 92.35%), 2 = Non-collision (13.40%, 7.65%) 
Object Involved 1 = No (81.24%, 83.06%), 2 = Yes (18.76%, 16.94%) 
Vehicle Movement 
1 = Straight (61.04%, 59.02%), 2 = Turning left (8.24%, 9.29%), 3 = Turning 
right (7.44%, 6.01%), 4 = Changing lanes (2.73%, 4.92%), 5 = 
Slowing/stopped in traffic (7.49%, 9.29%), 6 = Backing (2.68%, 2.73%), 7 = 
Other (10.37%, 8.74%) 
CTT Characteristics  
Vehicle Body Style 
1 = Single-unit (20.89%, 14.75%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (71.71%, 
75.41%), 3 = Tractor with doubles/triples (0.84%, 1.63%), 4 = Truck tractor 
(0.30%, 2.19%), 5 = Truck with trailer (6.25%, 6.01%) 
Vehicle Make 
1 = Freightliner (22.63%, 25.14%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (10.87%, 8.20%), 3 
= Kenworth (19.90%, 15.30%), 4 = Mack (5.16%, 1.64%), 5 = Peterbilt 
(14.39%, 28.42%), 6 = Other (27.05%, 21.31%) 
Vehicle Age Training: Mean = 7.55, SD = 6.62, Test: Mean = 7.59, SD = 7.49 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.63%, 3.83%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (9.33%, 
19.13%), 3 = More than 26,000 lbs. (88.04%, 77.05%) 
Roadway 
Characteristics 
 
Speed Limit Training: Mean = 53.73, SD = 15.05, Test: Mean = 50.00, SD = 17.68 
Number of Lanes 
1 = One (4.27%, 3.28%), 2 = Two (61.89%, 55.74%), 3 = Three (3.57%, 
6.56%), 4 = Four or more (30.27%, 34.43%) 
Road Surface Type 
1 = Asphalt (55.78%, 46.45%), 2 = Concrete (35.38%, 48.63%), 3 = Dirt 
(1.84%, 0.00%), 4 = Gravel (6.50%3.28%), 5 = Other (0.50%, 1.64%) 
Road Surface 
Condition 
1 = Dry (82.03%, 75.41%), 2 = Ice (3.03%, 8.20%), 3 = Sand/mud (0.99%, 
0.00%), 4 = Slush (0.15%, 0.00%), 5 = Snow (3.42%, 3.82%), 6 = Wet 
(9.23%, 11.48%), 7 = Other (1.14%, 1.09%) 
Road Level 
1 = Level (77.52%, 85.24%), 2 = Hilltop (1.89%, 1.64%), 3 = Slope (20.60%, 
13.12%) 
Road Curvature 1 = Straight (89.53%, 88.52%), 2 = Curved (10.47%, 11.48%) 
Intersection Involved 1 = No (59.85%, 52.46%), 2 = Yes (40.15%, 47.54%) 
Railroad Involved 1 = No (98.96%, 98.91%), 2 = Yes (1.04%, 1.09%) 
In Workzone 1 = No (95.43%, 93.44%), 2 = Yes (4.57%, 6.56%) 
Driver Characteristics  
Driver's Sex 1 = Male (98.06%, 97.27%), 2 = Female (1.94%, 2.73%) 
Driver's Age Training: Mean = 47.55, SD = 12.94, Test: Mean = 47.81, SD = 13.17 
Alcohol Related 1 = No (98.51%, 99.45%), 2 = Yes (1.49%, 0.55%) 
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Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Weather Conditions 
1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.15%, 85.25%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow 
(1.34%, 2.73%), 3 = Fog, smog, smoke (1.49%, 1.09%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… 
(0.10%, 8.74%), 5 = Severe crosswinds (6.80%, 0.00%), 6 = Snow (1.09%, 
2.19%), 7 = Other (3.03%, 0.00%) 
Light Conditions 
1 = Daylight (73.50%, 78.14%), 2 = Dark (21.49%, 18.03%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk 
(5.01%, 3.83%) 
(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation) 
 
Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Hazmat-Carrying CTT Crash Data 
Variable Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %) 
Response Variable  
Hazmat Release 1 = No (87.00%, 87.50%), 2 = Yes (13.00%, 12.50%) 
Explanatory Variables  
Crash Characteristics  
Vehicle Point of 
Impact 
1 = None (3.48%, 3.13%), 2 = Center front (17.58%, 15.63%), 3 = Center rear 
(6.78%, 9.38%), 4 = Left front (10.07%, 9.38%), 5 = Left rear (5.68%, 12.5%), 
6 = Left side (12.27%, 12.5%), 7 = Right front (13.37%, 9.38%), 8 = Right 
rear (4.03%, 9.38%), 9 = Right side (14.10%, 15.63%), 10 = All areas (0.37%, 
0.00%), 11 = Other (12.27%, 3.13%) 
Type of Crash 1 = Collision (86.08%, 90.63%), 2 = Non-collision (13.92%, 9.38%) 
Object Involved 1 = No (85.35%, 90.63%), 2 = Yes (14.65%, 9.38%) 
Vehicle Movement 
1 = Straight (62.09%, 62.50%), 2 = Turning left (7.14%, 6.25%), 3 = Turning 
right (7.14%, 3.13%), 4 = Changing lanes (1.83%, 0.00%), 5 = 
Slowing/stopped in traffic (8.06%, 12.50%), 6 = Backing (1.47%, 3.13%), 7 = 
Other (12.27%, 12.50%) 
Rollover 1 = No (84.57%, 90.63%), 2 = Yes (15.43%, 9.38%) 
CTT Characteristics  
Vehicle Body Style 
1 = Single-unit (21.25%, 15.63%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (69.41%, 
68.75%), 3 = Tractor with doubles/triples (1.47%, 0.00%), 4 = Truck tractor 
(0.37%, 9.38%), 5 = Truck with trailer (7.51%, 6.25%) 
Vehicle Make 
1 = Freightliner (22.63%, 28.13%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (11.36%, 6.25%), 3 
= Kenworth (24.73%, 15.63%), 4 = Mack (4.21%, 0.00%), 5 = Peterbilt 
(28.21%, 37.50%), 6 = Other (11.17%, 12.50%) 
Vehicle Age Training: Mean = 6.30, SD = 5.30, Test: Mean = 5.44, SD = 6.12 
Gross Vehicle Weight 
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.01%, 3.13%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (5.13%, 
6.25%), 3 = More than 26,000 lbs. (92.86%, 90.63%) 
Roadway 
Characteristics 
 
Speed Limit Training: Mean = 54.86, SD = 14.46, Test: Mean = 50.31, SD = 17.27 
98 
 
Number of Lanes 
1 = One (3.85%, 6.25%), 2 = Two (60.26%, 46.88%), 3 = Three (3.85%, 
12.50%), 4 = Four or more (32.05%, 46.88%) 
Road Surface Type 
1 = Asphalt (56.04%, 50.00%), 2 = Concrete (34.98%, 50.00%), 3 = Dirt 
(1.83%, 0.00%), 4 = Gravel (6.41%, 0.00%), 5 = Other (0.73%, 0.00%) 
Road Surface 
Condition 
1 = Dry (81.32%, 90.63%), 2 = Ice (4.40%, 3.13%), 3 = Sand/mud (1.28%, 
0.00%), 4 = Slush (0.18%, 0.00%), 5 = Snow (4.40%, 0.00%), 6 = Wet 
(7.88%, 6.25%), 7 = Other (0.55%, 0.00%) 
Road Level 
1 = Level (76.37%, 84.38%), 2 = Hilltop (1.47%, 3.13%), 3 = Slope (22.16%, 
12.50%) 
Road Curvature 1 = Straight (89.19%, 96.88%), 2 = Curved (10.81%, 3.13%) 
Intersection Involved 1 = No (63.19%, 50.00%), 2 = Yes (36.81%, 50.00%) 
Railroad Involved 1 = No (98.53%, 93.75%), 2 = Yes (1.47%, 6.25%) 
In Workzone 1 = No (95.97%, 100.00%), 2 = Yes (4.03%, 0.00%) 
Driver Characteristics  
Driver's Sex 1 = Male (98.90%, 100.00%), 2 = Female (1.10%, 0.00%) 
Driver's Age Training: Mean = 48.76, SD = 11.92, Test: 47.94, SD = 10.68 
Alcohol Related 1 = No (98.35%, 96.88%), 2 = Yes (1.65%, 3.13%) 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
 
Weather Conditions 
1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.81%, 90.63%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow 
(1.10%, 0.00%), 3 = Fog, smog, smoke (0.73%, 0.00%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… 
(6.59%, 9.38%), 5 = Severe crosswinds (0.92%, 0.00%), 6 = Snow (3.85%, 
0.00%), 7 = Other (0.00%, 0.00%) 
Light Conditions 
1 = Daylight (72.89%, 68.75%), 2 = Dark (22.89%, 28.13%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk 
(4.21%, 3.125%) 
(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation) 
7.5 Results 
This section presents the results of the train (train-level and car-level) and CTT 
conditional hazmat release classification, along with CTT rollover classification and 
prediction of number of cars damaged or derailed in train incidents. While logistic 
regression, mixed logistic regression, naïve Bayes and Poisson regression do not have 
hyperparameters to tune, RF and SVM do require it. Also, since RF was trained using the 
under-sampling technique, cutoff probability was not adjusted (and the default 50% was 
used for classification). However, for other methods ROC curves were developed and 
new cutoff probabilities were adjusted. Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 present the adjusted 
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cutoff probabilities, and the classification and prediction results for train and CTT, 
respectively. Figure 7.1 shows the ROC curves for all classification methods with 
adjusted cutoff probabilities.  
The hyperparameters of RF (v, t and n) were tuned using grid search and out-of-
bag cross validation. In other words, a range of values for these three hyperparameter 
were considered based on literature, and RFs were trained using all possible 
combinations of these values on the training set. Best out-of-bag performances (based on 
precision, recall, F1 Score and AUC) resulted in the best trained RFs (in cross validation 
and final training, each RF was run 15 times and the average of the outcomes was used 
for comparison, due to randomness in the structure of RF). The values used in grid search 
were 𝑣 = 1,2, … , 𝑝, 𝑡 = 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 𝑛 = 1, 10, 20, 50, 100, 
where p is the number of explanatory variables. Similarly, SVM’s hyperparameters (𝛾 
and c) were tuned using grid search and 5-fold cross validation. The grid search values 
included 𝛾 = 2−15, 2−13, … , 212, 214, and 𝑐 = 2−15, 2−13, … , 212, 214. While different 
criteria yielded one single set of hyperparameters for SVM as the best performance in all 
cases, three different sets of hyperparameters were identified for RF in classification. So, 
three RFs are reported in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6. 
The results showed the three RFs had the best performance in train-level hazmat 
release classification, based on different criteria. Two of RFs for car-level hazmat release 
classification had the best performance, as well, while the mixed logistic regression 
model had the best precision. According to RMSE, RF had the best prediction 
performance for number of cars damaged or derailed, while the Poisson regression had 
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better TCE. In classification of CTT rollovers, naïve Bayes had the highest precision and 
F1 score, one of the RFs had the best recall, and logistic regression had the highest AUC. 
SVM and one of the RFs had the highest precision and F1 score for CTT hazmat release 
classification, while logistic regression and naïve Bayes performed better based on recall. 
Naïve Bayes had the highest AUC. 
  
   
Table 7.5 Results of Train and Car-Level Hazmat Release Classification and Number of Damaged/Derailed Cars Prediction 
Train-
Level 
Method Logistic Regression RF 1 RF 2 RF 3 Naïve Bayes SVM 
Parameters - 
𝑣 = 16, 𝑡 = 1000, 
𝑛 = 100 
𝑣 = 2, 𝑡 = 500, 
𝑛 = 1 
𝑣 = 5, 𝑡 = 1000, 
𝑛 = 10 
- 
𝛾 = 2−15 
𝑐 = 214 
Cutoff 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.04 
Release 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 84.25% 15.75% 56.06% 43.94% 91.45% 8.55% 87.31% 12.69% 67.67% 32.33% 85.93% 14.07% 
1 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 41.11% 58.89% 35.56% 64.44% 38.89% 61.11% 38.89% 61.11% 
Precision 8.74% 6.42% 17.19% 13.28% 5.39% 11.58% 
Recall 50.00% 100.00% 58.89% 64.44% 61.11% 61.11% 
𝐅𝟏 Score 14.88% 12.07% 26.61% 22.03% 9.91% 19.47% 
AUC 71.73% 86.53% 84.20% 87.45% 72.59% 83.72% 
Car-Level 
Method 
Mixed Logistic 
Regression 
RF 1 RF 2 RF 3 Naïve Bayes SVM 
Parameters - 
𝑣 = 1, 𝑡 = 500, 
𝑛 = 1 
𝑣 = 3, 𝑡 = 50, 
𝑛 = 1 
𝑣 = 3, 𝑡 = 1000, 
𝑛 = 1 
- 
𝛾 = 2−2 
𝑐 = 210 
Cutoff 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.01 
Release 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 93.82% 6.18% 84.29% 15.71% 92.35% 7.65% 92.61% 7.39% 76.80% 23.20% 82.81% 17.19% 
1 42.22% 57.78% 21.15% 78.85% 32.44% 67.56% 31.11% 68.89% 24.44% 75.56% 37.78% 62.22% 
Precision 4.84% 2.65% 4.59% 4.83% 1.74% 1.93% 
Recall 57.78% 78.52% 67.56% 68.89% 75.56% 62.22% 
𝐅𝟏 Score 8.93% 5.12% 8.59% 9.02% 3.40% 3.75% 
AUC 80.30% 82.96% 83.20% 83.03% 80.53% 73.15% 
Number of 
Cars 
Damaged 
or 
Derailed 
Method Poisson Regression RF SVM 
Parameters - 𝑣 = 2, 𝑡 = 1000, 𝑛 = 1 𝛾 = 20, 𝑐 = 214 
RMSE 2.6313 2.4825 2.9117 
TCE 1.73% 6.74% 9.47% 
  
Table 7.6 Results of the CTT Hazmat Release and Rollover Classification 
Rollover 
Method 
Logistic 
Regression 
RF 1 RF 2 RF 3 Naïve Bayes SVM 
Parameters - 
𝑣 = 21 
𝑡 = 1000 
𝑛 = 100 
𝑣 = 3 
𝑡 = 500 
𝑛 = 1 
𝑣 = 8 
𝑡 = 1000 
𝑛 = 10 
- 
𝛾 = 2−8 
𝑐 = 20 
Cutoff 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Rollover 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 86.55% 13.45% 81.68% 18.32% 93.14% 6.86% 91.70% 8.30% 97.08% 2.92% 96.49% 3.51% 
1 16.67% 83.33% 8.33% 91.67% 32.04% 67.96% 23.33% 76.67% 33.33% 66.67% 33.33% 66.67% 
Precision 30.30% 25.98% 41.14% 39.32% 61.54% 57.14% 
Recall 83.33% 91.67% 67.96% 76.67% 66.67% 66.67% 
𝐅𝟏 Score 44.44% 40.49% 51.25% 51.98% 64.00% 61.54% 
AUC 92.69% 89.58% 89.98% 90.62% 88.79% 91.33% 
Hazmat 
Release 
Method 
Logistic 
Regression 
RF 1 RF 2 RF 3 Naïve Bayes SVM 
Parameters - 
𝑣 = 23 
𝑡 = 100 
𝑛 = 50 
𝑣 = 16 
𝑡 = 500 
𝑛 = 100 
𝑣 = 4 
𝑡 = 500 
𝑛 = 10 
- 
𝛾 = 2−2 
𝑐 = 2−4 
Cutoff 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 
Release 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 64.29% 35.71% 67.86% 32.14% 96.43% 3.57% 76.72% 23.28% 85.71% 14.29% 96.43% 3.57% 
1 25.00% 75.00% 28.33% 71.67% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 25.00% 75.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Precision 23.08% 24.16% 66.67% 23.44% 42.86% 66.67% 
Recall 75.00% 71.67% 50.00% 50.00% 75.00% 50.00% 
𝐅𝟏 Score 35.29% 36.13% 57.14% 31.91% 54.55% 57.14% 
AUC 62.50% 75.60% 69.88% 73.07% 80.36% 62.50% 
 
 
  
    
    
    
Figure 7.1 ROC curves for the classification methods with cutoff probability adjustment. 
104 
 
  
7.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
The main use of estimating conditional probability of hazmat release from trains 
and CTTs is in risk assessment. Risk assessment combined with economic analyses may 
be used for cost-sensitive decision-making. The type of the decision-making problem 
affects the choice of the criteria for comparison of the methods, and consequently the 
choice of the classification method. In other words, the benefits and costs of correctly 
classifying a hazmat release or misclassifying non-release cases as release depends on the 
objectives of the analysis. In train-level classification, for example, based on all criteria, 
RF is preferred. Among different settings for RF, the choice of method depends on the 
usage. RF1 is preferred if the cost of misclassifying non-release cases as release is not 
high, and RF2 is preferred, otherwise. RF3 is the best choice if these costs are not easy to 
estimate or have too many fluctuations. Similar type of analysis for car-level and CTTs 
should be considered.  
Selection of explanatory variables in this study was based on the reviewed 
literature, availability in the data, and avoidance of variables with missing values. In 
practice, variable selection may depend on other factors, as well. For example, a railroad 
company may have access to more detailed information about characteristics of the 
trains, cars, and operations. The use of these variables may affect the performance of the 
methods presented herein. Also, the purpose of classification and the stage of 
classification affects the availability of variables. Some explanatory variables may be 
outcomes of the incident/crash, and independent of all the other explanatory variables. 
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Such information may be unavailable and very hard to estimate, e.g. point of impact in a 
CTT crash. 
The classification methods classify outcomes of the incidents/crashes based on the 
probabilities they calculate for each class. In case of hazmat risk assessment, it is 
important to estimate these probabilities accurately. However, many classifiers are unable 
to produce accurate probability estimates and their initial estimates need to be calibrated 
(Zhong and Kwok 2013; Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana 2005). Some of the most popular 
calibration methods are Platt scaling (Platt and others 1999) and isotonic regression 
(Zadrozny and Elkan 2001, 2002). Among the classification methods of this study, 
logistic regression’s estimated probabilities are automatically calibrated, but RF, naïve 
Bayes and SVM need further calibration by the above methods, before using in risk 
assessment. Since RF used under-sampling, alternative calibration methods such as (Dal 
Pozzolo et al. 2015) can be utilized. 
The major limitations of this chapter were related to the datasets. The FRA rail 
incidents dataset does not include car characteristics. Availability of such information 
may improve the classification performance of the car-level classification. The CTT crash 
data was limited only to two Midwestern states, which may make the results less 
comprehensive and generalizable (a national police-reported crash data is not available). 
Also, there were some missing variables in the CTT data that could potentially affect 
probabilities of rollover and hazmat release, e.g. detailed driver and CTT characteristics, 
crash speed, type and amount of loaded hazmat, etc. For future studies, using other 
incident/crash dataset may address such limitation. Other classifiers and regressors may 
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be applied to the hazmat release problem and the results can compare to this study. 
Classification methods of this study can be implemented to the other components of 
hazmat risk, such as incident/crash frequency and release consequences in the future 
studies.  
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CHAPTER 8 MODELING OF FREQUENCY AND AGGREGATE MEASURES OF 
SEVERITY OF U.S. RAIL-BASED CRUDE OIL RELEASE INCIDENTS 
8.1 Introduction 
Production of crude oil has significantly increased in the U.S. over the past 
decade and trains transport a large portion of this crude oil to the refineries (26% in 2016 
and 12% in 2016). Between 2008 and 2014, the number of annual train carloads of crude 
oil increased by about 5100%. Despite a modest reduction in crude oil carloads after 
2015 due to changes in the U.S. pipeline capacity and international crude oil market, 
more than 200,000 carloads of crude oil were moved by rail in 2016 (Association of 
American Railroads 2017). This constitutes approximately one-fifth of the total hazmat 
moved by trains in that year in the U.S. (Bing et al. 2015). The transportation of large 
quantities of crude oil by trains potentially exposes people living near railways and the 
proximate environment to the ill effects of hazmat in cases of release incidents. The 
objective of this chapter is to estimate statistical models that can identify and quantify the 
effects of volumes and distances of rail-based crude oil transport and other macroscopic-
level variables on the frequency and severity of crude oil release incidents. These models 
may enable decision- and policy-makers to work towards better preparation for dealing 
with such incidents, decreasing crude oil release costs, and predict these costs for future. 
In this chapter, four OD-based statistical models were estimated for rail-based 
crude oil release incidents in the U.S.: one model for frequency and three models for 
measures of aggregate severity (number of released tank cars, quantity released, and total 
costs). State-to-state volume of crude oil movement (as a measure of exposure), transport 
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distance, availability of other modes of transportation and number of competing class I 
railroad companies served as explanatory variables in the models. This chapter utilized 
the 2007-2016 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) rail-
based crude oil release data. Since the state-to-state volume of crude oil movement is not 
available, a Linear Program (LP) was formulated to approximate these volumes of crude 
oil movement based on Energy Information Administration (EIA) higher-level 
production-consumption data (EIA divides the U.S. into 5 districts and reports the crude 
oil movement among these 5 districts). The estimated models quantified the effects of 
explanatory variables on frequency and aggregate measures of severity of crude oil 
release, along with providing a tool for predicting these safety measures for future. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 provides an 
additional literature review, section 3 introduces the methods used in this chapter, section 
4 presents all the datasets that were combined and used in the modeling, section 5 reports 
the modeling results, and conclusions and discussion in section 5 complete this chapter. 
8.2 Additional Literature Review 
The additional reviewed literature focused on transportation of crude oil, and 
macroscopic-level analysis of traffic crashes.  
8.2.1 Crude Oil Transportation 
Exclusive studies on surface transportation of crude oil received more attention in 
the early 2010’s following the crude oil boom in the U.S. Oke et al. presented a medium-
term market equilibrium model of the North American crude oil sector to evaluate 
different strategies, such as restricting rail loads, increasing pipeline capacity, and lifting 
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U.S. crude oil export ban, for mitigating the environmental and public-safety risk due to 
crude oil transportation by rail (Oke et al. 2016). Liu proposed a method for risk 
management of crude oil rail transportation that accounted for track segment specific 
characteristics, train-specific characteristics, and population density along each segment 
(Liu 2016). Liu and Dick estimated unit-train crude oil transportation risk by frequency 
of location-specific rail defect inspection through an optimization framework (Liu and 
Dick 2016). Yazdi and Bagheri compared the risk of transportation of crude oil by 
pipelines, trains and trucks, through a case study and found pipelines as the safest mode 
(Yazdi and Bagheri 2017). Other studies focused on chemical characteristics of different 
types of crude oil, regarding their effects on transportation risk (David Lord et al. 2015; 
Andrews 2014). 
8.2.2 Macroscopic-Level Accident Analysis 
A common macroscopic-level accident analysis in the transportation safety 
literature is crash frequency modeling (Mannering and Bhat 2014). These studies frame 
analytic approaches to identify factors that affect the number of crashes occurring in a 
geographical unit (e.g. a roadway segment, an intersection or a census tract) over a 
specified time period (Dominique Lord and Mannering 2010). The models use different 
explanatory variables, including land-use, demographic, employment, roadway, and 
environmental characteristics (Hadayeghi, Shalaby, and Persaud 2010, 2003; Park and 
Lord 2007). Modeling techniques utilized to account for different aspects of accident data 
included models such as Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, duration, 
multivariate, mixed effects, spatial/temporal correlation, and non-parametric (Mannering 
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and Bhat 2014; Dominique Lord and Mannering 2010). Several studies focused on 
modeling truck accident frequency (Miaou et al. 1992; Harwood, Viner, and Russell 
1990, 1993; Joshua and Garber 1990), and some investigated train accident frequency for 
different type of accidents, especially derailments (Anderson and Barkan 2004; Liu, 
Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017). 
8.2.3 Summary 
The additional literature review revealed the relatively recent crude oil 
transportation literature focused on risk assessment, market equilibrium, mode choice, 
and chemical aspects of crude oil. Despite the availability of macroscopic-level studies of 
traffic accidents, this review did not find any studies focused on modeling hazmat 
incident frequency or other aggregate measures for hazmat-related incidents. As well, this 
review did not uncover the use of OD-based accident frequency models in published 
literature. 
8.3 Methods 
The explanatory variables in this chapter comprised of state-to-state volume of 
crude oil shipment (as a measure of exposure), distance of shipment, availability of other 
modes of transportation, and the number of class I railroads competing for market. This 
chapter used Mixed-effects Negative Binomial Regression (MNBR) for modeling 
frequency and number of tank cars that released crude oil, and Mixed-effects Ordered 
Logit Models (MOLM) for modeling categorized quantity of release and total costs (the 
reason for categorization of these continuous variables is mentioned in the data and 
variables section). As a state-level crude oil movement data was not available to use as an 
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exposure measure in the models, an LP was formulated for approximating the volumes of 
state-to-state crude oil movement volumes.  
The EIA reports the movement of crude oil in the U.S. based on Petroleum 
Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs), which are geographic aggregations of the 
50 states and the District of Columbia into five districts. Figure 8.1 presents a map of 
these districts. Based on the available information regarding annual state production of 
crude oil, annual state capacity of petroleum refineries, state-to-state transportation 
distance, unit-price of crude oil transportation for different modes (rail, pipeline and 
water), and the PADD-to-PADD movement of crude oil by transportation mode 
information, an LP was formulated to approximate annual state-to-state volume of crude 
oil movement. In other words, the LP disaggregates the PADD-to-PADD crude oil 
movement data to the state-to-state level based on the above additional information.  
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Figure 8.1 Map of U.S. states, PADDs, oil and gas wells, refineries, and their geometric 
centroids (from various sources mentioned in the data and variables section). 
Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 be volume of crude oil movement from state i to refineries in state j by 
transportation mode m (rail, pipeline and water), 𝑑𝑖𝑗 be the defined distance from state i 
to state j, 𝑐𝑚 be the cost per unit volume per unit distance of transportation of crude oil 
by mode m, 𝑃𝑖 be the annual crude oil production of state i, 𝑅𝑗 be the annual petroleum 
refinery capacity for state j, 𝑁𝑘 be a set of states that belong to PADD k, and 𝑇𝑘𝑙,𝑚 be the 
annual volume of crude oil movement from PADD k to PADD l by transportation mode 
m. The formulated LP for minimizing the total cost of crude oil movement in the U.S., 
denoted by Z, is as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑍 =  ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑚
3
𝑚=1
50
𝑗=1
50
𝑖=1
 (8.1) 
subject to: 
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(𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 = 𝑃𝑖
3
𝑚=1
50
𝑗=1
                                 for 𝑖 = 1 to 50 
(𝑖𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 ≤ 𝑅𝑗
3
𝑚=1
50
𝑖=1
                                for 𝑗 = 1 to 50 
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 = 𝑇𝑘𝑙,𝑚
𝑗𝜖𝑁𝑙𝑖𝜖𝑁𝑘
                          for 𝑘 = 1 to  5, 𝑙 = 1 to 5, 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3 
(𝑖𝑣) 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 ≥ 0                                                  for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1 to 50 and 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3 
The objective function Z is the total costs of movement of crude oil among all the 
50 U.S. states. Constraint (i) for each state i, assures that the volume of crude oil moved 
from state i to all other states j is equal to the total crude oil produced in state i. 
Constraint (ii) holds the annual volume of crude oil moved to each state less than or equal 
to the annual refining capacity of the state. Constraint (iii) satisfies the PADD-to-PADD 
crude oil movement by transportation mode among states, and Constraint (iv) is the non-
negativity constraint. For 50 origins, 50 destinations, 3 modes of transportation, and 5 
PADDs, the LP included 7500 decision variables, 150 type (i) equality constraints, 150 
type (ii) inequality constraints, 60 type (iii) equality constraints, and 7500 non-negativity 
constraints. The Simplex method (Dantzig, Orden, and Wolfe 1955) was used to solve the 
LP in this study. 
The underlying assumptions of the LP include: 
- Minimizing the overall transportation costs of the movement of crude oil provides an 
approximation of the crude oil shippers’ decision on the volumes and destinations of 
shipment, 
- 𝑐𝑚𝑠 by mode are equal across the U.S., regardless of origins and destinations, 
- Crude oil produced in a certain year is shipped to refineries in the same year, 
- Transportation cost is the only factor affecting mode and destination choice. 
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8.4 Data and Variables 
The data used in this study comprised of a number of datasets obtained from 
different sources. These included U.S. crude oil release rail incidents data, state 
production of crude oil, crude oil wells and refineries locations, state capacity of crude oil 
refining, PADD-to-PADD data of crude oil movement by water, pipeline and rail, U.S. 
class I railroads maps, and U.S. crude oil pipeline and waterway maps. This section 
presents these datasets and the final variables. 
Transportation distance was used as a cost factor in the LP (equation 8.1), and 
also used as an explanatory variable that affected frequency and severity of incidents. 
This study defined this distance as the geodesic (the shortest path between two points on 
a sphere) distance between each state’s origin points to all the states’ destinations points. 
Origin points of each state were defined as the geometric centroid of the crude oil wells 
in that state, and the destination points of each state was defined as the geometric centroid 
of the refineries located in that state. Origin/destination was the geometric centroid of the 
state, if there were not wells/refineries located in that state. The location information of 
2016 U.S. oil and gas wells and 2017 U.S. refineries were obtained from FracTracker 
(FracTracker n.d.) and the EIA (Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2017a), 
respectively. This study calculated the geometric centroids of oil and gas wells and 
refineries in each state (origins and destinations), and the distances from all origins to all 
destinations using the geographic information system software ArcGIS version 10.5.1. 
Figure 8.1 presents this information.  
115 
 
The LP introduced in the methodology section was solved for ten years (2007-
2016) to approximate the state-to-state crude oil movement volumes. The LP’s input data 
was from different sources. Distance (𝑑𝑖𝑗) was defined as above and was assumed 
constant throughout the ten years. It was sufficient to consider the cost of moving crude 
oil by mode m, 𝑐𝑚, in a relative manner. Based on an internet search of crude oil carriers, 
the costs of moving crude oil by rail was assumed 7.15 times as large as pipeline and 5 
times as large as water (𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙= 5.0, 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒= 0.7 and 𝑐𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 1.0). Despite the existence of 
spatial and temporal variations in these ratios, they were assumed constant in this study, 
as the LP was very insensitive to changes of these values (less than 1% changes in the 
output) due to consideration of constraint (iii) which assures the correct share of modes. 
Annual crude oil production (𝑃𝑖), annual petroleum refinery capacity (𝑅𝑗) and the annual 
PADD-to-PADD volume of crude oil movement were from EIA (Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 2017b) for 2007-2016.  
Two variables captured the possible effects of availability of other modes or other 
class I railroad companies on frequency and severity of incidents. This was based on the 
hypothesis that in case of availability of pipelines and/or waterway for movement of 
crude oil, the railroad companies may try to decrease their price to stay in a competitive 
mode by decreasing their costs, leading to a lower level of safety. Also, the larger the 
number of competing class I railroad companies are available between the origin and 
destination, similar intention may result in cheaper but less safe transportation. A binary 
variable accounted for availability of other modes based on the petroleum pipelines and 
waterways for petroleum movement maps, obtained from EIA (Energy Information 
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Administration (EIA) 2017a). A continuous variable captured the number of available 
class I railroads between origins and destinations, based on the class I railroad maps 
available from Association of American Railroads (Association of American Railroads: 
Freight Rail Works n.d.). 
Ten-year data (2007-2016) of crude oil release incidents from trains in the U.S. 
was extracted from the PHMSA incident database by the Incident Reports Database 
Search tool (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Office of 
Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). According to PHMSA, the reported incidents are 
either reported through telephone within 12 hours after occurrence for more severe 
incidents or through a written notice within 30 days for other incidents. The incidents that 
require telephonic notice include cases “where: 1) as a direct result of a hazardous 
material a person is killed or injured requiring admittance to a hospital, the general 
public is evacuated for one hour or more, a major transportation artery or facility is 
closed or shut down for one hour or more, or the operational flight pattern or routine of 
an aircraft is altered; 2) fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected radioactive contamination 
occurs involving a radioactive material; 3) fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected 
contamination occurs involving an infectious substance other than a regulated medical 
waste; 4) a release of a marine pollutant occurs in a quantity exceeding 119 gallons for a 
liquid or 882 pounds for a solid; 5) a situation exists of such a nature that, in the 
judgment of the person in possession of the hazmat, it should be reported; or 5) during 
transportation by aircraft, a fire, violent rupture, explosion or dangerous evolution of 
heat occurs as a direct result of a battery or battery-powered device. Other incidents 
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include: 1) an unintentional release of a hazmat during transportation including loading, 
unloading and temporary storage related to transportation; 2) a hazardous waste is 
released; 3) an undeclared shipment with no release is discovered; or 4) a specification 
cargo tank 1,000 gallons or greater containing any hazmat that received structural 
damage to the lading retention system or damage that requires repair to a system 
intended to protect the lading retention system, and did not have a release.” 
The extracted data included 460 release incidents, 680 released tank cars, 
1,738,926 gallons of released crude oil and $65,608,355 total damages. Total damages 
included carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation costs, 
injuries/fatalities, and roadway closure (costs of evacuation were assumed $250 per 
person-day (Saat et al. 2014), monetary costs of not-hospitalized injury as the only type 
of injury/fatality that occurred in the dataset was assumed $62,500 per injury (Iranitalab 
and Khattak 2017), and roadway closure was assumed to cost $218,000 per day (Erkut, 
Tjandra, and Verter 2007; Mallela and Sadavisam 2011)). This dataset included the origin 
and destination of movement of each train that was involved in the release incidents. 
Using this information, the annual frequency of incidents, number of tank cars, quantity 
of crude oil released, and total costs for each pair of states (with at least one incident) 
were extracted. Pairs of states with larger-than-zero approximated crude oil movement 
volumes were added to the dataset with zero for frequency and severity of incidents. 
Volumes and other variables (distance, other modes and other class I railroad companies) 
were also added. The final dataset comprised of 318 rows; each row was a pair of states 
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with positive volume of crude oil exchange in one of the years 2007-2016. Table 8.1 
presents a summary of the variables. 
Table 8.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics of the Final Dataset 
Variable Variable Type Values and Statistics 
Response Variables 
Frequency  Count Min = 0, Max = 17, Mean = 1.3648, Var. = 5.6772 
Number of Tank 
Cars 
Count Min = 0, Max = 35, Mean = 2.0440, Var. = 19.6511 
Quantity Released 
Continuous 
(gallons) 
Min = 0, Max = 475176.00, Mean = 5451.20, Var. = 
1.93E+09 
Categorical 
Categories: = 0, 0 < ≤100, 100 < ≤10000, >10000 
Ratios: 0 (45.77%), 1 (47.34%), 2 (04.07%), 3 (02.82%) 
Total Costs 
Continuous 
(2016 U.S. 
Dollar) 
Min = 0, Max = 25,632,806, Mean = 205,669, Var. = 
2.71E+11 
Categorical 
Categories: = 0, 0 < ≤15000, 15000 < ≤100000, 
>100000 
Ratios: 0 (56.43%), 1 (33.86%), 2 (04.39%), 3 (05.33%) 
Explanatory Variables 
Volume (volume) 
Continuous 
(1000 barrels) 
Min = 0, Max = 1.54E+05, Mean = 1.75E+04, Var. = 
9.35E+08 
Distance (distance) 
Continuous 
(miles) 
Min = 67.03, Max = 2384.39, Mean = 742.0607, Var. = 
2.20E+05 
Other Modes 
(omodes) 
Dichotomous Yes (38.99%), No (61.01%) 
Number of Class I 
Railroad Companies 
(railroads) 
Count Min = 0, Max = 3, Mean = 1.3648, Var. = 0.8066 
The variances of the two continuous response variables (quantity released and 
total costs) were very large. This was due to a few extremely large values relative to the 
other values in these two variables, which could cause biased estimates, if a linear 
regression model was utilized (Nachtsheim et al. 2004). Natural logarithm or a root 
transformation were possible solutions for this issue, however as logarithm of zero is not 
computable and model interpretation of a root transformed response variable is not as 
conclusive, an ordinal categorization of these variables was preferred. Categorization also 
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alleviated the effects of possible inconsistency and inaccuracies in reporting and 
approximating costs and quantities. The thresholds of the categories were determined 
based on the variables’ dispersion between maximum and minimum values, and abating 
the effects of the very large values without excluding them.  
8.5 Modeling Results 
This section presents the results of the four models estimated for frequency and 
aggregate measures of severity of crude oil release rail incidents. The frequency model 
used the number of incidents between each pair of states with positive crude oil 
transportation volume as the response variable in an MNBR. The three aggregate severity 
models used three criteria as response variables to account for severity of incidents, 
again, between each pair of states with positive crude oil transportation volume: 1) the 
number of tank cars that released crude oil; 2) the quantity of crude oil released; and 3) 
the total monetary costs of crude oil release. The tank car model was also a MNBR. The 
quantity of release and total costs models were MOLM.  
In all the four models, the explanatory variables included volume and distance of 
crude oil shipment between pairs of states as continuous variables, availability of other 
modes of transportation as a binary variable (yes/no), number of available class I 
railroads as an integer variable (0-7), and quadratic and interaction terms for volume and 
distance variables. Three grouping factors were considered in the models: year; origin-
destination state pairs; and origin-destination PADD pairs. All the four main variables 
(volume, distance, other modes and railroad companies) were used in the models 
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regardless of their statistical significance, while the inclusion of quadratic and interaction 
terms, and the grouping factors were decided based on AICc values (Cavanaugh 1997).  
Table 8.2 presents the estimated coefficients, likelihood ratio (LR) test p-values 
and estimated standard deviations of random effects for the intercepts. The quadratic 
form of volume of crude oil was significant in all models, while the quadratic form of 
distance and the interaction of distance and volume did not contribute to any of the 
models in terms of AICc, and were excluded. The contribution of three grouping factors 
varied among the models which led to different random effects specifications. Random 
effects for variables other than the intercept did not contribute to the models’ AICc.  
Equations 8.2 to 8.5 present the estimated equations for the frequency, tank cars, 
quantity, and costs models, respectively. In these equations ?̂?𝑖 is the estimated frequency 
of crude oil rail incidents, ?̂?𝑡 is the estimated number of tank cars released crude oil, 
?̂?(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗) is the estimated probability of amount of crude oil release falling in a category 
equal or smaller than category j, ?̂?(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗) is the estimated probability of costs of crude 
oil release falling in a category equal or smaller than category j, 𝑋1 is the amount of crude 
oil shipped between a pair of states in thousand barrels per year, 𝑋2 is the geodesic 
distance between a pair of states in miles, 𝑋3 is the availability of modes other than rail 
(pipeline/water) between a pair of states, 𝑋4 is the number of available class I railroad 
companies between a pair of states, e is the base of natural logarithm and N(𝜇, 𝜎2) 
denotes a normal distribution with mean of 𝜇 and variance of 𝜎2. The other parameters 
are similar to their definitions in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑒
−2.76761+0.00003𝑋1−0.000000000168𝑋1
2+0.00131𝑋2+0.31678𝑋3+0.61329𝑋4+?̂?𝑠+?̂?𝑝 , (8.2) 
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?̂?𝑠~𝑁(0, 0.8090
2), ?̂?𝑝~𝑁(0, 0.2076
2).  
?̂?𝑡 = 𝑒
−2.79799+0.00004𝑋1−0.000000000207𝑋1
2+0.00148𝑋2+0.29936𝑋3+0.58017𝑋4+?̂?𝑠 , 
?̂?𝑠~𝑁(0, 1.0840
2).  (8.3) 
?̂?(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − ?̂?(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗)
= 𝑒?̂?𝑗0−0.00009𝑋1+0.000000000462𝑋1
2−0.00508𝑋2−1.77976𝑋3−1.00642𝑋4+?̂?𝑠+?̂?𝑝+?̂?𝑦 , 
?̂?𝑠~𝑁(0, 3.34268
2), ?̂?𝑝~𝑁(0, 1.88159
2), ?̂?𝑦~𝑁(0, 0.07415
2),   
?̂?00 = 0, ?̂?10 = 5.711, ?̂?20 = 13.773, ?̂?30 = 15.263.  
(8.4) 
?̂?(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − ?̂?(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗)
= 𝑒?̂?𝑗0−0.00008𝑋1+0.000000000400𝑋1
2−0.00271𝑋2−1.18009𝑋3−0.55749𝑋4+?̂?𝑠+?̂?𝑝 , 
?̂?𝑠~𝑁(0, 1.623
2), ?̂?𝑝~𝑁(0, 1.397
2),    
?̂?00 = 0, ?̂?10 = 4.433, ?̂?20 = 8.206, ?̂?30 = 9.068.  
(8.5) 
This chapter used percentage change (PC) and odds ratios (OR) for interpretation 
of MNBR and MOL, respectively. Confidence intervals (CI) were calculated for these 
two measures, along with point estimates to assist with model interpretation. As the 
quadratic form of the variable volume was in the final models, PC or OR for this variable 
was a function of itself, while they were independent for other variables. Therefore, Table 
8.3 presents point estimates and 95% CIs for PCs and ORs for variables distance, 
omodes, and railroads, while Figure 8.2 illustrates these measures for volume, 
corresponding to a range of values for volume. Parametric bootstrap and Wald 95% CI’s 
were calculated for MNBR and MOL models, respectively. The value of c in calculating 
PC and OR for volume, distance, omodes, and railroads were 1000, 100, 1, and 1, 
respectively.  
   
Table 8.2 Estimation Results of the Four Incident Frequency and Severity Models 
Model Components Variables 
Frequency Model Tank Cars Model Quantity Released Model Total Costs Model 
Coefficient 
LR Test p-
value 
Coefficient 
LR Test p-
value 
Coefficient 
LR Test p-
value 
Coefficient 
LR Test p-
value 
Fixed 
Effects 
Main 
Effect 
Intercept -2.76761 -2.79799 5.711, 13.773, 15.263 4.433, 8.206, 9.068 
Volume 0.00003 0.00000 *** 0.00004 0.00000 *** 0.00009 0.00022 *** 0.00008 0.00001 *** 
Distance 0.00131 0.00000 *** 0.00148 0.00000 *** 0.00508 0.00000 *** 0.00271 0.00005 *** 
Other Modes 0.31678 0.14582  0.29936 0.23414  1.77020 0.06852 . 1.20350 0.07169 . 
Railroad 0.61329 0.00000 *** 0.58017 0.00005 *** 1.00220 0.09064 . 0.67910 0.13693  
Quadratic 
and 
Interaction 
Terms 
Volume2 -1.68E-10 0.00046 *** -2.07E-10 0.00015 *** -4.62E-10 0.01367 * -4.00E-10 0.00129 *** 
Distance2 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Volume*Dist. — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Standard Deviation 
of Random Effects 
for the Intercept 
States 0.809 1.084 3.34268 1.623 
PADDs 0.2076 — 1.88159 1.397 
Year — — 0.07415 — 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
—: Not used in the model due to not contributing to the model according to AICc 
Table 8.3 95% Confidence Intervals and Point Estimates of PCs and ORs 
Variables 
Frequency Model Tank Cars Model Quantity Released Model Total Costs Model 
Percentage Change Percentage Change Odds Ratios Odds Ratios 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
of CI 
Upper 
Bound 
of CI 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
of CI 
Upper 
Bound 
of CI 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
of CI 
Upper 
Bound 
of CI 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
of CI 
Upper 
Bound 
of CI 
Distance 14.01 7.78 19.08 15.92 8.00 21.10 1.66 1.31 2.11 1.31 1.14 1.51 
Other Modes 37.27 -9.11 104.88 34.90 -18.24 117.16 5.93 0.84 42.05 3.25 0.85 12.43 
Railroad 84.65 39.45 129.55 78.63 27.50 129.39 2.72 0.82 9.10 1.75 0.84 3.63 
  
  
  
  
Figure 8.2 95% confidence intervals and point estimates of PC and OR for volume in the four estimated models. 
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Inclusion of value of “0” in CI’s calculated for PC’s and inclusion of value of  “1” 
in CI’s calculated for OR’s denote the lack of evidence towards the statistical 
significance of the variable’s effects on or association with the response variable. With 
95% confidence and holding all variables constant except the variable being interpreted, 
the models can be interpreted as follows: 
For each 100-mile increase in the distance of crude oil shipment by rail between 
pairs of states, the frequency of crude oil release incidents increased by 7.78% to 19.08%. 
This change in distance led to 8.00% to 21.10% increase in the number of released tank 
cars. Corresponding to the 100-mile increase in distance, the odds of increase in quantity 
released from any of the predetermined levels to a higher level changed by 1.31 to 2.11 
times. This change also resulted in 14% to 51% positive change in the odds of increase in 
total costs from any level to a higher level.  
The models indicated lack of evidence for existence of any impacts from 
availability of modes of transportation (other than rail) from the origin states to the 
destination states on frequency or severity of crude oil release incidents. However, the 
number of class I railroad companies between states was statistically significant in the 
frequency and tank car models. One unit increase in the number of class I railroad 
companies resulted in an increase in the frequency of crude oil release incidents by 
39.45% to 129.55% and in the number of release tank cars by 27.50% to 129.39%. 
Statistical evidence was not sufficient for the effects of this variable on quantity released 
or total costs. 
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Figure 8.2 shows how point estimates and CI’s for volume’s PC and OR change 
as a function of volume itself. For each 1-million-barrel per year increase in the shipment 
of crude oil between a pair of states, sufficient statistical evidence was found regarding 
the response variables limited to restricted volumes. The frequency of incidents increased 
by variable amounts less than 5%, up to a volume point of approximately 32 million 
barrels. The number of tank cars released crude oil increased by a value between 0 to 6%, 
up to a volume point of approximately 40 million barrels. Quantity released and total 
costs increased by less than 20% and 15%, respectively and for up to approximately 23 
million and 29 million barrels per year. The accurate amount of change can be calculated 
for all possible values of volume using the PC and OR estimated equations reported in 
Figure 8.2. With 95% confidence, sufficient statistical evidence was not found for effects 
of volume on the response variables for values higher than the ones mentioned. In all four 
models, approximately after 100 million barrels, increase in volume was identified to 
decrease frequency and aggregate severity of incidents, not statistically significantly. This 
may be due to lack of sufficient observation in this volume range, relative to lower values 
for volume. 
8.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
There are multiple factors that affect crude oil shippers’ destination choice. These 
include type of crude oil, type and capacity of refineries in the destination, transportation 
monetary and non-monetary (e.g. time) costs, etc. Distance affects transportation costs as 
it is correlated with price of transportation and time. But due to presence of other 
variables mentioned above, farther refineries may be more attractive to crude oil shippers. 
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This chapter quantified the effects of distance on frequency and aggregate measures of 
severity of incidents. Therefore, shippers are suggested to include these values in terms of 
monetary or non-monetary costs in their destination choice procedure, potentially leading 
to closer destinations. Policy-makers may consider these quantified impacts, in terms of 
restricting shippers in their refinery destination choice and/or penalizing the choice of 
further destinations. This may decrease potential costs of crude oil release incident, 
benefiting the crude oil shippers and the society, simultaneously. 
This chapter hypothesized that class I railroad companies attempt to decrease their 
costs (leading to more risky performance and more incidents), in order to stay 
competitive with other transportation modes (pipeline and water) and other class I 
railroad companies. Although presence of other modes was not found to exacerbate 
safety statistically, competition with other class I railroad companies was significantly 
associated with lower level of safety, in terms of frequency of incidents and number of 
tank cars released crude oil. Policy-makers may account for this factor in formulating 
safety policies. Also, based on this finding, incident response facilities may be more 
concentrated close to routes connecting origin-destination pairs with competing class I 
railroad companies for crude oil transportation. 
As expected, the larger the volume of crude oil shipped from one state to another, 
the greater was the frequency and aggregate severity of incidents between the two states. 
The finding that the rate of increase in frequency and aggregate severity reduced by 
increase in volume can be attributed to several reasons: higher volumes of shipment of 
crude oil may be more frequent between those pairs of states that have this interaction 
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routinely and consequently have a safer performance due to a lower level of uncertainty. 
Similarly, shipments with lower volumes may face more uncertainties due to smaller 
frequency, leading to more incidents and lower level of safety. Larger shipments of crude 
oil may occur more frequently between closer pairs of origin and destination, resulting in 
less sensitive-to-changes impacts on frequency and severity of incidents.  
In this chapter, the four response variables, despite being interdependent, captured 
different phenomena with different objectives. While a safety planner may be more 
interested in prediction of the frequency and the costs of the incidents, emergency 
response or environmental agencies may find prediction of quantity of release more 
useful. Railroad insurance companies may prefer a prediction tool for costs of incidents, 
while number of released tank cars may be more important from a railroad engineering 
point of view. Policy-makers may focus on any of the models, based on their priorities. 
Frequency models consider all incidents equally, regardless of the size and consequences 
of release. Such an approach is advantageous as it considers potential costs in, for 
example, incidents with potentially large consequences that occurred with small 
consequences due to fast response or occurrence in a small-populated location. As a 
disadvantage, these models treat less-concerning incidents, such as non-accident releases, 
similar to very costly incidents. The use of the frequency model along with at least one of 
the aggregate severity models is recommended in practice. 
The estimated models can be used for prediction in the future by inputting 
predicted values for the explanatory variables. Calculated distances among states may 
change in the future based on changes in number and locations of oil wells and refineries. 
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Transportation modes and railroad companies’ information may be predicted for future to 
use in the models. The parameters of the LP, including productions, refining capacity, 
and PADD-to-PADD shipment volumes need projection for future, based on historic 
data. Variations of the LP may approximate volumes of transportation of other hazmat 
among states. The LP needs modification depending on the hazmat, available modes of 
transportation, type of origin/destination, available production and consumption data, and 
available auxiliary information (such as the PADD information in case of this chapter). 
U.S. production of crude oil peaked in 2015 and faced a reduction in 2016. Also, 
the amount of crude oil moved by rail in the U.S. peaked in 2014 and decreased in 2015 
and 2016. These along with safety improvements have led to a smaller number of rail 
crude oil-release incidents in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014. However, this reduction 
does not affect the importance of this study because of several of reasons: the future of 
crude oil production and transportation depends on many factors, including international 
crude oil market and prices, domestic demand, economic factors, governmental decisions, 
etc., and the production and movement of crude oil may increase again in the coming 
years; similar sudden and unexpected increases in the rail transportation demand of crude 
oil or other hazmat may occur in the future, and this chapter provided a framework to 
study such occasions; and the amount of movement of crude oil by rail and the resulting 
release incidents, even after the recent reduction, is still considerable and necessary to 
address. 
One limitation of this chapter was the inevitable assumptions made due to lack of 
data availability. The majority of these assumptions were made in the formulation and 
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parameter tuning of the LP. It was attempted to minimize the sensitivity of the results due 
to the assumptions, however there may be still possible differences in the conclusions of 
this chapter as a result of different assumptions. The other limitation was in the 
categorization of the continuous response variables (quantity of crude oil release and total 
costs). It was preferable to model these two variables as continuous response variables 
and estimate the quantified effects of explanatory variables on them directly. 
Nevertheless, due to inconsistency in approximating and reporting of these values, very 
large variations, and the impossibility of the utilization of a useful transformation, these 
variables were categorized. Also, similar to chapters 4, 5 and 6, unobserved heterogeneity 
may be an issue in the models of this chapter as well and needs to be considered in using 
the models and their outcome in practice. 
Future studies may focus on modeling frequency of crude oil-carrying train 
incidents, regardless of releasing the crude oil, and modeling the probability of release of 
crude oil, given an incident, separately. This approach can provide the effects of 
microscopic factors, such as characteristics of crude oil, train, railroad, etc., on 
occurrence of crude oil release incidents. Such a study requires a dataset of crude oil-
carrying train incidents. The use of other statistical methods for modeling or machine 
learning methods for better prediction performance may also be investigated. 
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CHAPTER 9 JOINT AND SEPARATE MODELING OF TYPES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RAIL-BASED CRUDE OIL RELEASE INCIDENTS 
9.1 Introduction 
The transportation of large quantities of crude oil by rail potentially exposes 
people living in vicinity of railways and the proximate environment to the ill effects of 
hazmat in case of incidents leading to release. Various factors can affect the likelihood of 
incidents and consequences of crude oil release. Identifying these factors can assist crude 
oil shippers, railroad companies and policy-makers with decisions resulting in safer crude 
oil transportation.  
The main objectives of this chapter were identification of the factors that affect 
the types and consequences of crude oil release from trains, quantification of these 
effects, and investigation of the effects of types and consequences of crude oil release on 
the resulting costs and damages. The considered factors that can impact types and 
consequences of release included characteristics of crude oil, tank cars, and release 
incidents. On January 2, 2014, PHMSA issued a safety alert warning that the type of 
crude oil transported from the Bakken region may be more flammable than traditional 
heavy crude oil (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), n.d.). A secondary objective 
of this chapter was testing the hypothesis of the PHMSA safety alert throughout the 
statistical modeling. 
The investigation in this chapter involved estimation of two separate multinomial 
response models for types of crude oil release (gas dispersion, spillage and both) and 
consequences of crude oil release (fire, explosion and none), and one joint multinomial 
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response model, for types and consequences of release. This chapter used the 2007-2016 
PHMSA U.S. rail-based crude oil release data. Estimation of a robust linear regression 
model captured the effects of the types and consequences of crude oil release on total 
post-release costs, including carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation 
costs, injuries/fatalities, and roadway closure. 
An additional literature review pertaining to shipping of crude oil follows this 
introduction. The ensuing section presents the methods of this chapter, dataset and 
variables. Results from the modeling effort, their interpretations, discussion and 
conclusions complete this chapter. 
9.2 Additional Literature Review 
Liu proposed a method for optimal safety risk management of rail transportation 
of crude oil. The model accounted for track segment specific characteristics (segment 
length, track class, method of operation, and annual traffic density), train-specific 
characteristics (train length, train speed, and tank car safety design), and population 
density along each segment. He measured segment-specific risk by the expected number 
of affected persons. Also, the model estimated the average interval between release 
incidents (Liu 2016). Oke et al. presented a medium-term market equilibrium model of 
the North American crude oil sector to evaluate different strategies for mitigating the 
environmental and public-safety risk due to crude oil transport by rail. They reported that 
an integrated policy of restricting rail loads, increasing pipeline capacity, and lifting US 
crude oil export ban can address medium-term risk of crude oil transport by rail (Oke et 
al. 2016). 
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Following PHMSA’s safety alert regarding the possible extra flammability of the 
sweet light crude oil of the Bakken region relative to traditional heavy crude oil, several 
studies investigated the chemical characteristics of this crude oil. Lord et al. reviewed 
these studies and concluded that due to significant variability in criteria and procedures 
used in selection, acquisition, and analysis of crude oil samples, the available information 
was of insufficient quality to enable a meaningful comparison of crude oils. According to 
Lord et al., current methods for crude oil hazard classification and packing were often 
inadequate (David Lord et al. 2015). This provided the motivation to investigate the 
validity of PHMSA’s safety alert in this research. 
9.3 Methods 
This section introduces the statistical approaches used in this chapter by first 
discussing multinomial response models (used for separate and joint modeling of types 
and consequences of release of crude oil), and then discussing continuous outcome 
models (used in modeling post-release costs). 
9.3.1 Multinomial Response Models for Types and Consequences of Release 
Two modeling approaches were considered: estimating two separate multinomial 
models for types and consequences of release; and estimating one joint model for types 
and consequences of release, assuming a joint probability distribution for these two 
variables. Figure 9.1 shows the outcomes of the release incidents based on their 
frequencies in the dataset.  
In the separate approach, the response variables in the two estimated models were 
multinomial and indicated the type or consequence of crude oil release. One model with 
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spillage (base level), gas dispersion, and simultaneous spillage and gas dispersion as 
categories of the response variable was estimated. The categories for the consequences 
model included fire, explosion and none (base level). Multinomial regression models 
were used with characteristics of crude oil, tank car, and release incidents as the 
explanatory variables.  
In the joint approach, the response variable was constructed as a combination of 
the types and consequences of release. Based on the possible combined outcomes for the 
new response variable applicable to the dataset (refer to Figure 9.1), this variable had 5 
levels: 1) spillage with no consequence; 2) spillage and fire; 3) spillage and explosion; 4) 
gas dispersion and no consequence; 5) both types of release and no consequence. Again, 
multinomial regression with a similar set of explanatory variables were used in the 
modeling.  
 
Figure 9.1 Types and consequences of crude oil release. 
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The definition of odds ratios in this chapter is slightly different from section 3.6. 
In the separate consequences model, for example, odds for explosion are the probability 
of explosion divided by the probability of no explosion in an incident of crude oil release. 
For c-unit increase in a continuous explanatory variable, x, the odds ratios are interpreted 
as “the odds of explosion vs. no consequences (the base level) change by OR times for 
every c-unit increase in x, holding the other variables constant”. If x is a categorical 
explanatory variable, the value of c is 1, and the interpretation will be “the odds of 
explosion vs. no release consequence change by OR times as large for x =1 than for x = 
0, holding other variables constant” (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011). 
The interpretation of odds ratios for other levels of the separate models and for the joint 
model is in a similar manner. 
9.3.2 Continuous Response Model for Post-Release Costs 
Linear regression models were used, with costs as continuous response variables, 
and types and consequences of release, and two other factors as explanatory variables. 
The objective of estimation of these models was testing whether the types and 
consequences of release of crude oil significantly affect the post-release costs and 
quantifying the possible effects. 
One issue with such a statistical approach for modeling costs of release incidents 
is the distributional assumptions of a regular linear regression (Normal error distribution) 
do not necessary hold, and a heavy-tailed error term distribution is expected (due to 
presence of numerous small and non-costly reported incidents as opposed to few very 
costly release incidents). One remedy is to remove influential observations from the data 
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prior to model estimation. Another approach, termed “robust regression”, is to use a 
fitting criterion that is not as vulnerable as least squares to influential data points (Fox 
and others 2002). While there are different methods for robust regression, the most 
common type is M-estimation, which can be considered as a generalization of the ML 
estimation (Fox and others 2002).  This approach was utilized in this chapter and was 
implemented by the iterated re-weighted least squares. More information and details are 
available in (Huber 2011; Hampel et al. 2011). 
9.4 Data and Variables 
Similar to chapter 8, ten-year data (2007-2016) of crude oil release incidents from 
trains in the U.S. was extracted from the PHMSA database using the Incident Reports 
Database Search tool (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and 
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). PHMSA incident data description and 
reporting criteria are available in section 8.3. Missing values in the variables that were 
used in the modeling resulted in less than 3.8% decrease in the dataset’s size, leading to a 
final set of 638 tank cars.  
Table 9.1 presents the variables and their respective statistics. The bakken 
variable indicated whether the crude oil was shipped from the Bakken region and should 
have been categorized as Bakken light sweet crude oil or not.  This variable was formed 
based on the origin state of the shipment (North Dakota or Montana). The packing group 
information was available in the dataset. Packing group I, II and III represent great, 
medium and minor danger, respectively. The criteria for assigning packing group for 
crude oil is based on flash point and initial boiling point of the crude oil, that shippers 
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should obtain through laboratory tests (Class 3-Assignment of Packing Group 2010). 
Information regarding tank head puncture resistance system and tank insulation was 
extracted from the tank car specification marking (Specifications for Tank Cars 2012), 
that was available in the dataset. Tank head puncture resistance system is capable of 
sustaining coupler-to-head impacts of the relative speed of 18 mph, usually accomplished 
by the installation of separate head shields or full-head tank jackets made of 1/2-inch-
thick steel on each end of the tank car (Allen D. Maty 2017). Tank insulation is used to 
moderate the temperature of crude oil during transportation (Allen D. Maty 2017). 
FRA provides the definition of Non-Accident Releases (NARs) as: “the 
unintentional release of a hazmat while in transportation, including loading and 
unloading while in railroad possession, that is not caused by a derailment, collision or 
other rail related accident. NARs consist of leaks, splashes, and other releases from 
improperly secured or defective valves, fittings, and tank shells, and include venting of 
non-atmospheric gases from safety relief devices.” NARs were detected in the data based 
on the provided narrations. 
Table 9.1 Variables and Their Statistics 
Variable Names Values and Statistics 
Response Variables   
Type of Release type Spillage (86.21%), Gas Dispersion (08.93%), Both (04.86%) 
Consequence of Release cons Fire (07.21%), Explosion (07.21%), None (85.58%) 
Joint Type and 
Consequence of Release 
typecons 
Spillage and None (71.79%), Spillage and Fire (07.21%), 
Spillage and Explosion (07.21%), Gas Dispersion and None 
(08.93%), Both and None (04.86%) 
Explanatory Variables   
Bakken Crude Oil bakken 0 = No (51.72%), 1 = Yes (48.28%) 
Packing Group pack.group I (51.88%), II (30.41%), III (17.71%) 
Tank Head Puncture 
Resistance System punc.res 0 = No (90.28%), 1 = Yes (09.72%) 
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Tank Insulation insulated 0 = No (95.45%), 1 = Yes (04.54%) 
Tank Design Pressure 
(psi) dsgnpress mean = 107.97, variance = 3207.14 
Quantity Released 
(gallon) quant.rel mean = 2994.55, variance = 56620119 
Non-Accident Release 
(NAR) nar 0 = No (20.53%), 1 = Yes (79.47%) 
Similar to chapter 8, post-release costs, available in the dataset, included 
carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation costs, injuries/fatalities, and 
roadway closure (costs of evacuation were assumed $250.00 per person-day (Saat et al. 
2014), monetary costs of not-hospitalized injury as the only type of injury/fatality that 
occurred in the dataset was assumed $62500.00 per injury (Iranitalab and Khattak 2017), 
and roadway closure was assumed to cost $218,000.00 per day (Erkut, Tjandra, and 
Verter 2007; Mallela and Sadavisam 2011)). The minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation of the costs were $0.00, $25,330,322.00, $146,792.00 and 
$1,365,787.00, respectively. 
9.5 Modeling Results 
This section presents the estimated statistical models. These include multinomial 
regressions capturing the impacts of crude oil, tank car design and incident characteristics 
on types and consequences (separately and jointly) of release of crude oil in a train 
incident and a robust linear regression model quantifying the effects of type and 
consequence of release of crude oil on the post-release costs.  
9.5.1 Models for Types and Consequences of Release 
The variables used in each model and the p-values of the LR tests are presented in 
Table 9.2. Variable selection was performed using LR test and AICc (Bilder and Loughin 
2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011). 
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Table 9.2 p-values of the LR Test in the Release Type and Release Consequence Models 
Variables 
Separate Joint 
Type of Release 
Consequence of 
Release 
Type and 
Consequence of 
Release 
Crude Oil Characteristics bakken 0.00062 *** 0.09105 . 0.00181 ** 
 pack.group 0.00101 ** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
Tank Car Characteristics punc.res 0.00000 *** 0.07486 . 0.00000 *** 
 insulated 0.00198 ** —  0.01316 * 
 dsgnpress 0.48524  —  —  
Incident Characteristics nar 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
 quant.rel NA  0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1   
—: Not Used, NA: Not Applicable 
Point estimates of the odds ratios and their 95% CI for the release type with 
“spillage” as the base level are presented in Table 9.3. With 95% confidence and subject 
to keeping all the other variables (rather than the variable being interpreted) constant, the 
model interpretations are as follows. The odds of gas dispersion vs. spillage, and both 
types of release vs. spillage change by an amount between 0.29 to 0.98 times, and 0.05 to 
0.55 times, respectively, for the light sweet crude oil from Bakken region. Packing group 
II decreased the odds of gas dispersion vs. spillage by 0.14 and 0.64 times relative to 
packing group I. These values were estimated as 0.08 to 0.84 for packing group III. 
Equipment of tank cars to puncture resistance system changed the odds of gas dispersion 
vs. spillage by an amount between 2.35 to 9.70 times, and both release types vs. spillage 
by an amount between 4.49 to 33.67 times. Insulation of the tank cars increased the odds 
of both release types vs. spillage only by 2.58 to 20.26 times. The odds of gas dispersion 
vs. spillage were increased by an amount between 1.74 to 466.39 times, for NARs. Other 
than these effects, there was no sufficient evidence on the impacts of explanatory 
variables on the types of release. 
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Table 9.3 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence 
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Type Models 
Variables c 
Gas Both (Gas and Spillage) 
Point 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Crude Oil 
Characteristics 
bakken 1 0.53 0.29 0.98 0.17 0.05 0.55 
pack.groupII 1 0.30 0.14 0.64 1.09 0.41 2.85 
pack.groupIII 1 0.27 0.08 0.84 2.10 0.77 5.74 
Tank Car 
Characteristics 
punc.res 1 4.77 2.35 9.69 12.30 4.49 33.67 
insulated 1 1.32 0.37 4.69 7.23 2.58 20.26 
dsgnpress 25 0.97 0.80 1.18 0.93 0.77 1.13 
Incident 
Characteristics 
nar 1 28.51 1.74 466.39 11.01 0.62 195.69 
Table 9.4 presents the odds ratios and 95% CI’s for the consequences of crude oil 
release model, with “none” as the base level. With 95% confidence and holding all the 
other variables except the variable being interpreted constant, it can be said that packing 
group II, relative to packing group I increased the odds of explosion vs. no release 
consequence by an amount between 1.61 to 158.93 times. There was no sufficient 
evidence towards the existence of any impacts of packing group II on fire and packing 
group III on fire and explosion, relative to packing group I. NARs, relative to accident 
releases, decreased the odds of fire and explosion vs. no consequence, by amounts 
between less than 0.01 to 0.11 times, and less than 0.01 and 0.06 times, respectively. The 
odds of fire and explosion vs. no release consequence in a crude oil release incident 
increased for every 1000-gallon increase in quantity of release of crude oil by a 
percentage between 13.69% to 37.56% and 12.96% to 37.91%, respectively. Sufficient 
evidence was not available to support the existence of any effects of Bakken region crude 
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oil, tank head puncture resistance system, tank car insulation and tank car design pressure 
on fire or explosion. 
Table 9.4 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence 
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Consequence Models 
Variables c 
Fire Explosion 
Point 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Crude Oil 
Characteristics 
bakken 1 4.04 0.58 28.34 14.39 0.47 436.77 
pack.groupII 1 0.52 0.05 5.50 15.98 1.61 158.93 
pack.groupIII 1 0.48 0.07 3.06 0.08 0.00 2.40 
Tank Car 
Characteristics 
punc.res 1 5.56 0.86 35.96 0.79 0.03 21.21 
insulated 1 — — — — — — 
dsgnpress 25 — — — — — — 
Incident 
Characteristics 
nar 1 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.06 
quant.rel 1000 1.25 1.14 1.38 1.25 1.13 1.38 
—: Not Used 
Table 9.5 presents the odds ratios and 95% CI’s for the joint model of type and 
consequences of crude oil release, with “spillage and none” as the base level. Again, with 
95% confidence and holding all the other variables except the variable under 
interpretation constant, Bakken crude oil decreases the odds of simultaneous spillage and 
gas dispersion with no consequences vs. spillage with no consequences by an amount 
between 0.07 to 0.58 times. Packing group II, relative to packing group I, increased the 
odds of spillage and explosion vs. spillage and no consequences by an amount between 
1.70 to 138.33 times, while it decreased the odds of gas dispersion and no consequences 
vs. spillage and no consequences by 0.14 to 0.65 times. Packing group III, relative to 
packing group II, decreased the odds of gas disperse and none vs. spillage and none by an 
amount between 0.07 to 0.66. Equipment of tank cars to puncture resistance system 
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increased the odds of gas dispersion with no consequences, and both types of release with 
no consequences vs. spillage with no consequences by amounts between 2.41 to 10.03 
and 4.73 to 35.98 times, respectively. Insulation of the tank cars increased the odds of 
spillage and explosion vs. spillage with no consequences by an amount between 1.82 to 
17146.04 times, while it increased the odds of both types of release and no consequences 
by 2.87 to 22.31 times. The odds of spillage with fire, spillage with explosion, as opposed 
to spillage and no consequences for an NAR were decreased by amounts between less 
than 0.01 to 0.14 times and less than 0.01 and 0.06 times, respectively. A 1000-gallon 
increase in the amount of released crude oil increased the odds of spillage with fire, and 
spillage with explosion vs. spillage with no consequences by amounts between 12.88% to 
36.17% and 12.13% to 36.38%, respectively. 
Table 9.5 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence 
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Consequence Models 
Variables c 
Spillage and Fire Spillage and Explosion 
Point 
Estimate 
95% 
CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% 
CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
95% 
CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Crude Oil 
Characteristics 
bakken 1 3.31 0.47 23.20 19.99 0.56 719.82 
pack.groupII 1 0.48 0.05 4.55 15.33 1.70 138.33 
pack.groupIII 1 0.45 0.08 2.66 0.04 0.00 1.67 
Tank Car 
Characteristics 
punc.res 1 5.94 0.92 38.16 0.82 0.03 23.04 
insulated 1 1.85 0.02 154.96 176.68 1.82 17146.04 
dsgnpress 25 — — — — — — 
Incident 
Characteristics 
nar 1 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.06 
quant.rel 1000 1.24 1.13 1.36 1.24 1.12 1.36 
Variables c 
Gas Dispersion and None Both and None 
Point 
Estimate 
95% 
CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% 
CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
95% 
CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Crude Oil 
Characteristics 
bakken 1 0.55 0.29 1.02 0.18 0.06 0.58 
pack.groupII 1 0.30 0.14 0.65 1.12 0.42 2.94 
pack.groupIII 1 0.21 0.07 0.66 1.74 0.64 4.73 
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Tank Car 
Characteristics 
punc.res 1 4.92 2.41 10.03 13.05 4.73 35.98 
insulated 1 1.38 0.39 4.97 7.99 2.86 22.31 
dsgnpress 25 — — — — — — 
Incident 
Characteristics 
nar 1 7.95 0.54 116.85 9.98 0.43 233.75 
quant.rel 1000 1.08 0.90 1.30 1.19 0.99 1.43 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
—: Not Used      
9.5.2 Model for Post-Release Costs 
A robust linear regression model was estimated at the incident level, using total 
costs as the response variables, and types of release and consequences of release as the 
explanatory variables. The point estimates and 95% CI’s for the estimated coefficients, 
along with LR test p-values and standard errors are presented in Table 9.6. LR test results 
and CI’s indicate there was not enough evidence in the dataset to show that variations in 
types of release affected the costs, directly. However, the estimated coefficients for fire 
and explosion, along with NAR variable and quantity released were statistically 
significant in the model. These variables changed damage costs by amounts between the 
upper and lower bounds of the CI’s reported in Table 9.6. 
Table 9.6 95% CI's for the Damage Costs Robust Linear Regression Models (rounded to 
nearest $1) 
Coefficients Point 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error LR Test p-value 
95% CI 
Lower Bound 
95% CI 
Upper Bound 
(Intercept) 253,274.38 936.22 —  251,439.42 255,109.33 
Gas Dispersion -291.41 454.96 0.52220  -1,183.12 600.30 
Spillage 303.96 563.48 0.58990  -800.44 1,408.36 
Fire 2,072,608.65 1205.57 0.00000 *** 2,070,245.79 2,074,971.52 
Explosion 13,529,080.97 2188.78 0.00000 *** 13,524,791.03 13,533,370.91 
NAR -251,744.34 755.17 0.00000 *** -253,224.45 -250,264.23 
Quantity Released 28,860.20 192.79 0.00000 *** 28,709.20 29,011.26 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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9.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Sufficient evidence was not found in the data to show the light sweet crude oil of 
Bakken region significantly increased the probability of fire and explosion in case of 
release. Release of this type of crude oil was found less probable to lead to gas dispersion 
or simultaneous spillage and gas dispersion, relative to spillage. Therefore, the results of 
this chapter statistically cannot confirm PHMSA’s safety alert regarding the possibility of 
Bakken crude oil being more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil or other light 
sweet crude oil. While, in case of release, this type of crude oil is more probable to spill 
rather than disperse as gas, there was no sufficient evidence that spillage is costlier than 
gas dispersion, according to the costs model. So, evidence in this data do not support the 
hypothesis that transportation of Bakken crude oil by rail results in a different degree of 
risk, relative to other types of crude oil moved by rail in the U.S. 
The crude oil categorized as packing groups II (medium danger) and III (minor 
danger) decreased the probability of gas dispersion, and packing group II increased the 
probability of explosion, relative to crude oil packing group I (great danger). This might 
be due to possible inaccuracies in results of flash point and initial boiling point tests, or 
effects of other potential important variables that were not considered in this study. This 
finding was consistent with one of the findings of Lord et al. (David Lord et al. 2015), the 
inadequacy of current methods for assignment of crude oil transportation hazard 
classification and packing group. Based on these results, safety-related decisions solely 
based on packing groups are not suggested.  
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Tank car head puncture resistance system and tank car insulation were not found 
to be directly associated with probability of fire or explosion (except for the ignorable 
case of insulation and explosion in the joint model with an unusually wide CI, possibly 
due to small variation in the variable values), but they increased the likelihood of gas 
dispersion. The danger crude oil-carrying trains expose to the populations near railroads 
due to toxic gas dispersion, and a corresponding possible explosion with no time for 
evacuation (although not observed in the data but an example is the Lac-Mégantic rail 
disaster in Canada) is not negligible. So, based on the results, the use of such tank cars is 
not recommended for crude oil-carrying trains that pass though residential areas, while 
they may be preferred in other routes, since far from population gas dispersion may be 
preferred to spillage, due to generally lower probability of fire and explosion. 
For each thousand-ton increase in quantity of crude oil spillage, the probability of 
fire, explosion and total costs increased, significantly. This can be considered in terms of 
the quantity of crude oil that is loaded in each tank car, especially the tank cars with 
fewer safety design features, or tank cars with higher propensity to derail in an incident, 
depending on their position in a train (Saccomanno and El-Hage 1991, 1989; Liu, Saat, 
and Barkan 2014). NARs were associated with higher probability of gas dispersion, and 
lower probability of fire and explosion. Due to significantly smaller quantities of crude 
oil release in these releases, compared to accident-caused releases, they are generally less 
hazardous, and according to the costs models, they cause approximately 250 thousand 
dollars less than other releases on average. Countermeasures regarding prevention of such 
releases, e.g. regular and frequent inspection of valves, can be prioritized for 
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implementation based on the corresponding costs and benefits. Regarding the costs 
model, decision-makers may consider how the consequences of release of crude oil from 
trains affect damage and recovery costs. A more expensive countermeasure that is likely 
to prevent explosions more efficiently may be preferred over a less costly countermeasure 
that performs better towards fire prevention, despite its extra costs. The estimated costs 
that these release consequences cause should be considered in a cost-benefit analysis for 
decision-making. 
The results of the joint and separate models were consistent, and the magnitudes 
and directions of the odds ratios were relatively similar. Both approaches provided 
informative outcomes, useful in inference, and interpretation of the relationships between 
the explanatory and response variables. The differences in the results of the joint and 
separate approaches indicated how using a joint modeling framework for types and 
consequences of crude oil release from trains to account for the possible interdependence 
between these two variables was informative. However, estimation and interpretation of 
only the separate models assuming no correlation between the two response variables 
could be sufficient with regards to the general results and conclusions. As was mentioned 
in chapter 8, reduction in number of rail-based crude oil release incidents does not affect 
the importance of this study because of similar reasons. 
One limitation of this chapter was the unavailability of other potentially important 
variables in the dataset, including other tank car and release characteristics. Some of 
these variables were available in the dataset, but due to large proportion of missing 
values, were not used in this study (such as causes of release, tank cars capacity, amount 
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of material in tank cars, age of tank cars, material of construction, shell and head 
thickness, train speed, and weather conditions). This may have caused bias in the results, 
conclusions and recommendations of this chapter due to unobserved heterogeneity and 
should be considered in practice. Besides fire and explosion, entering a waterway/sewer 
system and environmental damage were the other two reported consequences of release 
of crude oil in the dataset. However, they were not considered in this study, since they are 
not independent of the environment where the release occurred, and the environmental 
information was not available in the dataset.  
For future studies, researchers may address the mentioned limitations of this 
chapter by obtaining datasets that are more comprehensive, in terms of safety design of 
tank cars, release details, and environmental characteristics. Other modeling techniques 
and data analysis approaches may be applied to crude oil release data, which might 
uncover other useful findings. Similar modeling approaches can be utilized for 
investigating types and consequences of other hazmat releases from different modes of 
transportation, such as trucks and pipelines.  
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CHAPTER 10 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary of the research and the conclusions of each of the six 
area foci of this dissertation, followed by recommendations for future studies. 
10.1 Train-Level and Car-Level Modeling of Hazardous Materials Release in Railroad 
Incidents 
This effort quantified the impacts of incident type, railroad, environment and 
train/car characteristics on the probability of hazmat release in a hazmat-carrying train 
incident and provided a prediction tool for hazmat release. Two sets of models utilized 
the FRA 2012-2016 rail equipment incident dataset. The units of analyses for these two 
sets were trains and hazmat cars. Logistic regression and mixed logistic regression were 
investigated to account for hazmat release and potential single-level and two-level 
grouping in the data (due to possible hazmat release interdependence among hazmat cars 
belonging to a train and trains belonging to an incident). Development of ROC curves 
improved the prediction performance of the models by defining an appropriate cut-off 
point.  
 Results showed that derailment increased hazmat release probability more than 
other incident types. Incidents due to signal and communication causes were most likely 
to result in hazmat release. Higher proportion of damaged/derailed hazmat cars and 
proportion of hazmat cars in a train, track classes 2 and 3, higher train speed, and train 
gross tonnage were the other important factors. Results of mixed models showed hazmat 
release from cars belonging to a train were interdependent and hazmat release from trains 
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belonging to an incident were independent. While models at both levels led to useful 
results, car-level models had better prediction performance.  
Future studies may utilize other explanatory variables to investigate their effects, 
such as hazmat car specification and safety design, and type of hazmat on the hazmat 
release probability. This requires the use of a more comprehensive train incident data. 
The effects of incident causes on hazmat release at a more detailed level in train incidents 
can be the emphasis of a future study. 
10.2 Rollover and Hazardous Materials Release Models for Cargo Tank Truck Crashes 
CTTs are one of the major surface transportation carriers of hazmat in the U.S. 
CTT’s rollover crashes are the leading cause of injuries and fatalities from hazmat 
transportation incidents. CTTs are susceptible to rollover crashes due to their size, 
distribution of weight, a higher center of gravity, and the surging and sloshing of liquid 
cargo during transportation. This endeavor concentrated on identification and 
quantification of the effects of various factors on the probability of rollover and release of 
hazmat in CTT-involved crashes, and developing a prediction tool for these probabilities. 
BMA-based logistic regression models were estimated with rollover and hazmat release 
as the binary response variables, and crash, trucks, roadway, environment, and driver 
characteristics as the explanatory variables. States of Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2016 
police reported crash data were combined and filtered for CTT-involved crashes and used 
in modeling.  
Salient results were: non-collision crashes were more likely to result in rollovers; 
side impacts to CTTs and severe crosswinds increased the likelihood of rollovers; heavier 
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and older trucks were more prone to rollovers; tractor and semi-trailer decreased the 
probability of rollover compared to all other body styles; and collisions with objects and 
higher posted speeds increased rollover probability. Rollover and involvement of 
intersections in the crash increased the likelihood of hazmat release. ROC curves 
indicated substantial prediction performance for both models, and ensured 
appropriateness of the modeling approach for inference on the crash dataset. 
 Future studies may attempt to use more comprehensive datasets that include other 
explanatory variables that could potentially affect probabilities of rollover and hazmat 
release, such as more detailed driver and CTT characteristics, crash speed, type and 
amount of loaded hazmat, etc. Utilizing other modeling methods and algorithms for 
inference and prediction may uncover additional useful information in future studies. 
While CTTs are one of the major truck carriers of hazmat, other types of trucks are also 
used for this matter. Similar investigation may be considered for those trucks. 
10.3 Modeling the Probability of Hazardous Materials Release at Highway-Rail Grade 
Crossings 
Crashes at HRGCs that involve a truck or a train carrying hazmat expose people 
and the environment to the potentially severe consequences of hazmat release. This 
research involved statistical modeling of the probability of hazmat release from trucks 
and/or trains in crashes at HRGCs to identify factors associated with hazmat release. The 
FRA HRGC crash dataset (2007-2016) yielded two subsets of crashes: 1) those involving 
hazmat-carrying trucks and 2) those involving hazmat-carrying trains.  
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Results from a logistic regression model using data subset 1 (crashes involving 
hazmat-carrying trucks) with hazmat release/no release as the response variable showed 
that standard flashing signal lights, railroad crossbucks, and railroad classes II and III 
(relative to railroad class I) were associated with lower hazmat release probability from 
hazmat-carrying trucks. Hazmat release probability from trucks was higher with freight 
train involvement. Results from a logistic regression model using data subset 2 (crashes 
involving hazmat-carrying trains) revealed that hazmat release probability from trains 
was lower with warmer temperature. However, the probability of release from trains was 
greater with railroad class II (relative to railroad class I), type of highway user (different 
types of trucks and motorcycle relative to automobiles) and weather conditions (fog, sleet 
or snow, relative to clear). A comparison of the results from this study with HRGC crash 
severity studies highlighted the importance and usefulness of this study. 
For future studies, researchers may use other HRGC crash data that include other 
potentially important explanatory variables, e.g. details about HRGC control devices, 
actions of highway users during crashes, sight obstructions, type of hazmat, roadway 
conditions, etc. Different modeling approaches may be utilized for analyzing hazmat-
related crashes at HRGCs that might lead to further insights. Short-term and long-term 
costs and damages of hazmat release at HRGCs may be studied to prioritize 
countermeasures and policies regarding public safety improvements at HRGCs. 
10.4 Prediction of Hazardous Materials Release In Train Incidents and Cargo Tank Truck 
Crashes 
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Quantifying conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains in rail 
incidents and CTTs in highway crashes is an important component of hazmat 
transportation risk as it assists safety agencies and shippers in decision-making. The 
objective of this focus was identifying computational tools with reliable performance for 
quantifying probability of hazmat release in train incidents as well as CTT crashes. 
Hazmat release (release or no release) was classified by statistical and machine learning 
methods (logistic regression, naïve Bayes, RF, and SVM) using available and relevant 
explanatory variables. The datasets were FRA rail equipment incident data, and 
combined Nebraska and Kansas police reported traffic crash data.  
The results were compared based on precision, recall and area under ROC curves 
(AUC). RF had the best performance in classifying hazmat release for trains and railcars 
in almost all cases, based on different criteria. For CTTs, SVM and RF had the highest 
precision, while logistic regression and naïve Bayes performed better based on recall. 
Naïve Bayes had the highest AUC. The research provided recommendations regarding 
usage of the classifiers and regressors depending on the purpose of analysis. 
For future studies, using other incident/crash datasets may address limitation of 
datasets of this focus, in terms of geographic diversity and potentially important 
explanatory variables. Other classifiers and regressors may be applied to the hazmat 
release problem and the results can compare to this study. Classification methods of this 
study can be implemented to the other components of hazmat risk, such as incident/crash 
frequency and release consequences in the future studies.  
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10.5 Modeling of Frequency and Aggregate Measures of Severity of U.S. Rail-Based 
Crude Oil Release Incidents 
Trains transport a large portion of produced crude oil to the refineries in the U.S. 
This potentially exposes people living near railways and the proximate environment to 
the ill effects of incidents resulting in crude oil release. The objective of this focus was to 
identify and quantify the effects of volumes and distances of rail-based crude oil transport 
and other macroscopic-level variables on the frequency and severity of crude oil release 
incidents. An optimization problem was formulated to approximate state-to-state volume 
of crude oil movement based on higher-level production-consumption data. Four mixed-
effects origin-destination based statistical models were estimated for rail-based crude oil 
release incidents: one model for frequency and three models for measures of aggregate 
severity (number of released tank cars, quantity released, and total costs). State-to-state 
volume of crude oil movement, transport distance, availability of other modes of 
transportation and number of class I railroad companies served as explanatory variables.  
Results provided useful insights for policy-makers and shipping companies. Some 
of the findings include: increase in volume of crude oil shipped from one state to another, 
up to a point, led to greater frequency and severity of incidents between the two states; 
for each 100-mile increase in the distance of crude oil shipment, the frequency of 
incidents increased by 14.01%; there was lack of evidence for existence of any impacts 
from availability of other modes of transportation on the response variables, while the 
number of class I railroad companies significantly affected frequency and number of 
released tank cars.    
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Future studies may focus on modeling frequency of crude oil-carrying train 
incidents, regardless of releasing the crude oil, and modeling the probability of release of 
crude oil, given an incident, separately. This approach can provide the effects of 
microscopic factors, such as characteristics of crude oil, train, railroad, etc., on 
occurrence of crude oil release incidents. Such a study requires a dataset of crude oil-
carrying train incidents. The use of other statistical methods for modeling or machine 
learning methods for better prediction performance may also be investigated. 
10.6 Joint and Separate Modeling of Types and Consequences of Rail-Based Crude Oil 
Release Incidents 
The main objectives of this focus were identification of the factors that affect the 
types and consequences of crude oil release from trains, quantification of these effects, 
and investigation of the impacts of types and consequences of crude oil release on the 
resulting costs and damages. The factors considered as potentially affecting types and 
consequences of release included characteristics of crude oil, tank cars, and release 
incidents. Two separate multinomial response models for types of crude oil release (gas 
dispersion, spillage and both) and consequences of crude oil release (fire, explosion and 
none), and one joint multinomial response model were estimated using 2007-2016 
PHMSA crude oil release data. Estimated robust linear regression models captured the 
effects of the types and consequences of release on post-release costs.  
Results showed that non-accident releases were associated with higher probability 
of gas dispersion, lower probability of fire and explosion, and lower costs. Tank car head 
puncture resistance system and tank car insulation did not directly affect the probability 
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of fire or explosion, but they increased the probability of gas dispersion. For each 
thousand-ton increase in quantity of spillage, the probability of fire and explosion 
increased significantly. While sufficient evidence was not found in the data indicating a 
relationship between types of crude oil release and post-release costs, fires and 
explosions prominently increased these costs. 
For future studies, researchers may consider using more comprehensive rail-based 
crude-oil release incident data, in terms of availability of characteristics of design of tank 
cars, details of release, and environmental characteristics. Other modeling techniques and 
data analysis approaches may be applied to crude oil release data, which might uncover 
other useful findings. Similar modeling approaches can be utilized for investigating types 
and consequences of other hazmat releases from different modes of transportation, such 
as trucks and pipelines. 
10.7 Summary of Objectives and Achievements 
This study had two main objectives. The first one was identification and 
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of 
hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for 
improving safety. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 were fully or partially devoted to this 
objective. Contributing factors to the conditional release of hazmat from trains and trucks 
were identified and the magnitude of their effects on hazmat release was estimated in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 8 had a macroscopic perspective, with the objective of 
identifying the factors that affect frequency and severity of crude oil release from trains, 
while chapter 9 took into account the contributing factors to the consequences of crude 
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oil release from trains. Each of the above studies were able to provide effective policies 
and countermeasures for safety improvement.  
The second objective of this study was quantifying components of risk of hazmat 
transportation for costs prediction, planning purposes, or short-term decision-making. 
While chapter 7 was completely devoted to this objective, the estimated models in the 
other chapters were useful for this objective as well. The model-based and non-model-
based methods that were utilized in this study were able to estimate some components of 
hazmat transportation risk, including conditional probability of hazmat release in rail 
incidents, CTT crashes, and HRGC crashes, frequency and aggregate severity of rail-
based crude oil release incidents, and probability of types and consequences of crude oil 
release from trains.  
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